An essay on divine command ethics by Evans, Jeremy Alan
  
AN ESSAY ON DIVINE COMMAND ETHICS 
 
 
A Dissertation 
by 
JEREMY ALAN EVANS 
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
August 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Major Subject: Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AN ESSAY ON DIVINE COMMAND ETHICS 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
 
by 
 
JEREMY ALAN EVANS 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
Approved by: 
 
 Chair of Committee,  Hugh J. McCann 
 Committee Members,  Scott Austin 
     James Aune 
     C.E. Harris 
 Head of Department,  Robin Smith 
 
 
 
August 2007 
 
 
Major Subject: Philosophy 
 iii 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
An Essay on Divine Command Ethics. 
 
(August 2007) 
 
Jeremy Alan Evans, 
 
B.A., Texas A&M University; 
 
M.Div., Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Hugh J. McCann 
 
 
 Twentieth-century analytic philosophy ushered in a renewed interest in an ethical 
theory known as the Divine Command Theory of ethics (DC).  Consequent to the work of 
G.E. Moore, philosophers have been involved in metaethics, or how we may ground 
ethical terms such as “good” and “right”.   The traditional DC response is to argue that 
God is the source of good, and best serves that role in that He is an “ideal observer” of all 
states of affairs.  The question is how is God’s will relevant to determining the moral 
status of actions?  At this point one may distinguish between what God wills and what 
God in fact commands.  However, the contemporary debate is to determine whether it is 
God’s commands or God’s will that is primary in determining moral obligation. The most 
vivid portrait of this distinc tion is found in the binding of Isaac.  There we note that God 
commands Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, but it is not at all clear that God wills the actual 
death of Isaac.  Thus, in this work I will present and defend a coherent DC view of ethics, 
whereby our moral obligations are derived from the commands of God. In chapter II I 
will provide a brief history of philosophers who have endorsed DC.  In chapter III I will 
 iv 
argue that the best ground for objective moral values is best defined by DC. Chapter IV 
will be devoted to my particular argument for DC.  I will take up the task of defending 
the traditional command view of DC.  Chapters V and VI will be devoted to developing 
plausible responses to major objections to DC.  In chapter V I will attempt a resolution of 
the famous Euthyphro dilemma, and in chapter VI I will argue that endorsing a DC view 
of ethics in no way negates the autonomy of the moral agent.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Alvin Plantinga notes in his address Advice to Christian Philosophers that 
Christian academicians should frame their respective intellectual queries, and seek 
answers to them, from the Christian point of view.  In metaphysics the burden is to 
articulate theories that ground God’s sovereign authority.  In epistemology it is to offer 
plausible rejoinders to the evidentialist burden, or the skeptic’s case for the prima facie 
incompatibility between noetically deficient mediums whereby we gain knowledge and 
our ability to have certainty about anything epistemic.  Regarding ethics, consider 
Plantinga’s advice: 
In ethics, for example: perhaps the chief theoretical concern, from the theistic 
perspective, is the question of how right and wrong, good and bad, duty, 
permission, and obligation are related to God and to His will and to His creative 
activity.  This question doesn’t arise, naturally enough, from a non-theistic 
perspective; and so, naturally enough, non-theistic ethics do not address it.  But it 
is perhaps the most important question for theists to tackle.1 
 
As a contribution to this enterprise, it is my intention in this work to give an adequate 
account of God’s authority and role in the moral sphere.  To be precise, I will defend 
what is known as the Divine Command theory of ethics (henceforth DC).  Traditionally 
there are two paradigms from which the DC proponent may work.  The first emphasizes 
God’s commands as the foundation of normative deontology.  Under the command 
paradigm, certain ethical states of affairs obtain in the world.  These states of affairs 
record the moral value of any human action.  We may characterize these states of affairs 
consisting in its being (1) morally required by God, (2) morally permissible, or (3) 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style and format outlined in the Chicago Manual of Style, 14th edition. 
1 Alvin Plantinga, “Advice to Christian Philosophers,” Faith and Philosophy 1 (1984), 253.     
 2 
morally neutral.  According to DC ethics, these states of affairs are related to God’s 
commands as follows: 
(DC1) The state of affairs of person P being morally obligated to do action A 
depends on God commanding that P do A. 
 
(DC2) The state of affairs of P’s being morally permitted to A depends on God 
not commanding that P not do A.    
 
(DC3) The state of affairs of A being morally neutral depends on God’s 
commanding neither that P do A nor that P not do A. 
  
 The second paradigm of DC ethics emphasizes the nature and content of God’s 
will (rather than command) as preeminent in giving rise to moral obligation.  Proponents 
of the divine will formulation may characterize the relevant human action in the same 
way as the command proponent, but, given the centrality of the will rather than the 
command, the propositions concerning moral obligation are altered to: 
(DW1) The state of affairs of P’s being morally obligated to do A depends on the 
state of affairs of God’s willing that P be morally obligated to A. 
 
(DW2) The state of affairs of P’s being morally permitted to A depends on the 
state of affairs of God’s willing that P be permitted to do A. 
 
(DW3) The state of affairs of A being morally neutral for P depends on the state 
of affairs of God’s willing that P be allowed to do/refrain from doing A. 
 
What all members of DC theory have in common, according to Mark Murphy, is that 
they hold “what God wills is relevant to determining the moral status of some set of 
entities (acts, states of affairs, character traits, or some combination of these).”2  In what 
follows I will be defending the command formulation of DC as the preferable view; the 
justification for this, and the relation between God’s relevant will and commands will be 
enunciated as the argument advances.   
                                                 
2 Mark Murphy, “Theological Voluntarism.” In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  See 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/voluntarism-theological/ . 
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 In order to advance my thesis it is pertinent for me to stipulate the assumptions 
under which I will be working for the duration of the project.  Indeed, if I were to 
examine every secondary and tertiary idea underlying the nature of my project, I would 
never develop the specific content of the thesis.  As Douglas Blount notes, “Instead, one 
can do little more than acknowledge such assumptions as playing a crucial role in one’s 
work, and invite others to consider their worth for themselves.”3  Thus, in this section I 
will acknowledge several assumptions upon which the discussions in the consequent 
chapters follow.  For a number of assumptions I will provide a prima facie defense for 
their plausibility. 
 In the following discussion it will be assumed that God exists.  When I make 
reference to “God” I am in agreement with Nelson Pike, who writes:   
The term ‘God’ is a descriptive expression having an identifiable meaning.  It is 
not a proper name.  As part of this first assumption, I shall suppose further that 
‘God’ is a very special type of descriptive expression--what I shall call a title.  A 
title is a term used to mark a certain position or value status as does e.g. ‘Caesar’ 
in the sentence ‘Hadrian is Caesar.’  To affirm of some individual that He is God 
is to affirm that the individual has some special position (e.g. that He is ruler of 
the universe) or that the individual has some special value status (e.g. that He is a 
being than which none greater can be conceived)…It is a logically necessary 
condition of bearing the title ‘God’ that an individual be perfectly good, 
omnipotent, omniscient, and so on for all the standard attributes traditionally 
assigned to the Christian God.  If we could assume that in order to be Emperor (as 
opposed to Empress) of Rome one had to be male (rather than female), then if ‘x 
is Caesar’ means ‘x is Emperor of Rome’, then ‘If x is Caesar, then x is a male’ 
would have the same logical status as I am assuming for ‘If x is God, then x is 
perfectly good.’  ‘If x is God, then x is omniscient,’ etc.4   
 
To be more precise, I will be assuming a fairly orthodox Christian view of theology 
according to which God is loving, omnipotent, omniscient, and so forth, and is creator of 
the universe.  Certain of the attributes involved in these working assumptions will be 
                                                 
3 Douglas Keith Blount, “An Essay on Divine Presence,” (unpublished), 3. 
4 Nelson Pike, “Omnipotence and God’s Ability to Sin,” In American Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1969): 
209. 
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brought into question at a later time, such as God’s goodness and what it means for God 
to be loving.  I will address these issues when I respond to major objections to DC.   
 Except in chapter III, I will also be assuming that objective moral values exist.  
By objective I mean that there is a moral order that exists independent of human 
convention.  In making this assumption I will take it that the meaning of “good” is 
grounded in God’s nature rather than, for example, non-evaluative natural properties.  
Robert Adams has recently defended this position, utilizing a realist conception of ethics 
whereby comparative predication entails relational properties that involve resemblance to 
something that is maximally excellent.5  By resemblance Adams means that “moral 
excellence” is an aspect of axiological excellence, where axiological excellence is to be 
understood as, “resembling God in a way that could serve God as a reason for loving the 
thing.”6  The particular strength of Adams’s position is that the good becomes inherently 
personal, but more pointedly the personal agency typified by God entails that moral 
goodness is grounded in something that is the paradigm of goodness.  Adams explains: 
Theists have sometimes tried to infer the personality of the supreme Good from 
the premise that persons, as such, are the most excellent things we know, from 
which it is claimed to follow that the supremely excellent being must be of that 
sort.  A more cautious line of argument begins with the premise, harder to deny, 
that most of the excellences that are most important to us, and of whose value we 
are most confident, are excellences of persons or qualities or actions or works or 
lives or stories of persons.  So if excellence consists in resembling or imaging a 
being that is the Good itself, nothing is more important to the role of the Good 
itself than that persons and their properties should be able to resemble or image it.  
That is obviously likelier to be possible if the Good itself is a person or 
importantly like a person. 7 
 
                                                 
5 Robert Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).  The content spans 
roughly from pages 13-130. 
6 Adams, 36. 
7 Adams, 42. 
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If we are willing to accept that goodness is a relational property where the relata are 
agents and a paradigm of moral goodness, then a sufficient prima facie case has been 
made that goodness is personal, unlike Platonic archetypes, and more like the traditional 
God of theism.  
 The structure of the essay will be as follows.  Given that no thought occurs in a 
historical vacuum chapter II will articulate a brief history of DC ethics.  In order to 
provide continuity of thought among philosophers, we will present the history in a topical 
approach rather than a chronological one.  For example, some philosophers justify a DC 
version of ethics from a “God as first cause” argument, whereas others approach it from a 
“laws entail a law-giver” approach.  It is with the history of these and other themes that 
we are mainly concerned, because these themes will recur throughout the work.   
 In chapter III we will engage the topic of whether and to what extent morality is 
dependent on God.  We will begin this chapter by considering what conditions must be 
met in order for a value to be objective, and then we will consider the more promising 
non-theistic accounts of objectivity in light of these conditions.  We will argue that no 
substantial non-theistic claim to the objectivity of values without God succeeds.  We will 
then provide reasons for the argument that our metaethics project is more feasible if we 
ground it in supernatural or theistic terms.     
 In chapter IV we will present a positive argument for DC ethics.  As we noted 
earlier, the current debate in DC ethics concerns the priority of God’s will verses God’s 
commands.  I accept the traditional command approach as correct, so that the utterances 
of God generate obligations upon those He has commanded.  However, this commitment 
does not come at the expense of articulating a role for God’s will in relation to the 
 6 
commands He does in fact utter.  In order to provide substance to the content of God’s 
relevant will, we will distinguish between His antecedent and consequent will.  We will 
argue that given God’s role as both Creator and Sustainer, all existing things are a matter 
of God’s consequent will in that He sustains them in existence.  However, we will be 
arguing that moral obligation is a matter of God’s antecedent will.  The argument will 
take on a more robust form at that time. 
 In chapter V we will be responding to the major objection to any DC theory of 
ethics. We will address the Euthyphro dilemma, derived from the Platonic dialogue of the 
same name.  Within this dialogue we find a dichotomy of possibilities that are seemingly 
unattractive for DC ethics.  Given Plato’s account, it seems that if God’s commands alone 
ground moral values, then it seems that morality is arbitrarily contingent on the will of 
one being, so that anything might have been good or evil.  Alternatively, God might 
command only actions that are good on independent grounds.  But if we choose this, the 
second horn of the dilemma, then there is a source of good that exists independently of 
God, which contradicts the fundamental claims of the DC theory.  We will be defending 
DC against this charge by articulating a doctrine of divine simplicity.  The thrust of this 
view is that God’s nature is essentially perfect, and the perfect-making properties are not 
merely exemplified by God; rather, God’s being is omniscience, omnipotence, and the 
like—that God is not distinct from His actions. Such a view diminishes the concerns of 
Euthyphro in that God’s commands flow from His nature, and are not capricious. It is not 
that we reject the concerns of Euthyphro, it is that we reject the latent theology and 
logical structure of the dilemma underlying the objection.  Divine Simplicity will resolve 
this concern.    
 7 
 In chapter VI we will be addressing other concerns that arise from my discussion 
of divine simplicity.  It may be argued that if God’s nature is so construed, then God’s 
impeccability, omnipotence, and freedom are compromised.  One may rightly question 
whether or not this is a God worthy of worship.  We will address the ramifications of 
these attributes, and propose several reasons why the God of traditional Christian theism 
is indeed to be worshipped; Soli Deo Gloria.     
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CHAPTER II 
A PARTIAL HISTORY OF DIVINE COMMAND ETHICS 
 
 
 Contemporary metaethics has seen resurgence among philosophers and religious 
thinkers of the ethical position commonly referred to as divine command ethics.  
Fundamentally a divine command theorist holds that moral obligations owe their 
existence to the positive commands or prohibitions of God.  Accordingly, William 
Frankena notes, “an action or kind of action is right or wrong, if and only if, and because 
it is commanded or forbidden by God.”8  Generally speaking Frankena’s statement of the 
divine command view is correct, with the exception that some philosophers do not 
stipulate a causal relationship governing moral obligation.  My purpose in this chapter is 
to examine the views of historical figures endorsing divine command ethics, as well as 
articulate their respective modes of justification for such a view.  My approach will be 
topical in nature rather than chronological, so as to provide continuity of thought 
addressed to particular themes.  This chapter is a non-exhaustive survey of the extant 
literature, and considerable attention is given to more recent developments.   
The God as First Cause Argument 
 There are two forms of the cosmological argument for God’s existence.  The first 
argues for an original cause efficacious in power to bring about the universe.  The second 
form argues for a sustaining cause that is the source of the universe’s continuing to be.  
All versions of the cosmological argument begin with the assumption that the universe 
exists and that something outside the universe is required to explain its existence.  The 
strength of cosmological arguments is derived from the fact that they are mostly based on 
                                                 
8 William Frankena, Ethics, 2nd Edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973), 28. 
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uncontroversial premises.  Such premises include that there exist things that are caused 
and these things are not causa sui.  The conjunction of these two premises with the 
conceptual entailment of the title God (by definition the uncaused first cause) provides a 
general scheme of how theistic philosophers arrive at a divine command theory of ethics.           
 Such arguments derive from Aristotle’s metaphysics, where a distinction is made 
between actuality and potentiality.  The movement from potentiality to actuality requires 
efficient causality; something that is pure potentiality cannot perform on itself (or, 
something cannot confer existence on itself).  Granted, Aristotle believed in a plurality of 
uncaused, self-existent actualities.  However, his reasoning is the foundation for future 
philosophers, especially theistic philosophers such as Aquinas, concerning the primacy of 
God in the contingent created order, including the moral order (or at least it may be taken 
this way).  This suggests a dependency of what is morally just on the divine will.  
Traditionally construed, God is the efficient cause of all contingent things, including 
moral values.  Accordingly, Hugh of Saint Victor writes: 
 The first cause of all things is the will of the Creator which no antecedent cause 
 moved because it is eternal, nor any subsequent cause confirms because it is of 
 itself just.  For what He did not will justly, because what He willed was to be just, 
 but what He willed was just, because He himself willed it.  For it is peculiar to 
 Himself and to His will that that which is His is just; from Him comes the justice 
 that is in His will by the very fact that justice comes from His will.  When, 
 therefore, it is asked how that is just which is just, the most fitting answer will be: 
 because it is in accord with the will of God, which is just.9 
 
The principles we may derive from this text include these two:  first, moral values are 
ontologically dependent on the will of God, for the divine will is considered to be 
paradigmatically just,10 and second, the divine will has no cause prior to it.  To be more 
                                                 
9 Hugh of Saint Victor, as quoted in Janine Marie Idziak, “In Search of ‘Good Positive Reasons’ for an 
Ethics of Divine Commands: A Catalogue of Arguments,” in Faith and Philosophy 6 (1989): 48.   
10 Ibid., 49. 
 10 
explicit, such arguments deny any metaphysical possibilities independent of God’s 
creative act; these non-possibilities include Platonic Forms, or the proposal that such 
principles are brute facts.  To deny these possibilities is to assert contingency simpliciter 
of all aspects of the created order; the divine will is absolute in terms of its efficacy. 
 Thomas Aquinas builds on the Aristotelian tradition in the same manner as Hugh 
of Saint Victor, proposing that justice and righteousness as found in the created order 
depend simply on the divine will.  His most prominent argument invokes the conception 
of God as first cause.  Janine Marie Idziak explains that for Aquinas, justice depends on 
the imitation of some rule, and the rule of an effect is due to its cause.11  As such, since 
the first cause of all things is the divine will, it is also the first rule from which everything 
is judged.  An antecedent consideration, not mentioned at this point by Aquinas, is that 
the success of such an argument depends not only on God as first cause, but also on God 
as uncaused in His nature and will.  Of course, one may note this as a positive argument 
for an ethic of divine commands; but secondarily, this reasoning is implicit in his “Fourth 
Way” to argue for the existence of God.  He writes: 
 Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble, and the 
 like.  But “more” and “less” are predicated of different things, according as they 
 resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is 
 said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest.12 
 
I make reference to this passage for two reasons.  Recently Robert Adams has argued that 
in order to avoid an infinite regress of explanations regarding axiological concepts, one 
must first offer an account of the source by which all excellent things are being 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 50. 
12 Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province (London: Burns, Oates, and Washbourne): 26.  Hereafter I will cite this work as 
Aquinas followed by a volume and page number from this translation.   
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measured.13  Such an account may be inferred from Aquinas’s point that “resemblance” 
entails a thing by which the likeness is being measured.  Given that perfect being 
theology regards God as omnibenevolent, God may serve such an explanatory role in the 
realm of value.  Also, and not to be anachronistic, the 20th century turn in the analytic 
tradition consequent to G.E. Moore’s Principia Ethica seeks an answer to just such a 
question.  In what do we ground the term “good” and how does the “good” relate to 
moral obligation?   One may argue that such concerns were not on the radar of Aquinas, 
but that need not worry us here.  The concept “good” may have other axiological 
definitions, but its extension certainly includes the domain of our discussion, namely 
moral values.    
Second, if we begin with Aquinas’s understanding of God as first cause, then the 
notion of comparative predication has strong prima facie force as a basis for an inductive 
a priori argument for the existence of God, but more relevantly it provides a plausible 
account of objective moral values grounded in personal agency.  The causal import of the 
cosmological argument allows for morality to be “part of the furniture of the universe.”   
 The cosmological argument for an ethics of divine commands is also found in 
Reformation and Protestant theology.  Janine Marie Idziak argues that Martin Luther and 
John Calvin are both considered to be divine command ethicists.  Part and parcel of their 
reasoning stems from the Reformation’s three dogmas: Sola Scriptura, Sola Fide, and 
Sola Gratia, a theme to which I will return in a section on theological motivations for 
divine command theory.  More related to our present inquiry, both make an appeal to the 
uncaused nature of God’s will with the expressed intention to guard God’s sovereignty.  
Implicit in Idziak’s presentation of the Reformers (or as I take her text to say) is the 
                                                 
13 Robert Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 46. 
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conjunction of two propositions: (1) sovereignty requires that no external factors 
influence God’s creative act, and (2) from (1) it follows that every feature of the created 
order follows solely from God’s will.   
Note how these theses resonate in the Bondage of the Will by Martin Luther: 
 The same reply should be given to those who ask: Why did God let Adam fall, 
 and why did He create us all tainted with sin, when He might have kept Adam 
 safe, and might have created us of other material, or of seed that had first been 
 cleansed?  God is He for whose will no cause or ground may be laid down as a 
 rule for its standard; for nothing is on a level with it or above it, but it is itself a 
 rule for all things.  If any rule or standard, or cause or ground, existed for it, it 
 could no longer be the will of God.  What God wills is not right because He 
 ought, or was bound to will; on the contrary, what takes place must be right, 
 because He so wills it.  Causes and grounds are laid down for the will of the 
 creature, but not for the will of the Creator.14 
 
With similar justification Calvin writes, “The will of God is the supreme rule of 
righteousness, so that everything which He wills must be held to be righteous by the mere 
fact of His willing it.”15  Just as God established the natural laws by divine fiat, likewise 
moral principles derive only from His will and creative act.  Theistic voluntarism, 
specifically a divine command theory, follows from such a view.  More will be said 
concerning the specific function of law for Luther and Calvin later, but suffice it to say 
that their construction of divine command ethics does not require any epistemic 
commitment concerning belief in God on the part of the agent; the law is universal and 
manifest to all.     
 The Puritan theologian John Preston speaks of God’s causal efficacy with regard 
to the moral order.  For Preston God is, “The first without all causes, having his being 
                                                 
14 Idziak,  50. 
15 Ibid., 51.  See also John Calvin The Institutes of the Christian Religion trans. Henry Beveridge (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmann’s, 1997)  III.32.2.   
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and beginning from himself.”16  To deny God’s causal efficacy in creation means that 
God is a necessary cause at best, contingent on the natural order to construct a 
functioning telos.  We find the background for such reasoning in Plato’s Euthyphro, 
where the question arises whether the gods love what is good because it is good, or is it 
good because the gods love it?  Preston is committed to the second horn of this dilemma 
in that if God were to choose something because He perceived it to be good, then God 
would be causally affected by something external to Himself.  If one holds the view that 
sans creation God exists timelessly alone, as Preston does, then such external factors are 
not logically possible; God is absolute in creation.   
A Conceptual Account from the Divine Attributes 
 A second line of reasoning in support for an ethics of divine commands is an a 
priori conceptual analysis of the attributes of God.  Traditionally God is construed as  
being omnibenevolent, omniscient, omnipotent, along with other traits being part of the 
position generally referred to as perfect being theology.  The purported purpose of such 
an approach is to show that endorsing a divine command theory is compatible with an 
established attribute or collection of attributes of God, and that in denying a divine 
command approach the compatibility is compromised.   
 Janine Idziak notes that Ralph Cudworth invokes such a method in postulating 
that divine command theory guards God’s omnipotence.  In his work A Treatise 
Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality he writes:  
 This doctrine hath been chiefly promoted and advanced by such as think 
 nothing else so essential to the Deity, as uncontrollable power and arbitrary will, 
 and therefore that God could not be God if there should be anything evil in its 
 own nature which he could not do.17 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 50. 
17 Ibid., 51. Of course, Cudworth is a noted opponent of divine command ethics. 
 14 
 
Earlier I noted that omnipotence is a central attribute of God for perfect being theology.  
However, if we consider Richard Swinburne’s notion that omnipotence entails God’s 
ability to make anything right which He wants, then there is no intelligible way to 
articulate an action that God is morally forbidden to do.18  Consider a state of affairs in 
which certain actions are wrong independent of the will of God.   The supposed 
entailment of postulating the independence of moral values from divine voluntarism is 
twofold.  First, such a view calls for a deontology such that God does not exercise any 
prerogative in determining moral va lues.  Second, from the postulate that moral values 
exist, let us say “in themselves,” we may infer that God is bound by His own nature to do 
what is morally right.  God does not have the power not to do what is right according to 
this standard, which entails that God does not have free will either.  Such a notion has 
been dismissed especially in the medieval literature as blasphemous.  Gabriel Biel, a 
disciple of William of Ockham, specifically endorses divine command ethics as a 
safeguard to God’s omnipotence.  Biel writes: 
 God can do something which is not just for God to do; yet if he were to do it, it 
 would be just that this be done.  Wherefore the divine will alone is the first rule of 
 all justice, and because he wills something to be done, it is just that it be done, and 
 because he wills something not to be done, it is not just that it be done.19     
 
Of course, from a modern vantage point it seems Biel is not so much concerned with 
responding to Euthyphro-type arbitrariness objections.  From the no tion that “the divine 
will alone is the first rule of all justice,” it follows for Biel that God is not bound to any 
law.  But, if one postulates an arbitrariness objection one misses the point entirely.  If by 
arbitrary one means “up to God and only God,” then Biel concurs.  However, if one 
                                                 
18 Richard Swinburne, “Duty and the Will of God,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1974): 213-214. 
19 Idziak, 53. 
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means by arbitrary that God selected a command of a specific type out of a number of 
command options, then Biel disagrees.  The commands follow from the will of God, 
which “can be neither different nor new nor changeable.”20  There are no other options to 
be found such that arbitrariness obtains, whether or not we like the content of the 
command.  Also, Biel’s formulation is commensurate with the doctrine of God’s 
impeccability; it follows that since God cannot act agains t His own will, God is logically 
incapable of sinning.  God remains good, and no explicit conceptual contradiction 
follows from His omniscience.          
 Persons rejecting a divine command approach consider the inalterability of moral 
values just as much a strength of their position as those who favor an ethics of divine 
commands.  To endorse divine commands means, as Richard Price mentions, “that we 
must give up the unalterable natures of right and wrong, and make them dependent on the 
divine will.”21  This statement is, of course, intended to be an indictment against the 
position.  Andrew of Neufchateau considered this in his earlier writings, and responds: 
 Just as the first and highest truth is related to other truths, so is the first goodness 
 related to other good things.  For no less does something being true from the first 
 truth have its status of being true from it than does another being good from the 
 first good take its status of being good from that.  But that notwithstanding, 
 something is true according to itself by its nature in such a way that it cannot fail 
 to be true…Therefore, that the created will be subject and conformed to the divine 
 will and that it will conformably to the divine decree and as God wills it to will is 
 a good for a rational creature other than God and cannot be present in him and fail 
 to be good or just.22  
 
Janine Marie Idziak argues that it follows for Andrew that moral claims are necessary 
truths, and since the constituents of nature are contingent, they cannot ground necessary 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 53. 
21 Ibid., 54. Price is a noted disputant of divine command theory. 
22 Janine Marie Idziak, Questions on an Ethics of Divine Commands (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1997), 57. 
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moral truths.23  The relationship is one between certain metaphysical and epistemic 
commitments; there is a logical priority of the metaphysical on the epistemic.  A Platonic 
construct may well suffice at this point for a number of theists.  However, the residual 
constraints on God’s freedom seem eminently problematic.  Hence Andrew of 
Neufchateau endorses a divine command theory in an effort to thwart the apparent threats 
to such central theistic doctrines.   
 Others, such as Gottfried Leibniz, provide a modified view and reject Andrew of 
Neufchateau’s position.  Leibniz writes: 
 Neither the norms of [the] conduct itself nor the essence of justice depends on 
 God’s free choice, but rather on eternal truths, or objects of the divine intellect.  
 Justice follows certain rules of equality and proportion which are no less 
 grounded in the immutable nature of things and in the divine ideas than are the 
 principles of arithmetic and geometry. 24     
 
Earlier I noted that such views require a modified divine command theory.  A few points 
of clarification are required.  First, in order to endorse a Leibnizian model one must hold 
that God is metaphysically free but morally constrained to produce the best possible 
world, hence I refer to this view as a weaker postulate of divine command ethics.  God is 
morally constrained by His nature to create the best possible world; such a view does 
nothing to prohibit God’s apprehension of the way the world could have been, but serves 
as a delimiting factor as to which world God chose to create.   
   To say that God is morally constrained seems unproblematic, for “what has one 
given up” in saying that God always does or creates what is best?  But such a notion 
provides the motivation for the second issue, namely what Leibniz calls “objects of the 
divine intellect.”  If divine ideas are archetypes of creation and have no being apart from 
                                                 
23 Ibid., 57-58. 
24 Quoted in Michael Murray, 5 (unpublished).  
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God, then the doctrine of divine ideas is merely God’s apprehension of His own creative 
will.  The plurality of ideas perhaps consists in a countably infinite series of 
counterfactuals the content of which are the various ways agents may imperfectly 
participate in creation.  I find this commensurate with Leibniz.  Accordingly, one may 
claim that antecedent to creation there were no counterfactuals, there was only God’s 
willing.  More importantly, “the suggested contention that a divine command theory must 
be adopted in the realm of ethics because there cannot be anything independent of God 
may be seen as an attempt to capture the religious ins ight of the absolute centrality which 
God is [ontologically] to enjoy.”25      
 Peter of Ailly provides similar reasoning as a consequence of his cosmological 
argument.  Previously I noted that cosmological proofs involve arguments from the 
absurdity of causa sui postulates; something must be the efficient cause of things, and no 
created thing can serve that function.  For Ailly the case for divine commands is similar, 
for there necessarily must be one first obligatory law, and no created law “enjoys this 
status for the reason that no created law has from itself the power of binding.”26  Of the 
first proposition, namely that one law is absolutely first, Ailly writes (and I quote in its 
entirety):  
 Proof: Just as there is not an infinite regress in efficient causes, as the Philosopher 
 proves in Metaphysics II.3; so there is not an infinite regress in obligatory laws.  
 Therefore, just as it is necessary to reach one first efficient cause, so it is 
 necessary to arrive at one first obligatory law, because the principle is entirely the 
 same in both cases.   
 Therefore, just as no created thing has of itself the power of creating, so no 
 created law has of itself the power of binding.27 
 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 54. 
26 Ibid., 57. 
27 Ibid., 58. 
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It is noteworthy that Ailly has as the “first obligatory law” the divine will, just as it is the 
first efficient cause.  The essence of arguments like those of Leibniz and Ailly is more to 
guard God’s omnipotence and freedom than God’s goodness.  One may hold that 
necessary moral truths exist independent of God, and that God only does what is good by 
His nature.  But such premises compromise God’s freedom and God’s omnipotence.  To 
postulate anything as necessarily existing that is not God is anathema to such defenders, 
and a divine command theory guards against this supposed anti-theological insurgence.  
In the contemporary literature such concerns have found possible answers, but I will 
delay that discussion until I take up the views of Philip Quinn.                  
Theological Motivations for Divine Commands   
 There is no dearth of literature conjoining the theological themes of justification, 
sanctification, and glorification to some version of divine command morality.  In this 
section I want to look at the ideology grounding such a connection in the writings of 
Martin Luther and John Calvin, for their writings differ greatly from their Catholic 
predecessors in that these themes are more concretely addressed in their work.  I will 
begin with a look at Luther’s two kingdoms, and segue into Calvin’s theological ethics.  
 It is important to note that Martin Luther makes a distinction between the 
doctrines of Law and Grace.  Law is a broad construction, including the power of the 
state over individuals, the Decalogue, and the natural law.  The natural law is universally 
binding, for all persons (whether theistic, atheistic, or agnostic) have epistemic access to 
its content.  Reason may give us knowledge of the natural law, for the intellect is the 
offspring of the divine intellect.  Saint Thomas Aquinas develops a similar theme in 
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Summa Theologica.28  A major difference between Luther and Aquinas regards the noetic 
effects of sin on fallen humanity.  Sin affects the will so as to confuse what the mind may 
know with clarity, including the significance of Divine laws such as the Decalogue and 
Christ’s commission in the Beatitudes (Matthew 5).  This aspect of Luther’s thought 
necessitated distinguishing the function of law from the function of grace.  In light of this 
theological distinction, Luther argues that persons may grasp the truth in the Gospel as 
God mediates through grace.  Grace functions as an epistemic bridge for one to 
understand the Law, and the understanding of the law awakens the individual to their 
own sin and culpability.29  Hence, he utilizes a moral doctrine to introduce the doctrine of 
justification, or more pointedly, ontologically reconciling the relationship between fallen 
humanity and God.  In order to understand this, we must first understand Luther’s two 
uses of law. 
 The first use of law, as found in the Decalogue, is to bridle the wicked.30  Luther’s 
view of humanity after the fall is compatible with psychological egoism, the view that 
humankind is selfish by nature.  Psychological egoism is a descriptive theory, and such 
descriptive states of affairs are not likely to mesh with what is normative.  Man is, 
“wholly turned to self and to his own,” seeking that which is guided by desire.31  Laws, 
however, provide a rubric to which persons may conform in establishing communities.  
Thus, the first use of law for Luther is conventional; society demands something to 
restrain man’s deficient nature.  And whatever fulfills this function must be absolute.     
                                                 
28 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 8, 10-11.  . 
29 A relevant text utilized to underscore these doctrines is Ephesians 2:1-10.   
30 I am using J.B. Schneewind’s The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 26. 
31 See Schneewind, 27. 
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 A second use law for Luther is specifically soteriological.  From the precepts of 
the first use of law we may arrive at the conclusion that mankind is in a state requiring 
reconciliation.  The law “reveals unto man his sin, his blindness, his misery, his impiety, 
ignorance, hatred and contempt of God, death, hell, the judgment and deserved wrath of 
God.”32  However, such edicts as the Decalogue 
 show us what we ought to do but do not give us the power to do it.  They are 
 intended to teach man to know himself, that through them he may recognize his 
 inability to do good and may despair of his own inability.33 
 
Luther is not saying that persons cannot behave as the laws require.  Luther grants that 
the natural power residing in humanity is not entirely corrupted by the fall.  He notes, “I 
make a distinction between the spiritual and the natural. The spiritual [endowments] are 
certainly corrupt, so that no man loves God or keeps His law; but the natural 
[endowments] are sound.”34  Mankind has the ability even after the fall to self-govern and 
follow the edicts of reason; reason conjoins with the natural law “written on the heart” to 
provide a socially cohesive structure.35  
 A significant note is that for Luther we may control the content of our actions; we 
may choose to murder or not to murder in a given time and context.  What is beyond our 
natural control is the underlying motivation for our actions.  From this Luther drives his 
doctrine of Grace.  In his “Sermon on the Three Kinds of Good Life,” Luther explains 
that God does not “just want [good] works by themselves…He wants them to be 
performed gladly and willingly; where right motive and joy are absent, these actions are 
                                                 
32 As found in Luther’s Commentaries on Galatians.  Here quoted by Schneewind, 26.  
33 Ibid., 27. 
34 Ibid., 27. 
35 For reference, see Schneewind, 28.    
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dead in God’s eyes.”36  Earlier I noted that Luther spoke of the destitution of humankind 
as a consequence of the fall; no one seeks God, and the privation is such that our motives 
for action are self-centered in nature.  Our motive should be to honor God, which is 
impossible given that we are at enmity with God.  To overcome the chasm, God provides 
grace to empower the will to defeat the love of self and regenerate love unto God.  Our 
free will extends only to natural (secular) matters.   
 For Luther, and thematically throughout Reformation theology, issues of moral 
evaluation necessitate the dichotomy of Law and Grace.  The secular person abides in the 
realm of Law (I Timothy 1:9), and the regenerate person abides in the realm of Grace.  
Previously I noted Luther’s cosmological argument for divine commands, but it is his 
theological motivation that is preeminent for his adoption of voluntarism.  The Law is an 
absolute standard binding on the saved and unsaved alike, though the saved are in a sense 
“above” the Law.  Luther’s soteriology follows from the Pauline thesis that to break one 
aspect of the Law is to break the entirety of the Law (Galatians 3:10); for in this the 
relationship between faith and regeneration may be devised.  Persons are no freer to 
believe than they are free to have a proper motive for their actions.  God thus regenerates 
persons unto faith, and faith unto the realm of Grace.  Of course, a theological fatalism is 
the byproduct of such a view, but that is not of concern here; the relationship of Luther’s 
theological themes to a divine command theory is.   
 A prominent contemporary of Martin Luther and noted voluntarist is the 
Reformation’s John Calvin.  In many respects Calvin agrees with Luther, especially 
regarding the doctrines of sin, justification, and God’s efficacious activity in bringing 
about these states of affairs.  Calvin also agrees with Luther that humans are bound by the 
                                                 
36 Ibid., 27. 
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dictates of two kinds of rule, earthly and divine.  In his Institutes of the Christian Religion 
Calvin writes: 
 [there is] a twofold government in man, whereby the conscience is instructed in 
 piety and in reverencing God; the second is political, whereby man is educated for 
 the duties of humanity and citizenship that must be maintained among men…the 
 former sort of government pertains to the life of the soul, while the latter has to do 
 with the concerns of the present life-not only with food and clothing but with 
 laying down laws whereby a man may live his life among other men holily, 
 honorably, and temperately.  For the former resides in the inner mind, while the 
 latter only regulates outward behavior.37 
 
Calvin is more explicit than Luther on the noetic effects of sin, for he believes that 
persons are so bound in the will to sin, that even the moral law (natural law) is obscured.  
Hence, God provides us with a “written law to give us a clear witness of what was too 
obscured in the natural law.”38  This written law is evident in the Decalogue as well as the 
decrees of the Levitical holiness codes, among others.  More specifically, the Ten  Words 
reveal the dichotomy between duties toward God and civic duties.  The first table shows 
duties to God, the second table shows duties to man. 39  It is the second element that is of 
secular significance, for man is by definition a “social animal”40  and naturally seeks 
convention.  He writes: 
…we observe that there exist in all men’s minds universal impressions of a 
certain civic fair dealing and order.  Hence no man is to be found who does not 
understand that every sort of human organization must be regulated by laws, and 
who does not comprehend the principles of those laws.  Hence arises that 
unvarying consent of all nations and of individual mortals with regard to laws.41 
 
Recall for a moment that Luther proposes two functions of law, namely, to “bridle the 
wicked” and to reveal knowledge of sin unto man through grace.  Calvin adds a third 
                                                 
37 See John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion trans. Henry Beveridge, (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmann’s, 1997):   III.xix.15.  Hereafter Institutes.  
38 See the Institutes II.viii.1. 
39 See the Institutes II.ii.24.  
40 Institutes II.ii.13. 
41 This quote is borrowed from Schneewind, 33. 
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function of law as a byproduct of Luther’s first function, namely that when we know 
what the law requires we are accountable to its content.  This cognizance is “an 
apprehension of the conscience which distinguishes significantly between just and unjust, 
and which deprives men of the excuse of ignorance, while it proves them guilty by their 
own testimony.”42  Much like the themes of modern philosophers such as Descartes and 
Leibniz, Calvin distinguishes between what the intellect apprehends as just and what the 
will prompts the person to do.  The deviation between the will and intellect is not bridged 
for Calvin by any appeal to human freedom, for humans are not free consequent to the 
fall.  Nor is it the case that, given this restriction in human activity, persons can initiate 
any positive action to reconcile their ontological deficiencies.  Given that the will is 
corrupt, no one can choose rightly without grace; the question is not can we bring about 
the state of affairs that we will to bring about, it is whether or not the will is free in any 
meaningful sense.  This third use of law Calvin sees as the necessary intermediate 
function of law between Luther’s two functions, for in it resides human accountability.          
Second, one may also see how such a doctrine entails the theological fatalism 
traditionally ascribed to Calvin and hyper-Calvinists; for persons not predestined to 
salvation sin “necessarily and willingly.  Because they want to do what is sinful, they sin 
voluntarily, not because of compulsion.”43  Further, one may construct a meaningful 
concept of grace, for in it resides the unmerited favor of God such that when God 
regenerates the individual, faith simultaneously occurs.  The byproduct is a transformed 
person, and the election of the individual prompts an obedience motivated by a love of 
                                                 
42 See Schneewind, 34 or Calvin’s Institutes II.ii.22. 
43 See Schneewind, 34-35.  For further reference see Institutes II.ii.4 and II.iii.9. 
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God, not the mandates of the law. 44  As for those not elect, the natural law can guide the 
unregenerate to some extent, for it pervades the created order; it does not circumvent the 
necessity of grace.  Calvin writes: 
As for the virtues that deceive us with their vain show, they shall have their praise 
in the political assembly and in the common renown among men; but before the 
heavenly judgment they shall be of no value to acquire merit.45 
 
The moral actions that persons perform are moral only in a secular sense, and from this 
communities may prosper.  But this is only one aspect of reconciliation that Calvin seeks 
to overcome, and it is of less significance than the second-reconciling the relationship 
with God is primary.  As he notes, Sola Gratia is the necessary and sufficient means for 
this resolve, and the moral worth of secular actions is “of no value to acquire merit.” 
 It is interesting to note the distinction made in the ethics of Luther and Calvin in 
contraposition to secular ethics.  Their endorsement of the divine command theory 
dovetails with antecedent theological themes that culminate in the doctrine of soteriology.  
The problem as they see it is one of sin, a deficiency of being that may be overcome if 
and only if the motivation of the individual changes to regard God before self. 
Is Kant a Divine Command Theorist? 
 A.T. Nuyen argues in a recent article that Kant is a divine command theorist.  
Such a view does not mesh with the consensus of Kant scholarship, but it serves us well 
to consider in what way Kant might be deemed a divine command ethicist.  Nuyen admits 
that, “there is a sense in which Kant is a DCT (divine command theorist), but there is a 
                                                 
44 This is given considerable attention in Schneewind, 35-36.  Calvin addresses this in the Institutes III.ix.4 
and III.vii.1-5. 
45 See Calvin’s Institutes II.iii.4, or in Schneewind, 36. 
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sense in which he is not.”46  The center of the argument hinges on a reevaluation of the 
Euthyphro dilemma and to what extent Kant endorses either the autonomy of ethics or the 
dependence of objective values on God.  According to Nuyen, “Kant’s view is that it is 
the case both that something is wrong because God forbids it and God forbids it because 
it is wrong.”47  Let us consider the coherence of such a view. 
 Nuyen argues that if Kant is a divine command theorist, then he must be so in a 
strong sense, where “strong sense” is defined as entailing that morality is, “impossible 
without religion, which is another way of saying that God is the source of morality and 
the only basis of its validity.”48  The question is in what way is God the only basis of 
morality’s validity?  Nuyen argues that strong dependence is the byproduct of God’s 
being the cause of morality by being the Legislator of moral law. 49  The purported 
evidence for such a view comes from Kant’s Religion within the Bounds of Reason 
Alone, where Nuyen says, “We find many passages where the language is decidedly that 
of a DCT.”50  Consider Nuyen’s evidence for such a view: 
For instance, Kant defines “moral religion” as that which consists “in the 
hearts disposition to fulfill all human duties as divine commands.”  Some ten 
pages later, Kant writes: “As soon as anything is recognized as a duty, 
obedience to it is also a divine command.”  A few pages after that, he says 
that “when men fulfill their duties to men (themselves and others) they are, 
by these very acts, performing God’s commands.”  The “essence of reverence 
to God,” Kant tells us, is “obedience to all duties as His commands.”  Finally, 
toward the end of the Religion, we have a slightly different definition of 
religion: “Religion is (subjectively regarded) the recognition of all duties as 
divine commands.”51 
 
                                                 
46 See A.T. Nuyen, “Is Kant a Divine Command Theorist?” in History of Philosophy Quarterly 15 (1998): 
441. 
47 Ibid., 441. 
48 Ibid., 442. 
49 Ibid., 444. 
50 Ibid., 444. 
51 Ibid., 444.  
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Admittedly one cannot avoid the explicit appeal to DCT in Religion, so let’s turn our 
attention to what version of DCT Kant endorses. 
 Nuyen argues that it is not “unreasonable” to read Kant as saying that “the 
concept of duty means a command given by a moral Law-giver” and that understanding 
the concept is “identical with” understanding what it means.52  More specifically, Nuyen 
argues that Kant arrives at his conclusion about moral legislation from two premises: 
(1) No law exists without a law-giver, no command without a commander. 
(2) Regarding moral law, God is, necessarily, the law-giver.53 
Premise (1), it is argued, may be grounded on a correlation between moral law and 
judicial law.  According to Nuyen, Kant compares what he calls an “ethical 
commonwealth” with a state:  
Just as there has to be a law-giver (of constitutional laws) to allow a mass of 
people to unite itself into a whole, (the legislators being people themselves or 
their representatives, in a free state), there has to be a be a public law-giver “for 
an ethical commonwealth.”54 
 
Premise (2) argues that the legislator of moral laws is God himself, for in an ethical 
commonwealth the law-giver must be someone “other than the populace” who can 
represent all “true duties as at the same time his commands.”55  Thus for Kant, according 
to Nuyen: “This is a concept of God as the moral ruler of the world.  Hence an ethical 
commonwealth can be thought of only as a people under divine commands.”56  Thus, in 
Religion one can argue that Kant endorses a DCT grounded in the notion that morality 
depends on religion in the sense that moral laws are legislated by God.  This picture of 
                                                 
52 Ibid., 445. 
53 Ibid., 445. 
54 Ibid., 446. 
55 Ibid., 446. 
56 Ibid., 446. 
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Kant provides his account of the objectivity of values as grounded in God.  The project 
now turns to how the second horn of Euthyphro’s dilemma is integrated into Kant’s 
moral theory. 
 Nuyen points out what most scholars of Kant like to emphasize, namely that in 
the Critique of Practical Reason Kant argues that it is not the case that an action is 
obligatory because God commands it; rather, “it is a divine command because it is 
obligatory.”57  When posed with the question of the moral authority of the Bible Kant 
explains, “I should try to bring the New Testament passage [containing divine 
commands] into conformity with my own self-subsistent moral principles.”58   
It is in this notion of “self-subsistent” principles that the bridge between the 
autonomy thesis and the dependence of ethics on God lies.  “Self-subsistent” moral 
principles are known to us through practical reason, which is why we “are not to look 
upon moral laws as arbitrary and as wholly unrelated to our concepts of morality.”59  The 
question becomes how it is the case that both something is a duty because God 
commands it, and God commands it because it is a duty.  To answer this, Nuyen turns our 
attention to Kant’s second Critique where “there is a mutual dependency between 
freedom and morality: the latter on the former for ratio essendi (for its reason why), and 
the former on the latter for its ratio cognoscendi (that of freedom).”60  If we think of God 
as the moral law-giver in the sense that God creates moral properties along with all the 
natural properties, then God is that which brings morality into existence (ratio fiendi).61  
In His creative act God brings into existence laws in the same manner as a state legislator 
                                                 
57 Ibid., 446.  
58 Ibid., 446. 
59 Ibid., 447.  
60 Ibid., 449.  
61 Ibid., 447. 
 28 
creates a body of laws that are “said to exist with a certain reality.”62  Through his 
commands God creates the “logical space for morality to be possible.”63   
 While God is the logical ground of morality, God in turn “depends on morality to 
be an idea in our thought.”64  In this sense one may read Kant saying that morality is the 
reason of knowing (ratio cognoscendi) of religion.  Thus, Nuyen argues that the mutual 
dependence of religion and morality may be fashioned out of a Kantian framework, for: 
The relationship between God and morality is asymmetrical: God is the ratio 
essendi (freedom creates the logical space for law) of morality and not conversely 
because God is self-determining; morality is the ratio cognoscendi of religion but 
not conversely because morality is “knowable through unassisted reason.”65       
 
In declaring the mutual dependence of religion and morality through this Kantian 
framework we have an account of the non-arbitrariness of God’s commands as well as 
how finite human agents can have ideas of God’s existence.  Nuyen explains, “The 
answer lies precisely in the fact that while God is the ratio essendi of moral laws, 
morality is the ratio cognoscendi of God.”66  In other words, all of our ideas of God are 
derived from practical reason, and arbitrated through moral precepts.  God cannot 
command evil because “practical reason” renders such a notion inconceivable.  Indeed, 
since “practical reason is the only cognitive means to religion, we can take God’s moral 
commands to consist in the moral laws of practical reasons.  Thus, we are to take God’s 
laws as “addressed to man’s holiness,” and to understand the “concept of divine will as 
determined according to pure moral laws alone.”67       
  
                                                 
62 Ibid., 449. 
63 Ibid., 449. 
64 Ibid., 449. 
65 Ibid., 450.  
66 Ibid., 451.  
67 Ibid., 452. 
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Robert Adams’ Transcendent Account of the Good 
 In the next two sections I will be articulating the most recent developments in 
divine command literature, most notably in the works of Robert Merrihew Adams and 
Philip Quinn.  I will begin by looking at Adams’ argument, which is most exhaustively 
treated in his work Finite and Infinite Goods where he makes two arguments that he 
thinks justify a divine command theory of morality.  The first is a semantic argument 
from the notion of moral obligation, and the second is an argument from the notion of 
necessary moral truths.  In the following section I will look at Philip Quinn’s recent work 
on the causal argument for divine commands.  I will later be giving a more thorough 
treatment of this (Adams’ and Quinn’s) literature because most of the subsequent 
discussion in this essay will be derived from it, though by no means are the other views 
without merit or utility.  I will begin with a brief treatment of the work of Robert 
Adams—which will receive a more thorough treatment in chapter II.   
 Robert Adams has recently defended this position, utilizing a realist conception of 
ethics whereby comparative predication entails relational properties consisting in 
resemblance to something that is maximally excellent.68  By resemblance Adams means 
that “moral excellence” is an aspect of axiological excellence, where axiological 
excellence is to be understood as, “resembling God in a way that could serve God as a 
reason for loving the thing.”69  The particular strength of Adams’ position is that the good 
becomes personal, but more pointedly the personal agency typified by God entails that 
moral goodness is grounded in something that is the paradigm of goodness.  Adams 
explains: 
                                                 
68 Robert Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 13-130. 
69 Ibid., 36. 
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Theists have sometimes tried to infer the personality of the supreme Good from 
the premise that persons, as such, are the most excellent things we know, from 
which it is claimed to follow that the supremely excellent being must be of that 
sort.  A more cautious line of argument begins with the premise, harder to deny, 
that most of the excellences that are most important to us, and of whose value we 
are most confident, are excellences of persons or qualities or actions or works or 
lives or stories of persons.  So if excellence consists in resembling or imaging a 
being that is the Good itself, nothing is more important to the role of the Good 
itself than that persons and their properties should be able to resemble or image it.  
That is obviously likelier to be possible if the Good itself is a person or 
importantly like a person. 70 
 
If we are willing to accept that goodness is a relational property where the relata are 
agents and a paradigm of moral goodness, then a sufficient prima facie case has been 
made such that goodness is personal, unlike Platonic archetypes, and more like the 
traditional God of theism. 71   
Robert Adams offers a plausible account of objective moral values as well as a 
unique account of deontological obligation.  It has not been my intent to agree with 
Adams, I am merely offering exposition of what I find to be his most compelling case for 
divine command ethics.  In fact I disagree with several aspects of his approach.  I will 
address this as I present my own theory of divine commands, and hopefully offer some 
suggestions that improve on aspects of his theory that I find particularly compelling. I 
now turn my attention to the details of Philip Quinn’s causal argument for the divine 
command theory.        
   
Philip Quinn’s Causal Argument 
 In an article entitled, “Divine Command Ethics: A Causal Argument,” Philip 
Quinn proposes a causal, normative theory of divine commands.  He writes: 
                                                 
70 Ibid., 42. 
71 See Michael Murray, “Do Objective Ethical Norms Need Theistic Grounding,” currently unpublished. 
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 For every proposition which is such that it is logically possible that God 
 commands that p and it is logically contingent that p, a sufficient causal condition 
 that it is obligatory that p is that God commands that p, and a necessary causal 
 condition that it is obligatory that p is that God commands that p. 
  
 For every proposition which is such that it is logically possible that God 
 commands that p and it is logically contingent that p, a sufficient causal condition 
 that it is forbidden that p is that God commands that not-p, and a necessary causal 
 condition that it is forbidden that p is that God commands that not-p. 
  
 For every proposition which is such that it is logically possible that God 
 commands that p and it is logically contingent that p, a sufficient causal condition 
 that it is permitted that p is that it is not that case that God commands that not-p, 
 and a necessary causal condition that it is permitted that p is that it is not that case 
 that God commands that not-p.72  
 
Quinn’s intention is to formulate an account of divine commands whereby God is the 
agent that creates moral obligations or prohibitions from His legislative activity.  His 
theory has undergone several revisions, and I will be focusing my account on those 
revisions.  However, it should be noted that despite the revisions the theory remains a 
causal one.  As such, I will first note the initial problems with Quinn’s 1979 work, and 
then offer his account of how these objections may be overcome.   
 If we consider the three causal relationships Quinn proposed, two things are to be 
noted.  The first is that stipulating p as a causally sufficient condition of q just means that 
the relationship is causal necessity, but not logical necessity.  In the governing necessary 
(causal) condition, it is not logically necessary that if p then q.  From these postulates, 
Quinn notes, “Where God’s commanding p is logically possible and p is contingent, 
God’s commanding p is a causally sufficient and necessary condition of p’s being 
morally obligatory.”73    
                                                 
72 See Philip Quinn, “Divine Command Ethics:  A Causal Theory,” in Idziak, Divine Command Morality, 
312.  
73 Ibid., 310-312.   
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 William Wainwright notes an objection to Quinn’s thesis, which Quinn 
addresses.74  The objection is: 
 Some statements of moral requiredness appear to be necessarily true.  For 
 example, it seems necessarily true “that everyone refrains from gratuitous torture 
 of innocents is obligatory.”75 
 
  In his later work Quinn revises his position, holding that some obligatory states of 
affairs are necessary; that is, they obtain in every possible world.76  The revision 
stipulates the compatibility between his causal theory and his treatment of God’s will as 
being primary in causing moral obligation to obtain; but he stipulates the theory not in 
explicitly causal terms but rather in proffering the relationship between God’s will and 
God’s beliefs (“beliefs” eventually to be replaced with “intentions”).  The divine will is, a 
la Ockham and Biel, immutable-and as such may be considered necessary in itself.  
Following Thomas Morris, Quinn adopts the position of absolute creation, which holds: 
 God is the creator of necessary as well as contingent reality.  As [Morris] sees it, 
 in order to be absolute creator, God must be responsible somehow for the 
 necessary truth of all propositions that are necessarily true…Thus, for example, 
 even if it is necessarily true that murder, theft, and adultery are morally wrong, 
 God is responsible, according to the absolute creationist, for the necessary truth of 
 the proposition that murder, theft, and adultery are wrong. 77  
 
Borrowing from Michael Loux, Quinn postulates that necessary truths involve the 
asymmetrical relation of “metaphysical dependence” between certain divine beliefs and 
facts being necessarily as they are.78  The relevant divine belief is a strong belief, which 
may be defined as “a person x strongly believes that p if and only if x believes that p and 
                                                 
74 See Philip Quinn, “An Argument for Divine Command Ethics,” in Michael Beatty, ed., Christian Theism 
and the Problems of Philosophy (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), henceforth, Quinn 
1990a.  See also “The Recent Revival of Divine Command Ethics,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 50 (1990), henceforth, Quinn 1990b.  See also “Divine Command Theory,” in Hugh LaFollette, 
ed., The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000), henceforth, Quinn 2000.  
75 See Wainwright, 98. 
76 Quinn modifies his approach in Quinn, 1990a, 301.   
77 Quinn (2000): 63. 
78 Quinn (2000): 63-64.  
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does not entertain that non-p.”79  From this Quinn argues that since God is omniscient, 
“divine beliefs correlate perfectly with truth and divine strong beliefs correlate perfectly 
with necessary truths.”80  Thus if moral truths necessarily obtain, it is because God 
strongly believes that they obtain.   
 To account for the relationship between God’s willing states of affairs and God’s 
beliefs about them (for they are independent of one another but “perfectly coordinated”), 
Quinn writes: 
 There is controversy over which divine acts bring about moral requirements, 
 permissions, and prohibitions.  As I see it, it is at the deepest level God’s will, and 
 not divine commands, which merely express or reveal God’s will, that determines 
 the deontological status of human actions.81   
 
To be more specific:  
 “The idea is that moral facts about deontological status are as they are because 
 God has certain antecedent intentions concerning the actions of creaturely moral 
 agents, and necessary moral facts about deontological status, if there are any, are 
 as they are because God has strong antecedent intentions concerning the actions 
 of moral agents.”82   
 
A distinction must be made between three key concepts in order to grasp Quinn’s 
formulation.  Quinn explains: 
  
 It is standard to distinguish between God's antecedent and God's consequent will: 
 God's consequent will is God's will absolutely considered, as bearing on all actual 
 circumstances; God's antecedent will is God's will considered with respect to 
 some proper subset of actual circumstances.83 
 
God’s antecedent intentions are the necessitating causes of moral obligations.  As such, 
no account of the reconciliation between God’s willing and strong believing is required; 
                                                 
79 Quinn (2000): 64. 
80 Quinn (2000): 64. 
81 See Quinn (2000): 55. 
82 See Quinn (2000): 64. 
83 See Mark Murphy, “Theological Voluntarism,” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [accessed 8 
August 2006]; available from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2002/entries/voluntarism-theological/ .   
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the antecedent intent ion is the “sole cause” of, for instance, the prohibition of harming 
innocents.  Necessary moral facts are brought about by God’s strong antecedent 
intentions, where a strong antecedent intention is “S strongly intends that p if and only if 
S intend that p and does not consider not-p.”84  The notion of necessity follows from 
God’s strong antecedent intention, for if it is necessarily the case that harming innocents 
is wrong, it is because God strongly antecedently intends that no one bring about these 
states of affairs.  More formally: 
 For every human agent x, states of affairs S, and time t, (i) it is morally wrong that 
 x bring about S at t if and only if God antecedently intends that x not bring about 
 S at t, and (ii) if it is morally wrong that x bring about S at t, then by antecedently 
 intending that x not bring about S at t God brings it about that it is morally wrong 
 that x bring about S at t.85    
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have given attention to the historical arguments in favor of a 
divine command theory of ethics.  I have not attempted to articulate criticisms of views, 
nor has this been a project of modifying or providing positive arguments in support of 
such views.  Rather, it is has been a project of representing the landscape of 
argumentation as to why one may hold such a view.   
 There is continuity amongst a number of the theories, such as the God as first 
cause argument and God as the grounds of necessary moral truths.   I have attempted to 
order the theories to accommodate the continuity, though this is not necessary for my 
project.  Recent developments in the philosophy of language and modal logic, namely 
those developments that occurred with the analytic turn, bracketed off the discussion in 
the works of Adams and Quinn; both rely heavily on contemporary modal logic in their 
                                                 
 
85 Quinn (2000): 56. 
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discussion of possible worlds and the nature of necessity.  As such I treated them 
individually rather than thematically as I did the other philosophers.  In each case I 
presented the theories partly in response to major objections, for their theories have 
undergone several revisions.  Thus I proposed their theories not in their final form, but 
rather as they are found progressively in response to such objections.  My motivation in 
giving Adams and Quinn priority follows from how they fit into my discussion, and as 
such they received privileged consideration.  I will build on this historical background as 
I offer my own divine command theory.  It is to this project that I now turn my attention.      
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CHAPTER III 
 
NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL ACCOUNTS OF MORALITY 
 
 
 
 There is an ongoing debate as to whether morality is dependent on religion, and 
the dependency relationship itself has been given different characterizations.  Some argue 
that morality is normatively dependent on God—often on the basis of a “laws entail a 
lawgiver” premise.  Another line of thought has it that morality is logically dependent on 
religion. 86  Here the discussion turns on whether or not ethical notions are defined by 
explicitly theological terms, or at least deduced from such concepts.  A third line of 
inquiry examines whether a person could be motivated toward moral actions if God does 
not exist.87  However, after the publication of G.E. Moore’s Principia Ethica the 
conversation focused on metaethics proper: or how we define the ethical term good.88  
The reason Moore’s work was so influential is that it focused ethics on its foundations—
without which all of our ethical inquiries are a waste of time, like shifting deckchairs on 
the Titanic.  Moore’s purpose was to articulate an argument proving that any account 
according to which moral properties may be reduced to non-moral terms must fail; this is 
famously known as the open-question argument.  Moore invites us to answer the question 
“what is good?”  By this Moore means not that we are to offer an account of what things 
are good, or exhibit goodness, but rather  that we are to explicate the property (or 
properties) of goodness.  Moore argues that only three options are possible for answering 
such a question.   
                                                 
86 William Frankena, “Is Morality Logically Dependent on Religion?” in Paul Helm, ed. Divine Commands 
and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). 
87 Michael Martin takes up such a concern in Atheism, Morality, and Meaning (Prometheus Books, 2002). 
88 Moore, G.E.  Principia Ethica  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903). 
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1. Goodness is a complex property that can be broken down by analysis into 
its parts, in which case one can offer an illuminating definition of the 
property that works by identifying the various parts that combine to 
constitute goodness (in the same way that, for instance, one might define 
the property of being a bachelor as being a male human over a certain age 
who is unmarried) or 
 
2. Goodness is a simple property that itself cannot be broken down by 
analysis into parts, in which case the only accurate definitions are those 
that trade in synonyms and so shed no real light on the nature of the 
property.  (There must be at least some simple properties, Moore argued, 
since they are needed as the building blocks out of which all more complex 
properties would have been built) or 
 
3. Goodness is no property at all and the word ‘good’ is meaningless, in 
which case, of course, no definition can be offered.89     
 
What we are driving at in answering this question is nothing less than the foundation of 
ethics—the account of our value term “good” in its objective existence.90  More 
specifically we want to consider who it is that has the best answer to the question of the 
source of objective values, our concentration being on moral values.  Are objective moral 
values inextricably tied to a divine origin, or can naturalism proffer and account that is 
validated through the conditions of objectivity?  Or are moral properties, “emergent 
properties” that supervene upon certain physiologically complex organisms and particular 
social configurations?”91  It is the project of this chapter to argue that objective moral 
values are best grounded in a theistic construct.  Second, we will turn our attention to the 
possibility of naturalistic accounts of objectivity, only to conclude that such accounts fail.  
In this second part of the project we will consider an evolutionary account of objectivity, 
                                                 
89 This account found in Geoffrey Sayre -McCord, “Moral Realism” in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical 
Theory, ed. David Copp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 6. 
90 Admittedly some are not concerned with objective value and postulate other types of value, both moral 
and otherwise.  Our primary concern is to consider what makes values objective, and not give substantial 
attention to the postulate that values, both moral and otherwise, are subjective.   
91 See Paul Copan, “God Naturalism, and the Foundations of Morality.”  Currently this work is 
unpublished.  
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and ask whether under such an account there can be proper moral motivation for human 
actions.  What we will find, if my argument is correct, is that the motivation for human 
actions will ultimately fail if the foundation upon which those actions are based is flawed.  
Admittedly there are objections to such a view, the most pointed of which is the 
Euthyphro objection.  This objection will be addressed in chapter IV.      
Perspectives on the Objectivity of Values 
 It is interesting to note that when G.E. Moore provided his tripartite analysis of 
the possibilities of defining the good he did not consider a fourth option, namely a 
supernatural entity that is goodness itself.  We want to consider this possibility, but only 
after we have made clear what it means for a value to be objective.  After all, if there is 
one aspect of ethics upon which both theists and atheists can converge, it is that objective 
moral values are a basic part of human moral evaluation.  For example, Kai Nielson 
writes: 
It is more reasonable to believe such elemental things [as wife beating and child 
abuse] to be evil than to believe any skeptical theory that tells us we cannot know 
or reasonably believe any of these things to be evil.  I firmly believe that this is 
bedrock and right and that anyone who does not believe it cannot have probed 
deeply enough into the grounds of his moral beliefs.92   
 
 If we assume objectivity as a basic moral starting point, then we need to offer an account 
of objectivity to arbitrate among the competing views of its source.  And so the 
discussion begins with defining the necessary and sufficient conditions of objective 
value.  William Wainwright provides an excellent definition: 
 First, value claims are either true or false.  Second, values are universal.  If 
 something is good or right or beautiful, it is good or right or beautiful at all times 
 and all places. Third, values aren’t products of our desires.  The goodness of 
 truthfulness or friendship, for example, can’t be reduced to the fact that we desire 
 them or would desire them if we were fully informed.  But while these conditions 
                                                 
92 Kai Nielsen, Ethics Without God (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1990), 10-11. 
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 are necessary they are not sufficient.  To be objective in the intended sense, values 
 must also be part of the “furniture of the universe.”93   
 
I think the first condition is mostly uncontroversial, at least in the parlance of moral 
realism. 94  What is to be emphasized under this first condition is that the values spoken of 
are not merely perceived to be true or false; rather the commitment is that for any action 
the perceived value intended in the action is either objectively present or not.  In other 
words, our perceptions of value in an action perhaps motivate the action, but do not 
ground the value of the action.  It is interesting to note how this principle vies with some 
naïve forms of utilitarianism.  The truth or falsity of a value claim is settled before any 
action ever takes place.  Of course, we may only find only out after the action whether or 
not there was any [good] in performing the action.  But what this entails is that even if we 
endorse teleological ethics of some sort, the ends do not justify the means.  The ends only 
reveal whether or not our perceptions of the value in the action were correct.  
 The second condition requires some polishing, for it seems to confuse what is 
objective with what is absolute.  For something to be absolute means that it admits of no 
exceptions, such as the claim that murder is wrong at all times and all places.  Objective 
value, per condition three, means that these values are not constructs of value preference, 
nor do we (or I) ground the truth value of the proposition per condition one.  What this 
leaves as the ground of objective value is that these values exist independent of human 
minds and constructions.  In connection with Wainwright’s condition two, it is important 
to realize that there can be a state of affairs whereby two or more values that we hold dear 
are in conflict with one another.  One might think of the famous “murderer at the door” 
                                                 
93 William Wainwright, Morality and Religion (Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005), 49. 
94 One might, however, be a moral antirealist and question this first condition. One proponent of moral 
antirealism includes J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (London: Penguin Books, 1977). 
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dilemma where the value of truth-telling clashes with the value and regard for human life.  
What this conflict means, then, is that we must make a distinc tion between prima facie 
duties and all-things-considered duties.  Once this is done, our claim to the objectivity of 
values through condition two remains sound.  It can be objectively true that the value of 
life is greater than the value of truth-telling, especially when it is the case that in the act 
of truth-telling one brings it about, or makes it more reasonable to assume, that life will 
be lost.  Even if we struggle with what seems to be moral failure “come-what-may,” we 
must not confuse the category of moral obligation with that of moral value.  If we recall, 
what we determined through condition one is that moral value is anterior to any 
obligation.  This makes for a lingering question as to whether or not one has any moral 
obligation to evil agency (Hitler’s henchmen, for example).  But that is not our concern 
here.          
 The third condition of objectivity counters the notion that objective values are 
grounded in desires.95  What we can agree to is that what persons have a tendency to 
pursue is the fulfillment of their desires—but we must not claim that desire fulfillment 
yields objective value.  If we recall, Moore argued against such a claim in the Principia, 
highlighting the fact that reducing goodness to a set of properties, such as pleasure or 
happiness, will not work.  There is an asymmetrical dependency relationship between 
goodness and the descriptive properties of what is good.  As we know, to postulate that 
“pleasure is good” does nothing to answer the question “is the good pleasure?”  The 
implication of this objection carries over to other complex properties such as preference 
and happiness.  If we replace the variable x with any property or set of properties in the 
                                                 
95 We could also speak of preferences, because it seems to me that desires and preferences are not the same 
thing.  One may desire something but not prefer to another course of action, say a greater desire.  
Preference is connected to the settled intent of desire satisfaction.     
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proposition ‘x is good,’ the question will always remain whether or not “the good is x.”  
Moore’s response to the problem is that the good is unanalyzable, “Good is good, and 
that is the end of the matter.”96  I will soon be arguing that the good is a person who is 
intentional, causal, and so forth, much like the God of traditiona l theism.   
 I think the sufficient condition of objectivity, that values are part of the furniture 
of the universe, is certainly correct.  If the discussion at hand is not a matter of 
ontological fact, then the previous three conditions do not have any footing.  Without 
value being part of the furniture of the universe value statements may be true, but only as 
a matter of subjective or conventional definition (contra condition one).97  We have good 
reason not to accept this as a condition of objectivity, for if I am the truth-maker of a 
moral proposition then two things (at least) follow.  First, I can never enjoy any moral 
progress.  To say that a person is progressing morally means that they are advancing 
toward a value external to themselves.  It is a value they are “mapping” onto.  On the 
other hand, if I ground the truth of values, then I can never be wrong.  Even if my mind 
changes and the content of the moral proposition is its logical compliment, no absurdity 
follows. Why? It goes back to who grounds truth—in this case the truth is always 
contingent on me.  More can be said, but I think this suffices.  The second issue is that 
there is an odd relationship under this scheme between the moral values derived from my 
edict and their import on a wider community.  Does my having the property of truth-
maker in any sense obligate other persons to the values I define?  There is no reason to 
think so.  Consider the fact that under this rubric all moral values are determined by the 
                                                 
96 See G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), 6.  
97 Some noncognitivists argue that there are no truth values ranging over moral propositions, and moral 
statements are merely a matter of preference.  For example, see C. L. Stevenson, “The Emotive Meaning of 
Ethical Terms,” Mind 46 (1939): 14-31. 
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individual—including competing claims on value between persons.  Not only is it the 
case that contradictory propositions can both be true, it also follows that no imposition of 
obligation can occur from one agent to the other.  My reasoning hinges on the first aspect 
of our discussion, namely that under this construction no one makes any moral progress.  
Obligation, in virtue of the very concept, entails both moral progress and moral lapse 
(when one strays from obligation).  But if we cannot make any moral progress, then we 
have no reason to think that we have any obligations of any kind.   It seems the 
subjectivist paradigm is found wanting. 
 Perhaps we are on better footing to hold a conventionalist account of values 
whereby values are a matter of social adoption.  There is the obvious question of what it 
is that makes these values true.  More pointedly, what is it about a society such that it 
provides a suitable source of objective values?  The motivation for asking this question is 
straightforward—at least under the subjectivist account of value we have a definite 
ontology, the self governs value.  It is not very clear what it is about a society that gives it 
such a clear function.  It has been argued that what grounds moral values or truth (and 
there are moral truths) is a matter of rational deliberation and choice.98  If one adopts this 
stance, which is traditionally called constructivism, a sufficient account of rationality 
must be provided.  Specifically, how there can be convergence on a rational principle 
within a culture to determine what maximizes rights and liberties?  Whether or not these 
rational choices are aimed at some value is not the real question; rather the question is 
how can it be the case that rationality is merely a matter of cooperatively rubbing our 
heads together?  To point out the obvious, combining a thousand leaky buckets does not 
mean that we have one that is functioning properly.  But supposing this possible, and I 
                                                 
98 For example John Rawls work A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).   
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doubt that it is, then all we have done is beg the question.  If we are trying to ascertain the 
objective source of human value, which is an explicitly ontological category, we do not 
determine its essence simply by thinking it—an explicitly epistemic operation.  What the 
epistemic project does is ground what is perceived to be true about values, but in no way 
entails that these values are intrinsic.   
 But even if we grant that the truth-making condition is met, such an account will 
not likely get through the other conditions of objectivity.  I think the real concern here is 
how it can be said, apart from theism, that morality is a part of the furniture of the 
universe—our sufficient condition for objectivity.  If constructivism defaults into a view 
like Christine Korsgaard’s such that values are “grounded in the structure of rational 
consciousness” and “projected onto the world” then there is no sufficient grounding for 
objectivity. 99  Further, I do not see a clear reason for thinking these “projections” could 
satisfy the necessary condition of objective values being independent of our desires and 
preferences.  In fact, if what we have is that through tacit consent we arrive at what we 
desire as a community, there still remains the problem of whether or not our collective 
perspective on human needs and desires is correct.  I agree with the constructivist that our 
worldview is largely a matter of where we stand and how we see things to be—hence our 
perspective on the resolution.  But all this reveals is how important it is to be standing in 
the right place so that our perspective is, to borrow from the normative notion, as it 
should be.  I think there is another serious concern, similar to the one that affected the 
                                                 
99 Korsgaard, Chris tine, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 116.  
This point is more developed by William Wainwright in Religion and Morality, 53. 
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subjectivist account of values—namely that objectivity requires the “possibility of 
error.”100  Suppose we take the following: 
 (P1) Murder is wrong at all times and all places. Or, 
 (P2) Torturing innocent children for fun is morally wrong. 
What we have in these two propositions is an appeal to universal moral principles that 
admit of no exception.  But what is implicit in their content is that they are not grounded 
in our judgment regarding them.  Rather, these propositions have a truth value 
independent of our perceptions and beliefs about them.  They are not to be likened unto 
collective preference claims, nor to mere matters of judgment — such as on which side of 
the plate to organize our dinnerware—which highlights my concern very nicely.  If moral 
values (or even other values) are mind-dependent in the sense that constructivism has 
charged, then it is entirely unclear what it would mean for someone to err in judgment.  
The ontological implications of such a view deny moral realism, and ground the objective 
nature of value in rationality.  So long as this is the standard, then there is nothing to 
arbitrate between competing claims about a moral proposition when identical standards 
of rationality are employed. At best, the constructivist may claim that in such cases 
bivalence does not hold, which undermines the original assertion about the truth value of 
moral propositions.  It is not that moral propositions do not have any truth values, the 
problem is that they can have mutually exclusive truth values in the same time and in the 
same way—which is counterintuitive.     
 If we do not endorse either or these subjectivist stripes, then what is left for non-
theistic accounts of objective value?  We could postulate that ethical statements such as 
(P1) and (P2) are true even if God does not exist, and in order to avoid the snafus of our 
                                                 
100 See Wainwright, 53-54. 
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previous discussion, assert that these truths are “brute facts” about reality.  The strengths 
of such a view are obvious.  In saying that these statements are true we have grounded 
value independent of any human minds or constructions—thus the truth condition is met.  
Further, it seems that the brute fact view postulates moral values as real values, in some 
sense they are ontologically a part of the furniture of the universe.  And from this our 
sufficient condition of objectivity is met as well.  Also, given that their ontology is not 
contingent upon our perceptions of their value, these values would exist even if it were to 
be the case that no human existed—thus they are independent of our preferences and 
mere judgments.  But there is a lingering concern, having to do with the principle of 
“queerness.”  Even if the necessary and sufficient conditions of objectivity have been 
met, one may still inquire about the “oughtness” of the principles that get articulated.101  
Consider Michael Martin’s account of the Argument from Queerness: 
 1.  If there were moral facts, they would have an intrinsic prescriptive quality. 
 2.  If moral facts have an intrinsic prescriptive quality, then naturalism is not true. 
 3.  Naturalism is true. 
 4.  Hence, there are no moral facts. 
 4a.  Therefore, objective morality is impossible.102 
 
Martin finds premise (1) of the argument problematic, and in fact denies that moral facts 
have an intrinsic prescriptive quality—the prescriptive quality follows from “what the 
moral fact is” and the “psychological state of the agent.”103  But I find this attack on 
premise (1) seriously flawed.  Its most obvious difficulty is that the psychological state of 
the agent has nothing to do with the prescriptive force behind the moral fact.   Whether or 
not I accept the force of the statement’s content is not the same as whether or not I should 
                                                 
101 This is a concern of J.L. Mackie in Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (New York: Penguin Books, 
1979). 
102 See Michael Martin’s book Atheism, Morality, and Meaning (New York: Prometheus Books, 2002), 37. 
103 Ibid., 37. 
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accept the force and content of the statement.  It is unclear what Martin means in stating 
that the prescriptive quality comes from moral facts and psychological states, but it seems 
the best reading is that these two conditions are conjunctive properties.  It is the case that 
(1) if it is a moral fact, and (2) the psychological state of the agent understands and 
accepts the content of the moral fact (e.g. an ideal observer), then the agent is bound by 
its content.  But here it seems (2) falls prey to some of our earlier concerns, namely that a 
condition of objectivity must be that obligation be independent of our desires and beliefs.  
An analogy will help here.  If we take the statement “Racial discrimination is morally 
wrong” and apply Martin’s critique, we can see his error.  What we have in this statement 
is that the representative force follows from the fact that there is a negative value term 
ranging over a specific action; if the statement were “Racial discrimination is morally 
permissible” the prescriptive nature changes.  In this second version there are two 
possibilities open to the agent, and these possibilities follow from the concepts of the 
statement.  If an action is morally permissible, then the agent is free to either perform or 
not perform that action.  Thus, I do not see how the conjunction of moral facts and 
psychological states refutes in any way what Mackie proposed in the “queerness” 
objection.  At best Martin’s critique arrives at something like a Kantian Hypothetical 
Imperative.  Concerning racial discrimination, if we deny it as a means to human 
flourishing we have good reason to not to practice it.  The contingency of its moral 
reprehensibility is obvious—if discrimination does promote human flourishing, then there 
is rational, if not pragmatic grounds, to endorse it.   
Obviously, the Categorical Imperative will not arrive at this conclusion.  The 
Categorical Imperative has the universalizability principle as its maxim; we act according 
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to that rule whereby we could at the same time will that it (discrimination) become a 
universal law.  The practice of discrimination cannot be morally permissible in this 
system.  Discrimination succeeds only when a select group benefits from its practice, 
which is a violation of the universalizability criterion.  Further, the Categorical 
Imperative systemically includes treating persons as ends- in-themselves and not as a 
means to an end.  But this is just what we mean by (1).  (2) holds that if the agent both 
understands and accepts the moral fact, then the agent is bound by its content.  Given that 
Kant holds that reason binds the will, the agent is bound to the content through 
intellection, whether or not they accept it.  Thus, it appears this possibility will not work.                        
 Martin’s own proposal, which will be our final candidate for a naturalist account 
of objectivity, is to make an epistemic argument from an ideal observer theory 
(henceforth IOT).104  According to this theory, the meaning of ethical expressions is 
“analyzed in terms of the ethically significant reactions of an observer who has certain 
ideal properties such as being fully informed and completely impartial.”105  Once we 
define the term in this way, the normative construct follows therefrom.  Martin’s view 
holds: 
1.  X is morally wrong = If there were an Ideal Observer, it would contemplate X 
with a feeling of disapproval. 106 
 
According to Martin, the strength of IOT is that it postulates an agent, whether 
hypothetical or real, whose properties of being fully info rmed and completely impartial 
are “reducible to empirical properties and are not ethical ideals on a par with being 
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completely just or fully benevolent.”107  IOT is a cognitivist model; hence ethical 
propositions have truth values that are not relativistic.  Contra subjectivist views, the 
analysis of ethical expressions does not contain egocentric terms, thus its content does not 
vary “systematically with the speaker.”108  In fact, ideal observers, being fully informed 
and unbiased, will agree upon the content of each ethical expression.  Thus, objectivity is 
garnered at least in two senses.  First, there are moral facts.  Second, IOT is compatible 
with non-subjective values.  Martin explains: 
Instead of moral values being based on psychological states such as pain, 
pleasure, and desires, moral value is based on non-subjective states.  These would 
include character traits, the exercise of certain capacities, the development of 
certain relations with others and the world.109 
 
Concerning the exercise of certain capacities, an IOT holds that moral properties are 
properties such that the content of ethical statements have (either relationally or non-
relationally) characteristics of human experience (such as apparent rightness).110  This 
overcomes, at least prima facie, the “queerness” objection to moral propositions.  The 
moral wrongness of rape, for example, has the phenomenological property of “appearing 
to one” as being morally wrong—just as under proper conditions I will be appeared to 
“greenly” when I say that the grass is green.  I’m afraid this last statement falls prey to a 
major theistic point, but more on that in a moment.  Central to this thesis is that it is a 
view about the reactions of an impartial observer to a moral proposition or purported 
moral facts.  Under most accounts, the impartial observer need not be omniscient about 
non-moral facts, but rather have awareness of relevant data in relation of one agent to 
another.     
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 I think the IOT is ultimately doomed to fail.  First, contrary to the claim cited 
above, IOT does not provide a good response to the “queerness” objection.  There are 
several lines of response here, beginning with the fact that an IOT is merely an account of  
the factual content of moral and non-moral properties; it does not locate any being who 
could plausibly impose moral “requiredness” on any agent.  Granted, one might hold a 
relational account of obligation where phenomenologically moral “oughtness” simply 
appears in either our experience or of the content of a moral proposition; and then 
maintain that the moral judgments of an ideal observer count as properly basic beliefs.  
For instance, J. Budziszewski argues that there are moral truths we can’t not know unless 
we engage in self-deception or, as the Apostle Paul explains, suppress the truth in our 
conscience.111  I think the point here is significant, for even if we endorse IOT it 
presumes a second level of obligation, namely that of epistemic obligation. 112  If it is the 
case that our perceptions determine the content of our deliberation on matters moral, then 
it becomes all the more important, and indeed obligatory, that we be looking in the right 
direction in order to be appeared to “rightly.”   
Another concern reverts to our rubric for objectivity.  Even if I granted a 
cognitivist approach to IOT and the dispassionate nature of its scope (per necessary 
condition (3)), IOT fails to address the sufficient condition of objectivity—that is, it does 
not explain how values are a part of the furniture of the universe.  If the IOT argues that 
they are brute facts, then our previous concerns arise and we have good reason to reject 
them.  In a similar vein the IOT might postulate a Moorean hypothesis that value features 
are simple and unanalyzable.  But even so, we still have the problem of efficient causality 
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as to their obtaining in the actual world.  Recall that IOT postulates a hypothetical entity, 
not an actual one—and this entity has a psychological response to the content of moral 
propositions and actions.  Hypothetical entities do not have the potency to obligate, nor 
evaluate, nor have any reaction (emotive or otherwise) to ethical concerns.  There are 
other objections, such as the Euthyphro problems faced by IOT, but these objections 
suffice for our purposes.           
A Theistic Construction 
 In order to avoid the pitfalls of the previous views, let us consider how it a theist 
might ground objective values in God.  By objective I mean that there is a moral order 
that exists independent of human convention.  In making this assertion I am grounding 
the metaethical term “good” in God’s nature rather than identifying it with, for example, 
non-evaluative natural properties.  Robert Adams has recently defended this position, 
utilizing a realist conception of ethics, according to which comparative predication as to 
value entails relational properties consisting in resemblance to something that is 
maximally excellent.113  By resemblance Adams means that “moral excellence” is an 
aspect of axiological excellence, where axiological excellence is to be understood as, 
“resembling God in a way that could serve God as a reason for loving the thing.”114  The 
particular strength of Adams’ position is that the good becomes personal, but more 
pointedly the personal agency typified by God entails that moral goodness is grounded in 
something that is the paradigm of goodness.  Adams explains: 
Theists have sometimes tried to infer the personality of the supreme Good from 
the premise that persons, as such, are the most excellent things we know, from 
which it is claimed to follow that the supremely excellent being must be of that 
sort.  A more cautious line of argument begins with the premise, harder to deny, 
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that most of the excellences that are most important to us, and of whose value we 
are most confident, are excellences of persons or qualities or actions or works or 
lives or stories of persons.  So if excellence consists in resembling or imaging a 
being that is the Good itself, nothing is more important to the role of the Good 
itself than that persons and their properties should be able to resemble or image it.  
That is obviously likelier to be possible if the Good itself is a person or 
importantly like a person. 115 
 
Once again, if we are willing to accept that moral goodness is implicitly relational, where 
the relata are agents and a paradigm of moral goodness, then a prima facie case is made 
by Adams such that goodness is personal, unlike Platonic archetypes, and more like the 
traditional God of theism. 116     
 It is a central tenet of Christian thought that God has created persons in His 
image, and it is in virtue of this fact that our value is ontologically grounded in the 
conjunction of how God views Himself and how, per the Imago Dei, He views us.  As we 
noted in chapter II, God is for theists the efficient cause of all that in any way has being.  
The implications of this supposition are twofold.  First, this postulate is contrary to the 
“brute fact” thesis discussed in the previous section.  If values exist as a matter of brute 
fact, then these values are beyond the creative will and control of God.  If we postulate 
moral values as abstract objects, then God is at best a craftsman, molding the moral order 
from preexisting essences into creation.  And second, this view rejects theistic views that 
hold necessary truths are beyond God’s control. 117  What are some principles that lead 
one to think theism has more explanatory power in grounding objective values than its 
naturalistic counterpart? Paul Copan writes: 
(a) Simplicity: Theism offers a much simpler alternative to naturalism: humans 
have been made in the image of God, whose character is the source of 
objective moral values; by contrast, naturalistic moral realists assume a pre-
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existent independent moral realm and the eventual evolution of valuable 
human beings who find themselves subject to comply with this moral realm.  
Theism offers a ready moral connection between a good God and humans. 
 
(b) Asymmetrical Necessity: Even if ‘murder is wrong’ is a necessary truth, it 
need not be analytic (cp. “water is H2O”); also, a necessary truth may still 
require some kind of explanation (e.g., “water is necessarily H2O” still 
requires an explanation for water’s existence and structure).  Furthermore, 
certain necessary truths are logically prior to/more metaphysically basic than 
others: “Addition is possible is necessarily true because numbers exist is 
necessarily true and numbers have certain essential properties.  The necessity 
of moral truths does not diminish their need for grounding in the character of 
a personal God.  God, who necessarily exists in all possible worlds, is the 
source of all necessary moral (and logical) truths that stand in asymmetrical 
relation to God’s necessity.  The necessarily existing good God is 
explanatorily prior to any necessary truths, whether moral or logical. 
 
(c) Cosmic Coincidence: Even if we grant that moral facts are just brute givens 
and necessarily true, a problem remains—namely the huge cosmic 
coincidence between the existence of these moral facts the eventual 
emergence of morally responsible agents who are obligated to them.  That this 
moral realm appears to be anticipating our emergence is a staggering cosmic 
coincidence that begs for an explanation. 
 
(d) Accounting for Human Value: Even if this Platonic realm of moral forms 
exists, there is no good reason to think that valuable, morally responsible 
human beings should emerge from valueless processes.  Theism offers a far 
more plausible explanation for human value, as it does a better job than 
nontheistic accounts of explaining human dignity. 118      
 
I have dealt with (c) in the previous section, especially in relation to the conjunction of 
brute facts with IOT.  My intention in this section is to offer an argument for the 
necessity of a personal agent to ground objective values.  I agree, generally, with the 
approach taken by Robert Adams—that the property of goodness requires a paradigmatic 
standard of goodness by which it is being gauged.  Given that in the previous section the 
problem of the “queerness” of objectivity was such a concern, I will argue that grounding 
objective values in an agent who embodies those features provides a sufficient account of 
moral obligation.   
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 Robert Adams writes that God’s commands provide the best cumulative case 
connecting the entailment of the expression “moral obligation” to what is “semantically 
indicated” in that expression. 119  To be more specific, he writes of four features that are 
“constraints” on the nature of moral obligation; features that set the parameters of what is 
semantically indicated, but are seldom jointly articulated sufficiently to provide an 
account of moral obligation.  First, moral obligations are “things that we should care 
about complying with.”  Second, it follows that certain emotive responses are appropriate 
when a wrong is done, and these responses (perhaps including guilt) are both within the 
individual toward herself, and from the community.  Third, moral obligations are 
something “that one can be motivated to comply with,” and as such should be “grounds 
for reasons to comply.”  From these suppositions, Adams provides a fourth feature, “it is 
part of the roles of moral obligation and wrongness that fulfillment of obligation and 
opposition to wrong actions should be publicly inculcated.”120   
 According to Adams, morality is inherently social, even if one were to confine the 
“social” implications strictly to the agent in her relationship to God.  The last condition is 
an explicit statement of the social element in moral evaluation.  More importantly, 
according to social theories, “having an obligation to do something consists in being 
required (in a certain way, under certain circumstances or conditions), by another person 
or group of persons, to do it.”121  To reveal why the secular dimension alone is not 
satisfactory, Adams elucidates several conditions, each of which is necessary for moral 
obligation to obtain from “social bonds.”  First, the social bonds must be grounded in 
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something good, not merely perceived to be good.  The difference stipulated here is 
ontological rather than phenomenological.  Right value (communally) comes from that 
which is grounded in something good.122  Another salient feature may be summed up in 
the adage “consider the source,” for Adams writes that the “personal characteristics” of 
persons imposing social requirements are “relevant to the possibility of social 
requirements constituting moral obligation.”  We have more reason to follow the 
mandates of that which is “knowledgeable, wise, or saintly” than those of one who does 
not exhibit such features.  Finally, the restriction on compliance follows from the 
gradation of good obtaining between the good demanded and on the degree to which 
“making the demand” affects the relationship in a quantifiably better way.  Though these 
conditions are necessary, the list may be modified to include other social standards that 
“approximate” the moral requirements for obligation.   
 Adams’ contention is that the objectivity of moral obligations, which he views as 
requisite for social theories, cannot be accounted for on any secular model.  If 
conventionalism is right, then “society would be able to eliminate obligations by just not 
making certain demands,” where conventionalism is defined as the truth of moral 
propositions being determined by a particular social setting.  The supposed objection 
against divine command ethics as being uniquely silent on social issues such as slavery 
serves as a perfect analogue.  The Bible, it is argued, seems to make slavery morally 
permissible given that there is no explicit prohibition in either the Old or the New 
Covenant.  However, Adams notes that secular moral theories are in no better shape, for 
“moral reformers have taught us that there have been situations in which none of the 
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existing human communities demanded as much as they should have.”123  The moral 
rightness or wrongness of an action may reduce to the specific needs of a given 
community, but this does not account for the objectivity of, say, the intrinsic value of a 
human life.  Adams’ conclusion is that: 
 These are all reasons for thinking, as most moralists have, that actual human 
 social requirements are simply not good enough to constitute the basis of moral 
 obligation…A divine command theory of the nature of moral obligation can be 
 seen as an idealized version of the social requirement theory.  Our rela tionship 
 with God is in a broad sense an interpersonal and hence a social relationship.  And 
 talk abut divine commands plainly applies to God an analogy drawn from human 
 institutions.124   
 
The purported force behind Adams’ statement is that divine commands provide the 
objectivity independent of our beliefs and motivations.  And since God is, at least in 
perfect being theology, morally perfect, then God fills the role “semantically indicated” 
of the good.   
 Second, divine command theory offers an account of the emotions (such as guilt) 
brought about from wrong actions, for God is a person against which these actions are 
being done.  Granted, divine command theory is particularly theistic, and the concern 
may arise that atheists have no cognitive access to what is morally required.  However, 
Adams contends that this may be resolved in that the content of commands may come to 
us through the design of our mental faculties, so that we are aware through conscience of 
what is socially required.125  One may honor most social obligations through Adams’s 
cognitive thesis.  We have ideas of social good and progress because God designed us to 
understand how we are to function as a social entity.  For example, one may come to 
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understand that it is in his or her better interest to have regard for others.  When we fail in 
this assignment, the requisite negative emotions such as guilt occur for those that are 
functioning properly cognitively.  This aspect of Adams’s theory does not require belief 
in God; only that “the order of knowing is not the same as the order of being” as the 
Scholastics say.  Thus Adams may differentiate between adherence to right conduct 
between human persons and right conduct between humans and God.  It is this latter 
aspect that motivated my previous comment that one may honor most social obligations; 
God is a member of every social system, and wrongs done against Him are equivalent in 
type to the wrongs done against humans.  So, the theory has compatible notions with 
secular ethics, it just views them as incomplete.         
  I now turn my attention to Adams’ argument from necessary moral truths.  
Suppose that we are obligated to not harm innocent children for the fun of it.  According 
to Adams, obligation arises from the prohibitions of God.  But if one were to ask whether 
this obligation obtains without God, either ontologically or per His command, Adams is 
committed to the view that no such obligation holds.  This follows, he thinks, from the 
discussion of the nature of necessary moral truths.  Michael Murray explains, “A number 
of theists have argued that moral claims are necessary truths and as such require some 
non-natural entities as their truth-makers.”126  According to Adams and in the tradition of 
Anselm, God is the suitable candidate to fill such a role.  However, and Adams notes this 
in chapter IV of his book, if God does not exist or if God is quantifiably morally different 
[for the worse] than we believed Him to be, then Adams’s theory of value does not hold.  
For the purpose of theoretical evaluation, Adams proposes we assume God exists and 
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morally fits the category of candidate as the good, thus “excellence is the property of 
faithfully imaging such a God, or of resembling such a God in such a way as to give God 
a reason for loving.”127  More appropriate, I think, is Adams’s later contention that: 
 Another possibility, perhaps no more satisfying, would be to say that we evaluate 
 possibilities from our standpoint in the actual world and that excellence in any 
 possible world is measured by conformity to the standard of excellence as it is in 
 the actual world-so that, on my theory, what God is like in the actual world will 
 determine the nature of excellence in all possible worlds.128  
 
What Adams is striving for is a non-contingent account of what is excellent; for to him 
the standard of excellence should have a definitive ontology such that persons may know 
and map onto it.  A contingent account of excellence provides no such ontology and 
reduces, in Adams’s estimation, to conventionalism.  Thus, the best explanation is that 
God necessarily exists and His ontology is such that in every possible world “in which 
creatures like us exist, he commands them not to lie, to protect the innocent, and so 
on.”129  The force behind such an argument is that it seems implausible, given the nature 
of God, that there would be some world in which torturing children for the fun of it 
would be morally permissible.  And, with each state of affairs there is a triad of 
theological value judgments (morally forbidden, morally required, and morally neutral) 
such that God has an expressed will that God necessarily issues under relevant 
circumstances.  Supposedly, this avoids God commanding that which seems to be 
abhorrently evil, for the content of His character is one of the relevant conditions for what 
is commanded.  Adams explains: 
 We should be clear…about some things that are not claimed in the divine 
 command theory that I espouse.  Two restrictions, in particular, will be noted 
 here. One is that when I say that an action’s being morally obligatory consists in 
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 its being commanded by God, and that an action’s being wrong consists in its 
 being contrary to a divine command, I assume that the character and commands of 
 God satisfy certain conditions.  More precisely, I assume they are consistent with 
 the divine nature having properties that make God an ideal candidate, and the 
 salient candidate, for the sematically indicated role of the supreme and definitive 
 Good.  It is only the commands of a definitively good God, who, for example, is 
 not cruel but loving, that are a good candidate for the role of defining moral 
 values.130      
 
We have noted that Adams’ view is a “Platonic” account of the good, and this may bring 
up some problems.  But Adams’ view is not a traditional Platonic view, and for the most 
part I think the lingering objections can be assuaged. 
Polishing and Amending the Transfinite View  
 I think the first objection one may lob at Adams is that if we accept his “Platonic” 
archetype model of goodness, then God merely exemplifies goodness rather than is 
goodness.  But I think this is to misconstrue his model.  What Adams means by 
“Platonic” model is to offer an account such that the phrase ‘x is good’ implies that it is 
intrinsically good to value x, and this even of divine agency.  But one can certainly value 
good that is intrinsic to oneself with no necessary external referent by which that good is 
being measured.  What I have in mind here is a Trinitarian model; the co- instantiation of 
perfect making properties across the three Persons of the Trinity.  More importantly, 
though, there is nothing incoherent in the idea that one can be both an exemplar and the 
paradigm of an attribute, in this case goodness.  What is the upshot of this response? 
First, God is not good via resemblance to any external standard, nor is He good through 
His resemblance to His essential properties.  Rather, God’s goodness is an essential 
attribute of His existence; hence He is necessarily good and recognizes this about 
Himself.  Thus we may adopt a Platonic “shift” whereby instances of the good “are 
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likenesses or imitations of the Forms under which they are classed.”131  In other words, 
things are excellent insofar as they resemble or imitate God (rather than ideas).  God, 
whose existence grounds the possibility of comparative predication, empowers the 
argument originated by Aquinas that if creatures are good insofar as they image God, 
then goodness may be predicated of both God and all of the elements of the created order 
(hence the attribution of the social element mentioned above).  I think other objections 
might arise.  For example, in postulating that God knows His own goodness and loves 
Himself for it, one might claim that God is narcissistic.  But this hardly follows.  
Narcissism has to do with a self- concept that is deluded, or the magnification of 
attributes that the agent does not really embody.  Under this construction, God’s 
recognition of His perfect-making properties does not merit the charge of narcissism—it 
is recognition of an ontological truth.  Just as persons can introspect and find attributes 
that are desirable and good, all the more for the One who embodies the fullness of being.  
So I do not think this objection has any merit.   
 Does Adams’s theory satisfy our criteria presented above? I think it does.  Given 
that God’s goodness supervenes on His actions we have a solid account of these values 
being a part of the furniture of the universe.  Further, given that these properties are 
objectively grounded in God’s essential na ture, and that persons are made in the image of 
God, we have a promising account of the necessary conditions of universality and truth 
being met.  It is not that God merely exemplifies these properties; it is that God both 
exemplifies goodness and is the standard by which actions are measured.  As we argued, 
it does not make sense to postulate something as a standard that does not exemplify the 
properties that it is the standard of.  There is the lingering concern that if this argument 
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goes through, then one becomes subject to belief in God; it would be incoherent to hold 
such a view without belief in God.  But as we noted, given that God’s goodness 
supervenes on creation, the epistemic question of belief becomes unnecessary.  God is the 
best semantic indicator of these values, and the epistemic pathway to moral knowledge is 
not entailed through this theory.  If we agree with Richard Taylor, though, then one might 
want to reconsider the plausibility of naturalism in light of theism’s more promising 
account of moral values defeat of the “queerness” objection.  Richard Taylor writes: 
A duty is something that is owed.  But something can be owed only to some 
person or persons…Similarly, the idea of an obligation higher than this, and 
referred to as moral obligation, is clear enough, provided reference to some 
lawmaker higher than those of the state is understood.  In other words, moral 
obligations are more binding upon us than our political obligations.  But what if 
this higher-than-human lawgiver is no longer taken into account?  Does the 
concept of moral obligation still make sense?  The concept of moral obligation is 
unintelligible apart from the idea of God.  The words remain, but their meaning is 
gone.132     
 
Conclusion 
What must remain clear is that this has been a project in grounding the good; it 
has not been a project in grounding moral obligation—the topic of Taylor’s quote.  But I 
bring this up to highlight a very important feature of our discussion.  If God offers the 
best account of moral value, then God will offer the best account of moral obligation.  It 
will be at this point that the naturalist concern about theistic belief will take shape.  But 
this is the project of my next chapter, where I will make an argument for the Divine 
Command theory of ethics.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
DIVINE COMMANDS, DIVINE WILL, AND MORAL OBLIGATION 
 
 
 
 “To be a theological voluntarist” writes Mark Murphy “is to hold that entities of 
some kind have at least some of their moral statuses in virtue of certain acts of divine 
will.”133  It may be the case that the status of actions described as obligatory are so in 
virtue of a “single supreme obligation”, namely to obey God.134  The traditional version 
of DC ethics is built upon such a framework, such that “all of the more workaday 
obligations that we are under…bind us as a result of the exercise of God’s supreme 
practical authority.”135  Hence, the traditional DC theory is a normative metaethical 
thesis, and “it is a version of theological voluntarism because it holds that all other 
normative states of affairs, at least those involving obligation, obtain in virtue of God’s 
commanding activity.”136 
 Granted, the traditional DC view dominated the literature of the Medieval 
Scholastics, and perhaps developed even sharper teeth in the contemporary works of 
Robert Adams.  The current trend is to give an account of what it is in DC ethics that 
makes it an “interesting thesis” and an “informative account” of normative concepts, 
properties, and states of affairs.137  Thus the emphasis shifts from a normative metaethical 
view to a descriptive project in which a version of DC is fashioned in terms of some acts 
of divine will.  Let us distinguish these two accounts; the normative interpretation will be 
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called DCN, and the metaethical interpretation will be called DCM.138  In either case, 
proponents of DC are in agreement regarding one thing, namely that what God wills is 
relevant to how moral obligation obtains. 
 In this chapter I will be defending a traditional DC theory of ethics whereby moral 
obligation arises from the commands of God.  In order to succeed in my task, I will first 
challenge Mark Murphy’s thesis that DC ethics is best articulated in a will formulation.  I 
will offer a sketch of Murphy’s thesis, and give criticisms as to why such a construal will 
not work.  Next, I will turn my attention to the development of my own theory regarding 
DC ethics.  Here I will discuss (1) how the will of God is integrated into a meaningful 
DC ethic, (2) how a DC theorist can ground God’s authority in a meaningful way such 
that He has “practical” authority with regard to the content of His commands, and (3) 
what moral obligation entails and why moral obligation is only binding on defective 
moral agents 
Mark Murphy’s Divine Will Formulation 
  “Assume” writes Mark Murphy “that theological voluntarism is an account of 
obligation-type properties.  A second issue concerning the proper formulation of the view 
concerns the relevant act of divine will.”139  According to Murphy, there are three options 
that exhaust our possibilities: 
(1) That it is obligatory for A to f depends on God’s commanding A to f. 
(2) That it is obligatory for A to f depends on God’s willing that A f. 
(3) That it is obligatory for A to f depends on God’s willing that it be obligatory 
for A to f.140 
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139 Mark Murphy, “Theological Voluntarism”, #5.  
140 Ibid., #5.  
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I will save discussion of (1) for later, given that I will defend it in my own theory. 
Murphy thinks that the dispute is between (1) and (2), for (3) “is, understood in one way, 
no competitor with (1) or (2); and understood differently, it has little argumentative 
support.”141  Let us consider why (3) should be rejected, and orient the rest of our 
discussion on the debate between (1) and (2). 
 What we have in (2) is that some person be bound by moral requirement to 
perform a certain action.  God’s commanding Abraham to sacrifice Isaac was God’s 
willing that Abraham be morally obligated to sacrifice Isaac.  Murphy notes that this 
view can be given either a metaethical or normative version.  According to the normative 
version, all humans are required to do what God wills that they be morally required to do.  
Thus, “particular actions that God wills that we be morally obligated to perform become 
actual moral requirements.”142  Every human, as such, is morally required to obey God’s 
will, and all of the particular moral obligations are specifications of this general moral 
requirement.  However, the metaethical version of (3) “does not appeal to a general moral 
requirement that is particularized under the content of God’s will.”143  Contrariwise, the 
metaethical thesis is that God creates moral obligations ex nihilo, that is, “out of 
normative nothingness.”144   
 What becomes clear is that the normative and metaethical versions of (3) differ in 
their explanation of moral obligation, and in the implications of what obligations there 
are.  The metaethical thesis explains the existence of particular moral obligations in terms 
of God’s power to “actualize normative states of affairs; no normative states of affairs 
                                                 
141 Ibid., # 5.  
142 Murphy, Faith and Philosophy, 11. 
143 Ibid., 11. 
144 Ibid., 11. 
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obtain prior to God’s willing.”145  Given that the normative thesis explains moral 
obligation in terms of the normative state of affairs that that persons are morally required 
too obey God, “it follows trivially that humans are under a moral obligation to obey 
God.”146  We have already noted that the metaethical view does not have this implication.  
Thus, our first objection is that the normative and metaethical versions of (3) are distinct 
theses, neither view entails the other. 
 One of the reasons for accepting (3) is that it best supports the doctrine of divine 
sovereignty.  The doctrine of divine sovereignty over creation is, “that nothing distinct 
from God is independent of God.”147  The dependence referenced here is an ontological 
dependence; thus one state of affairs contributes to the obtaining of the other state of 
affairs.  Philip Quinn, fo r example, argues that this dependence relationship can be 
understood in one of two ways.  There is the stronger thesis which holds that all states of 
affairs, even those involving or entailing God’s existence, are metaphysically dependent 
on God’s willing them.  The weaker dependence holds that only contingent states of 
affairs are metaphysically dependent on God’s will.148  It is this second dependence 
relationship that Quinn endorses.  The problem with Quinn’s view is that in morality, 
most states of affairs are wholly distinct from God’s existing.  Murder’s being morally 
forbidden and love’s being morally required are “obviously distinct from God’s existing, 
and so if God is sovereign over creation in this moderate sense then the obtaining of those 
normative states of affairs is dependent on God’s willing that they obtain.”149  God’s 
sovereignty, thus construed, does not support the claim that any normative states of 
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affairs obtain, nor “does it show that the moral requirements that we are under are a result 
of a prior moral requirement to obey God.  Rather, the appeal to sovereignty shows only 
that God’s will must enter into any complete explanation of why a normative state of 
affairs obtains.”150  This argument shows that we might get a metaethical version of (3) 
from Quinn’s argument, but we do not get the normative version.  Consider an example.  
From the supposition that promise-keeping is a morally obligatory state of affairs that 
obtains, we do not derive the normative principle from its dependence on God’s 
existence.  Murphy writes: 
This state of affairs is, I think, wholly distinct from the existence of promises: one 
can conceive of its being morally obligatory to keep promises yet no one has 
made any; and one can accept that promise-keeping is obligatory while not 
accepting that there are any promises to keep.  One can, pace Anselm, conceive of 
God’s non-existence while conceiving that it is morally obligatory to obey God, 
and one can accept the view that obedience to God is morally required while 
denying God exists.151      
 
Thus, the preferred conclusion to the sovereignty thesis is not that the moral requirement 
to obey God implies God’s existence.  Even if one finds a way to make the relationship 
between the normative and metaethical versions of (3) symmetrical, what we have 
through the argument from divine sovereignty is not what (3) argues.  In fact, if moral 
requirement does not imply God’s existence, then the obligation to obey God is distinct 
from His existence.  If moral obligation is distinct from His existence, then the only other 
option for (3) is that obligation depends (metaphysically) on God’s will; but this is the 
claim of (2), not (3).  For these reasons, we will not consider (3) a live option for our 
discussion.            
                                                 
150 Ibid., 12. 
151 Ibid., 13. 
 66 
I will now articulate what the dispute is between (1) and (2), first giving priority 
to the development of (2).  What we will find is that there is much common ground here, 
but a central disagreement will center on the relationship of speech acts and their 
informative and obligating power.  What I hope to provide is a solid defense of DC in 
terms of the illocutionary and perlocutionary force of God’s commands.  It will be on 
these points that Murphy and I will disagree—for I agree in large part, one proviso, with 
his views on the content of God’s will.  So after I offer Murphy’s will construct, I do not 
have much interesting to say against it merely in terms of what God wills.  I do have a 
bone to pick with his thesis about DW as normative; so it will be there that he and I part 
company.  For purposes of clarity, from this point forward I will refer to (1) as DC and 
(2) as DW respectively to keep the contrast between the command formulation and will 
formulation clear.         
 Mark Murphy’s Argument from Proposition (2)   
 What DW asserts about morality is that the act of will “that is relevant is God’s 
will that some persons be bound by moral requirement to perform a certain action.”152  
Indeed, one of the strengths of such a view is that it is common currency among theists to 
claim that they performed a certain action because it was God’s will. The project for this 
view is to articulate a thesis of God’s activity that specifies a sense of willing that lies 
between two extremes.  The first of these extremes is that one may specify a sense of 
                                                 
152 See Mark Murphy, “Divine Command, Divine Will, and Moral Obligation” in Faith and Philosophy 10 
(1998): 10.  Since I am referencing two Murphy works, I will henceforth cite this one as Murphy, Faith and 
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My rejection of (3) is  largely due to the problem of speech-acts, which I will address in a moment.  I think 
the other concerns we provided before are sufficient for a rejection of (3) as a viable hypothesis.  This may 
just be an instance of inconsistency for Murphy.  Rather than say that the act of will that is relevant is 
God’s will that some persons “be bound by moral requirement to perform a certain action,” he can say the 
relevant act of will is God’s [antecedent] will for an agent to perform an action.     
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willing that is “too strong.”153  If a picture of God’s sovereignty is drawn such that His 
will is efficacious in all human actions, then no one could possibly violate a moral 
requirement.154  Second, if one specifies a sense of willing that is too weak, then it “does 
not seem appropriate to connect that sense to moral obligation.”155  Let us first consider 
the strong sense of God’s willing. 
 The strong sense of “God wills that X” is “that in which God intends that X. 156  
What is needed for DW is a weaker sense of willing that does not entail intending, for 
God’s intentions guarantee a state of affairs obtaining because it follows from God being 
omniscient and rational.”157  As the argument goes, if God is omniscient with regard to 
human actions, then God knows whether or not a certain state of affairs, say Abraham’s 
sacrificing Isaac, obtains.  As Murphy notes, if we suppose that God intends that 
Abraham sacrifice Isaac and God knows that Abraham will not sacrifice Isaac, then God 
is irrational, for “it is irrational to intend a state of affairs that one knows will not 
obtain.”158  The problem is obvious—it must be the case that if God intends this state of 
affairs, then it is not true that God knows that Abraham will not sacrifice Isaac.  If God 
intends the sacrifice to obtain, then God knows that the relevant act of sacrificing will 
obtain.  To state the strong sense of will otherwise, “what God wants God gets.”159  Such 
a result is counterintuitive, for the very problem that we are dealing with is the narrative 
of human moral failure, not success.  We need an account of willing that avoids this 
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counterintuitive approach, one that is strong enough to account for moral obligation but is 
not so strong as to preclude moral violation. 
 At this juncture Murphy considers a promising resolution proposed by Thomas 
Aquinas in the Summa Theologica.  There we find a discussion of how it can be the case 
that God’s will is necessarily fulfilled, in a sense, while circumventing the negative 
effects of the earlier postulates.  Aquinas writes: 
The words of the Apostle, God wills that all men be saved, etc., can be understood 
in three ways.  First, by restricted application, in which case they would 
mean...God wills all men be saved that are saved, not because there is no man 
whom He does not wish to be saved, but because there is no man saved whose 
salvation He does not will.  Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every 
to every class of individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case 
they mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved…but 
not all of every condition.  Thirdly, they are understood of the antecedent will of 
God; not of the consequent will.  This distinction must not be taken as applying to 
the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent or consequent, but to 
the things willed.160  
 
The third construal is what theologians have drawn on to resolve the apparent 
discrepancy in Scripture on doctrines of eschatology and soteriology.  God wills, for 
instance, that all persons be saved and yet not all persons are saved (I Tim. 2:3-4, Matt. 
7:13-14).  A moral corollary may be found in the Holiness Code of the Old Testament or 
in the Sermon on the Mount of the New Testament where Jesus utters the imperative “Be 
perfect as your Father in heaven is perfect (Matt. 5:48).”  As Mark Murphy notes, “What 
makes this coherent is that the sense of willing in which God wills that all be [saved] is 
antecedent: prior to a consideration of all the particulars of a person’s situation.”161  To 
make the moral point, God wills that all men be perfect prior to and independent of any 
action being instantiated by the agent(s).  The sense in which everything that God wills 
                                                 
160 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 1, 272.    
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obtains is grounded in God’s consequent will; that is, posterior to and with regard to 
particular actions by moral agents.  The upshot is that the distinction between God’s 
antecedent and consequent will grounds a sense of willing strong enough for moral 
obligation to obtain, but it is not as strong as the intention thesis that effectually makes 
God the author of sin (for nothing, under this rubric, occurs independent of God’s 
intentions).  Murphy explains: 
There remains the possibility that moral obligations can be held to depend on 
God’s antecedent intentions.  These might be thought to have the requisite 
strength to be associated with moral requirements, and since not all of God’s 
antecedent intentions need be fulfilled, this association would not have the 
unwelcome implication that necessarily no moral obligations are vio lated…This 
is possible, because God’s antecedently willing that S F does not entail that it is 
the case that S will F.162  
 
If we recall, Murphy is a proponent of the DW formulation, whereby morality is 
primarily a matter of God’s will.  I think he has given sufficient defense for the cogency 
of how God can will a state of affairs and yet that state of affairs not obtain.  He 
contends, however, that such a distinction only makes sense under a DW formulation; for 
under the DW formulation “God’s capacity to impose moral obligations is not 
objectionably contingent, depending on a very special set of institutional facts.  Rather, 
what is relevant in a command is that God is expressing His antecedent intentions 
regarding human action.”163  The “institutional facts” Murphy references must be DC’s 
analogue of human speech-acts to that of divine speech-acts; God’s speech-acts impose 
moral obligation in the same way that human speech-acts do.  He writes: 
For it to be possible for one to give another a command to F, there must be a 
linguistic practice available to the addressee in terms of which the speaker can 
formulate a command.  This is not just for the sake of having the means to 
communicate a command; rather; commands are essentially linguistic items, and 
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cannot be defined except in such terms.  Imagine, though, that a certain created 
rational being, Mary, inhabits a linguistic community in which there is no practice 
of commanding.  One can successfully make assertions to Mary…but one cannot 
successfully command Mary to do anything.  Here is the question: so long as 
Mary’s linguistic resources are confined to those afforded by this practice, can 
God impose obligations on her?164  
 
Murphy’s emphasis here is that there is an asymmetrical dependence relationship 
between what God wills and what God commands.  For, as Murphy argues, “It is far from 
clear that it is a real option for God to command that A F while not intending that A 
F.”165  The dependence of the commands on the will hinges on a “sincerity condition,” 
for if God commands what He does not intend, then God is “insincere” in uttering the 
injunction.  Contrariwise, God might intend for humans to act in a certain way while not 
commanding them to do so.166  The reasoning is forthright.  Proponents of DC are bound 
to answer this question in the negative, while proponents of DW answer in the 
affirmative.      
   We have provided the contrast between DW and DC to facilitate our own 
argument for DC, for it is in response to these issues raised by Murphy that we are 
writing.  Before we turn to our own DC construction, there is one more element of 
Murphy’s argument to be considered.  Murphy argues that the DW approach is superior 
to the DC approach for another reason, for DW is “capable of providing defenses of 
several commonly he ld deontic theses that [DC] cannot.”167  Thus, we consider the 
following three theses: 
(1) If one is morally obligated to F, and ? -ing is a necessary means to F- ing, then        
     one is morally obligated to ? . 
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(2) If one is morally obligated to F, then it is possible for one to F (“ought  
     implies can”). 
   
(3) If one is morally obligated to F and is morally obligated to ? , then one is 
morally obligated to F and to ? .168  
 
The claim that God’s intentions regarding human actions determine our moral obligations 
provides an apologetic for DW on all three of these claims.  For if God intends the ends, 
then God intends the means; “So, if God intends that S F, and S’s ? - ing is necessary if S 
is to F, then God (being rational) intends that S ? . ”169  Second, God does not intend what 
God believes to be impossible.  Therefore, “If God believes that it is impossible for S to 
F, then it is impossible for S to F, and God (being rational) does not intend that S F.170  
Finally, it is a tenet of “rational intending” that one’s “separate intentions should be 
joined to an “overarching plan.”  From this we may derive, argues Murphy, that “if God 
intends that S F and God intends that S ? , then God intends that S both F and ?  (and is 
morally obligated to both F and ? ).”171   
 There are other factors Murphy provides as defense, but what we have so far 
suffices for our purposes—at least as a rubric for DW and the concerns for DC.  So what 
is the task for the DC view?  I think our project, in order to be successful, must give 
response to three questions:  
(1) How might the DC proponent respond to the claim that God’s commands are 
only a byproduct of His will (and hence the preeminence of the divine will)? 
 
(2) How might the DC proponent respond to the linguistic analogue of the “non-
imperative community” (see the problem of Mary above)? 
 
(3) How might the DC proponent respond to the claim that only through a DW 
approach may one endorse all three claims regarding rational intending? 
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Divine Command Formulation and the Will of God 
 It should be noted that proponents of DC are not saying that God’s will is 
irrelevant to His commands.  Rather, what proponents of DC are emphasizing is that 
God’s commands bring about moral obligation, and without the requisite act of 
commanding no moral obligation obtains.  Let us now consider a DC argument.     
 First, I agree with Murphy that a distinction must be made between God’s 
antecedent will and God’s consequent will.  But contrary to Murphy, this is what I find 
problematic for the DW proponent.   Robert Adams explains, “The most obvious problem 
for the divine will theories of obligation is that according to most theologies, not 
everything wrong or forbidden by God is in every way contrary to God’s will.”172  
Adams’ contention is that the ground of moral obligation is “not to be found” in God’s 
permissive will (understood as either His consequent or even antecedent will), rather, 
moral obligation obtains under God’s revealed will.173  By revealed will Adams means 
that which is “substantially” the same as God’s commands.174  Thus, the bridge that 
covers the gap between a strictly metaethical project (descriptive) and a normative thesis 
is to be grounded in God’s revealed will.  I will treat the revealed will of God with more 
rigor in my section on speech-acts.               
 But first, what of Murphy’s account of rational being Mary who inhabits a 
community with no concept of imperatives?  Under the DW rubric there is a good story 
to tell as to how God brings about actions in that community, namely that God expresses 
His preferences regarding their actions in given circumstances.  For example, if my wife 
                                                 
172 See Adams , Finite and Infinite Goods, 259. 
173 Ibid., 259. 
174 Here Adams allows for “counsels” or advice, but the actual commands of God are the most narrowly 
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tells me that she would like for me to wash the dishes, then there is enough content in the 
expression of her wishes for me to understand, as a rational agent, what state of affairs 
she desires to see obtain.  Further, there may be enough inflection in her voice and 
sternness in her eyes to relay grades of intensity in her preferences.  Though she cannot 
command me, her will can be known.       
 I will concede that merely from the perspective of the “non-imperatival” 
community an expression of will accomplishes what the DW proponent wants and the 
DC proponent cannot provide.  However, I think that in constructing the community as 
such, Murphy has sacrificed his previous assertion about the sovereignty of God.  Moral 
obligation does not obtain when God merely “prefers” or “wishes for” or even merely 
wills an agent to perform an action; but in fact antecedently wills and commands that 
action to be done.  Previously we noted that Murphy rejected a preferential model of DW, 
for it was not strong enough to account for moral obligation.  So I think the sovereignty 
concern is warranted.  Further, in creating the “non- imperatival” community it seems that 
Murphy cannot account for God’s rationality.  Consider Robert Adams: 
It leaves us faced, however, with the question of why God would ever leave the 
obligatory uncommanded…Why would God ever want something to be 
obligatory but not command it?  Perhaps, of course, in view of a mix of 
advantages and disadvantages, God would have an antecedent but not a 
consequent volition that the action be obligatory, and would not command it; but 
in that case the action would presumably not be obligatory, since what God wills 
antecedently but not consequently does not happen—certainly insofar as it 
depends on God.  So it seems implausible to think of divine volitions regarding 
obligations as grounding obligations without issuing the relevant commands.175   
 
Granted, Adams was not, in this passage, responding to Murphy’s analogy, but I think his 
argument has force there as well.  Traditional Divine Command theories postulate a 
direct connection between what is commanded by God and how the commands are to 
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produce an intention in the agent on whom the command is directed; this falls in line with 
Murphy’s postulate (2) above (the ought implies can principle).  I like the way Robert 
Adams responds to such claim as Murphy’s: 
The main benefit I can see in replacing divine commands with divine will in a 
theory of obligation would be avoiding the problems that attend the requirement 
that commands must be revealed or communicated in order to exist as commands.  
This benefit would depend on the assumption that the relevant divine will can be 
what it is, and impose obligation, without being revealed.  But this yields an 
unattractive picture of divine-human relations, one in which the wish of God’s 
heart imposes biding obligations without even being communicated, much less 
issuing a command.  Games in which one party incurs guilt for failing to guess the 
unexpressed wish of the other party are not nice games.  They are no nicer if God 
is thought of as party to them.176   
 
Murphy may contend that God’s wishes may be expressed; but the problem remains that 
it cannot be done as a command.  So I see no good reason to maintain a DW view as 
opposed to a DC view in Murphy’s analogy.  In fact, if moral obligation is to obtain, then 
the requisite act of commanding is necessary to impose the obligation.   
A Closer Look at Speech-Acts 
 A good question to ask, and one that elicits concern over DW, is whether or not 
God’s commands are speech-acts.  I say this is a concern for DW not because the DW 
proponent must hold that God cannot speak, but rather because DW does not capture 
what occurs when in fact God does speak.  We have noted that Murphy and others hold 
that God’s commands play merely an informative, not a normative one, and that God’s 
will is what obligates.  It is this claim that I want to consider, in light of a distinction 
drawn out in most accounts of speech-acts, namely that between the illocutionary act of 
speech and the perlocutionary act of speech.  Consider this question: if God utters a 
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command, can it be the case that the only thing that happens is that in uttering the 
command God merely informs us of His will?  I will argue against this possibility. 
 In proper speech-act parlance we may ask “if God commands me to X:” 
(1) What does the command of God say?  And,  
(2) What does the command of God do? 
According to J.L. Austin, speech acts have three distinctive elements.177  The “locution” 
is the set of words that is uttered, the “perlocution” is the effect of what is said, and the 
“illocution” is the message conveyed by what is said.  What is important here is that in 
order for speech to be an act, certain conditions must be met; this because speech is 
ingrained in social customs and institutions.178  Take, for example, the following words 
uttered from God to Abraham: 
 (s) Abraham, sacrifice Isaac. 
In uttering this statement several things have been done.  A witness might report that God 
said to Abraham “sacrifice” meaning “take the life of in some way” Isaac.  This is the 
locution of the statement.  Second, in saying to Abraham “sacrifice Isaac” God persuaded 
Abraham to sacrifice Isaac—this is the perlocutionary force of the statement.  Further, 
one may derive from (s) that in uttering those specific words it was the intention of the 
speaker to command Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, rather than offer it as a suggestion or 
merely as a report of the speaker’s desires—especially in light of relevant facts such as 
authorial relations or how institutional authority may obtain between the speaker (God) 
and the hearer (Abraham).  This is the illocutionary force of the speech-act.   
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 The question now becomes whether or not moral obligation is derived from either 
the perlocution or the illocution of divine speech-acts, or perhaps both.  I see this to be 
the case because DW and DC cannot say the same thing here.  If we hold to the DW view 
that commands are the information highway to God’s will, then moral obligation 
obtained (at least logically) before any divine speech-act—and such a contention seems 
incompatible with what speech-act theory proposes.  Divine speech, as it were, is the 
divine action of obligating, and the words of the commands are inseparable from the 
content of the commands.  The DW view, of necessity, separates the content of speech 
from the content of action.   
The DW proponent may at this point recur to the possibility of the “non-
imperatival community” mentioned above, and claim that placing the focus of obligation 
on speech acts fails under this model—for it would then be impossible for non-
imperatival communities to be moral.  But this need not be the case.  Speech-act theory 
allows for indirect speech, which can have the same locution, illocution, and perlocution 
as direct speech.  I think ind irect speech might be what a natural law theorist would 
want—but in this case we need only postulate that so long as divine commands supervene 
on the created order—there is no problem (it’s not either Divine Commands or natural 
law, it is both, narrowly construed).  The difference between DC and natural law is that 
between specific revelation (e.g. the Bible) and general revelation (e.g. the created order).  
The difference between these aspects of revelation is epistemic, not ontological.  Both 
specific and general revelation are divine speech-acts, namely two aspects of God’s 
revealed will.  Specific revelation’s normative force is more likely to seen as true from 
someone from within a theistic tradition because of a commitment to some type of verbal 
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inspiration.  In fact, most theistic traditions have it that their sacred texts are inspired by 
God.  No such theistic (epistemic) commitment is required from the natural law.  It is my 
contention that if divine commands supervene on the natural law, then one may accept 
the normative force of the natural law and not reckon it to its source.  But this difference 
is merely one of how God speaks, not if God speaks.  In other words, the medium of 
speech is not as important as the content of the speech, and in proposing a “non-
imperatival community” as a counterargument against DC on this point is strictly an ad 
hoc maneuver.  Why should we postulate a logical construct where God, qua Creator, 
even considers the act of creating such a community?     
Murphy argues that in order for an argument like mine (and Adams) to pass 
muster, there must be a correlation between human speech-acts and divine speech-acts.  
If this connection cannot be made, then the DW proponent need not waver.  Murphy 
argues, in tandem with Rawls, Simmons, and Searle, that conventional rules and social 
paradigms do not confer moral obligation except by way of a moral principle that “entails 
adherence to those rules is morally required.”179  Against such an objection one may not 
invoke moral obligation in terms of God’s will without question-begging (Why obey 
God—because God said to).  Rather, we must construct an independent moral principle 
that implies that adherence to obligations resulting from divine commands is morally 
binding.  What Murphy has in mind is that mere rules are not moral, nor are positional or 
institutional requirements moral obligations.  Why is this objection so problematic?  
Because if no speech-acts generate moral obligations, then divine speech-acts do not 
generate moral obligations.  But this objection is not, it seems to me, one about speech-
act theory—it seems to be one about God’s authority, which is only manifested in 
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speech-acts.  If we can answer this concern, then I think the speech-act model regains its 
original force, which favors DC and not DW.  Let us consider a response to this 
objection—which is another tour de force from Murphy. 
Suppose we take the line that God’s commands cannot themselves be sufficient 
reasons for obedience; why obey them?  We could say that if we do not obey God, He 
will squash us like a bug; or if we do obey He will reward us handsomely.  In either case 
these appeals, and any others like them, are independent of the content of God’s 
commands, and this makes His act of commanding only one of a number of reasons for 
doing that action. 180  What Murphy argues is that the DC rubric fails to account for God’s 
practical authority. 181  Interestingly enough, his mode of justification for such a view is 
that “authority-bearing acts are content-bearing acts:  they are speech-acts with 
propositional content.”182  Here is where I think Murphy loses one of his major theses.  
Earlier I argued that if one holds to a speech-act view, then it is going to favor a DC 
construct at least insofar as the illocutionary force of the speech-act is concerned.  Recall, 
DW loses the authoritative force of the illocution because the content of God’s will is 
what obligates an agent unto action—especially if, as Murphy later argues, “practical 
authorities constitutively actualize reasons for action by their commanding acts.”183  
Thus, if all we have in divine agency is a being that can, in a speech-act’s perlocution, 
inform us of the content of His will, then it seems that humans can do something through 
speech-acts that God cannot; for the full force of divine speech-acts is stunted in making 
something obligatory that does not rely on the speech-act being complete (locution, 
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perlocution, and illocution).  On the other hand, Murphy might well contend that his 
theory is complete, and that humans can generate moral obligations merely through their 
act of willing, without any recourse to the content of their commanding.  But here I recur 
to Adams’s statement that this would be an unfair game.       
So where does Murphy go to disconnect God’s authority in commanding, so that a 
DW construct is preferable?  He argues it is not the case that God’s omniscience, 
omnipotence, or goodness entails that He has practical authority over us.184  I would like 
to consider what it means for an agent to have practical authority.  If my take on the issue 
is effective, we will see that God is practically authoritative, and the DC has no reason to 
be ill-at-ease.   
The question, it seems, is whether or not practical authority is a divine perfection, 
not whether divine perfections are what ground practical authority. 185  Hence, we cannot 
make an argument from God’s omniscience to His authority because all we get out of the 
omniscience claim is that God knows what decisive reasons an agent has for acting, 
which merely “passes along” information to rational creatures giving them decisive 
reasons to believe that the agent has decisive reasons to perform that action. 186  In other 
words, God’s omniscience entails that He would not tell us to do something when there is 
not a decisive reason for us to do it.   
A similar case can be made from His perfect moral goodness.  If we look to 
morally good agents for insight into a situation, then looking to God for moral insight has 
some purchase; for a fortiori there is no one morally superior to God.  Further, if we take 
the conjunction of God’s omniscience (guaranteeing that He is not prone to epistemic 
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mistakes) with His inherent moral goodness, then an even greater case seems to be made 
for God’s practical authority.  Murphy dissents, arguing that: 
There is a difference between the claim that if God tells us what to do, then we 
have decisive reason to do it and the authority thesis, which is the claim that 
God’s telling us what to do constitutes a decisive reason for doing it.187     
 
In other words, the authority thesis entails the compliance thesis.  If we hold that the 
compliance thesis means an agent has compelling reasons for an action, this does not 
mean that one of those reasons is that God has told him or her to do that action.  If we 
seek the advice of an Aristotelian virtue ethicist who embodies virtue, then this gives us 
reason to think that the virtuous man or woman has better access to independently 
existing practical reasons for action. 188   
 A final consideration is whether or not God’s omnipotence entails practical 
authority.  Murphy argues that God’s omnipotence does not entail His practical authority, 
only theoretical authority; I want to consider why he makes this argument and why we 
should reject it. Certainly divine properties entail theoretical authority over agents, but 
that is not what is at issue here.  Practical authority, writes Murphy, elicits a normative 
power over an agent, whereas theoretical authority does not.189  Thus, if we think of 
omnipotence as a theoretical authority, it “may seem to deny practical authority to God is 
to deny God certain powers, which is tantamount to denying divine omnipotence.”190  If 
God cannot provide sufficient reason through his command for an agent to act, then God 
lacks a power that he could have and apparently does not.  And what is worse, it seems 
that people have this kind of power—we might think of the power of a CEO and over one 
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of his minions as just such a power.  Just as my previous concern with DW is that it 
enables human agents to do something through speech that God cannot, here we have the 
same concern for the DC proponent regarding divine making properties.     
But I think there is a plausible rejoinder to Murphy’s concerns; namely that 
practical authority is to be counted as a divine perfection—and this not in virtue of the 
fact that God is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent.  Rather, practical authority 
is an essential divine property.  I think there are several lines of attack here, the first of 
which resorts to a distinction between direct and indirect speech-acts.  If Murphy’s 
concern is that the direct command of God does not provide an agent with any reason to 
act in a certain way, this need not worry the DC proponent; for we have allowed 
obedience to the natural law to mitigate this concern.  Admittedly, such obedience is not 
in conformance with a divine command issued through God’s literal obligation- 
generating activity through direct speech, but rather conforms to a command given 
through indirect speech.  Even Murphy writes, “it is plausible that states of affairs that 
constitute reason-candidates have their status as such only given certain features of the 
world—features about the nature of the created rational beings in those worlds, the nature 
of the forms of action available to those beings, the characteristics of those being’s 
environment, and so forth.”191  Suppose the supervenience thesis works here, what does it 
say of my previous contention that God’s practical authority is not in virtue of His 
omniscience, and so forth?  Under this construal God’s practical authority follows 
perforce from His creating the world with goodness supervening on it—including the 
intellection of human agents.  This is why the distinction between direct and indirect 
speech is so helpful.  Murphy is simply wrong to argue that God’s commands do not 
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express compelling reasons for an agent to act.  If we consider Abraham, it seems the 
only compelling reason he had to sacrifice Isaac is because God commanded it—there is 
no other story to be told there.  But even if there were, the idea that God’s practical 
authority is diminished by the fact that his direct speech does not have any purchase with 
most agents is not decisive in-and-of- itself.  We may still derive every element of a 
meaningful speech-act theory from the content of God’s indirect speech.  If Murphy’s 
concern is that agents have decisive reason for action, this is just as compelling a case as 
any.  For as every natural law theorist would want to propose, there are some things that 
we can’t not know.  In the order of ontology, this is because these features supervene on 
creation, and have there being from God as their first cause.   
I think my account effectively answers another of Murphy’s concerns, namely 
that divine-making properties must, of necessity, have intrinsic maxima.192  As the 
argument goes, if these properties do not have intrinsic maxima, then it is logically 
possible for God to be more perfect than He is.  Thus: 
For A to be maximally great is for A to be maximally great in every possible 
world with respect to every perfection.  For A to be maximally excellent in a 
world with respect to a perfection P is for A to exhibit P to an extent such that no 
being in any world exhibits P to a greater extent.193      
 
Murphy’s argument regarding practical authority may be characterized thusly: 
1. Divine perfections must have an intrinsic maximum. 
2. Practical authority does not have an intrinsic maximum. 
3. Therefore, practical authority cannot be a divine perfection. 194         
 
The first premise follows from Murphy’s argument about intrinsic maxima—namely that 
no being can be God if it is possible that another being exhibit any of His attributes more 
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perfectly than He.  The second premise hangs on the notion that practical authority 
depends on two things (1) the number of rational beings over whom one is authoritative, 
and (2) on the scope of the actions with respect to which one’s dictates constitute reasons 
for action. 195  Additionally, since the possible beings and scope of actions may be 
increased, there is no intrinsic maximum.  Thus, if practical authority does not have an 
intrinsic maximum, and divine perfections must have an intrinsic maximum, God does 
not have practical authority.     
Concerning this argument, we need first to observe that its first premise may be 
questioned. William Wainwright argues that “one plausible interpretation of Murphy’s 
first premise is that God is unsurpassable in the sense that (1) for each perfection which 
has an intrinsic maximum, God exhibits it to the utmost degree, and (2) for each 
perfection that lacks an intrinsic maximum, God exhibits it to a superlative degree and is 
such that no other possible being exhibits it to a greater degree.”196  This reading of the 
premise is problematic, however, for while it allows that some divine perfections need 
not admit of an intrinsic maximum, thus blunting the force of the objection, it leaves open 
the possibility that God might have been more perfect than He is.  But this need not be a 
concern, for if the argument has it is as a logical possibility that another agent might 
exhibit more excellence than God, we need not accept this as true.  What we must 
conclude, it seems, is that for whatever degree of excellence any agent may exhibit, God 
exhibits it nearer to its upper maximum than any other possible being.  Admittedly, I find 
it suspect that one deny every perfect or excellent making property does not exhibit an 
intrinsic maximum, but that is not the concern here.  The broadly logical possibility that 
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an agent exhibit said features in greater fashion than God is the issue—and in no way 
must we say this (logically or otherwise).   
Concerning the second premise, Murphy has confused a distinction between a 
being possessing a divine perfection and exercising a divine perfection.197  William 
Wainwright argues, correctly I think, that we can distinguish between God’s “creative 
power” and it exercise.  To quote Wainwright: 
That God creates 5 billion rational beings in possible world w1 and 150 billion 
rational beings in possible world w2 doesn’t entail that God has more creative 
power in w2 than in w1 since, while God has created 5 billion rational beings in 
w1, he could have created more.198  
 
I suspect that even if one holds that God could have created a better world, producing 
more goodness in it than that of the actual world, does not diminish His goodness in any 
way; rather, it admits of a distinction between the possession of goodness as an intrinsic 
property of that being (in this case God), and the manifestation of that perfection through 
His creative power.  Likewise, the distinction between the possession of practical 
authority and its exercise has some purchase here.  Even if there is a concern that God 
practices more practical authority in w2 than in w1 does not mean He possesses any less 
in one world over the other.  So I think that Murphy’s objection, as it stands is not enough 
to defeat what the DC proponent needs with regard to the content of God’s commands 
qua practical authority.                              
Moral Obligation and Morally Defective Agents 
 Thus far we have shown how God’s will is integrated into a DC theory, and we 
have seen why a DC model is preferable to a DW model in normative ethics.  I now want 
to offer an account of moral obligation, and explain why moral obligation binds only on 
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defective agents.  In brief, one consequence of my view is that God has no obligations, 
moral or otherwise.  Once a meaningful theory has been set forth, I will then propose how 
my theory affects the narrative in Genesis 22, otherwise known as the binding of Isaac 
(which will be addressed in a later chapter). 
 In order to present a coherent theory of moral obligation, we need to delineate a 
distinction between two terms, the good and the right.  It is a tenet of Christianity tha t 
God is essentially good.  I will give more attention to what this means when I address the 
Euthyphro dilemma in chapter V, but suffice it to say that God, existing sans creation, 
embodied everything that is good and did so independent of any external constraint; for 
no external agency exists to constrain God in such a context—that of God as the First 
Cause.  Since I am working under a Christian rubric, this means that the Trinity 
embodied perfect-making features, such as love, without any necessitating external cause.  
This framework provides the background for our discussion of the relationship between 
the good and the right, for the good exists anterior to the right.  However, I will be 
arguing that moral obligation follows from what is right, and what is right is grounded in 
that which is goodness itself.  What is important to note at this point is that members of 
the Trinity were not obligated in any way to exhibit perfect making features; the 
commitment is to the idea that God is goodness itself.     
 What every ethical theory that strives for objectivity requires is an account of 
moral obligation that has moral value prior to the obligation.  If we propose moral 
obligation as something that binds an agent to some moral good, then the value must exist 
(at least logically) before any agent is obligated to it.  As such, we may disagree with the 
postulate that moral obligation exists before moral good, either temporally or logically, 
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the supposed entailment of which is that moral good is the byproduct of moral obligation.  
If this is correct, then the implications for moral agency are quite clear.  Moral obligation 
is understood as the condition that binds an agent morally to some action; which requires 
some agent for whom it is binding.  If, however, an agent is essentially morally good, 
then nothing binds that agent to a moral obligation.  Moral obligation requires an agent 
who is ontologically capable of doing moral evil, and the purpose of the obligation is to 
draw the agent away from an action (of negative value) that he is about to perform.  
Moral good is the standard by which all obligations obtain, and obligation is the medium 
between moral good and morally defective agents.  Given that we began this section by 
noting moral goodness is metaphysically prior to moral obligations, it is possible for us to 
do moral good before or without being under any moral obligations.  As such, God, who 
is essentially morally good, does good without being under any obligation.  In fact, it is 
conceptually incoherent to suppose that God requires anything to “draw” Him away from 
one action and to another if our supposition is that He is goodness itself.   
 Another consideration that is important here is that it is entirely unclear who it is 
that could obligate God.  It is part of the very concept of obligation that the one who is 
under an obligation is subordinate to the one who obligates.  Such a notion restricts the 
class of potential “obligators” down to a very narrow field when we are speaking of 
divine obligation, for none of us has the authority to obligate God to any action.  It seems, 
prima facie, that we could hold God accountable for the promises He has made, and in 
this sense have an account of divine obligation.  But I think this line of argument fails as 
well.  First, given that the source of the obligation to keep promises would be God, there 
must be some sort of coherence to the notion of a first person imperative.  However, there 
 87 
is no good reason to suppose this is coherent.  Suppose God promises to bless Abraham.  
Under the first person construct, the obligation would follow from a divine imperative to 
the same agent: “I command myself to bless Abraham.”  But this is exactly where the 
incoherence resides; for if God obligates Himself unto action, then it is because He 
knows He is not likely to perform that action—obligation creation, if we remember, is 
where one agent draws another into an action they are otherwise not going, or are not 
likely to, perform.  Second, in order for God to obligate Himself, He has to have authority 
over Himself in order to obligate Himself (at least morally).  I think it is clear that this 
makes no sense whatsoever in terms of the concept employed (i.e. authority) or the 
possibility of applying it.   
More could be said, but I think one more thought on this line is enough.  If we 
agree that first person imperatives are incoherent, then perhaps we can re-track and 
ground divine accountability in the content of what God reveals.  God promises to bless 
Abraham, therefore Abraham has it to his advantage to hold God to His promise.  But this 
is to confuse obligation with accountability.  Persons are held accountable (at least rightly 
held accountable) for actions because they have failed to do something to which they 
were previously obligated.  Since God has no obligations and this because there is no 
necessity to Him being drawn to keep His promises, it is hard to see how one might hold 
Him accountable.  Thus, the best way to understand what occurs when God makes 
promises is as a report.  God’s promise to Abraham is a report of the way things are 
going to be between God and Abraham.  I will be arguing in chapter V that God is 
essentially morally good, and as such no obligation is needed to guarantee the content of 
His promise-making or actions. Suffice it to say at this point, what it would mean for God 
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to be obligated is entirely unclear.  Persons do not have the position to obligate Him, nor 
is there any coherence to the notion that He obligates Himself.  To morally obligate 
someone is for a person of superior stature to bind another to a specific action; thus moral 
obligation only obtains on morally defective agents.                     
Conclusion 
 What we have been considering in this chapter is how a DC proponent can hold 
such a view to be superior to DW constructions.  It has been my intent to substantiate 
most of what the DW proponent wants, especially DW accounts that ground moral 
responsibility as in some way deriving from God’s antecedent will.  But what we noticed 
is that DW views are incomplete, for the bridge between the content of God’s will (a 
metaethical issue) and moral obligation (a normative thesis) resides in God’s revealed 
will.  To substantiate this claim we have given attention to how speech-acts are to be 
understood in a DC view, and that DC is a more complete system to ground how it is, via 
speech-acts, God obligates through His commands.   
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CHAPTER V 
THE EUTHYPHRO DILEMMA 
 
In this chapter I am going to consider an argument that, if successful, seriously 
damages the plausibility of any Divine Command theory of ethics.  Some consider it to 
be the earliest formulation of what a DC theory entails, only to subvert such a theory to a 
logical conundrum and utter defeat.  Of course I am speaking of the Euthyphro dilemma 
that comes from the Platonic dialogue Euthyphro.  There we are invited to consider the 
ramifications of endorsing a strong theistic ethic.  I like Bertrand Russell’s formulation of 
the problem.  He writes: 
 The point I am concerned with, if you are quite sure there is a difference between 
 right and wrong, you are in this situation:  is that difference due to God’s fiat or is 
 it not?  if it is due to God’s fiat, then for God Himself there is no difference 
 between right and wrong, and it is no longer a significant statement to say that 
 God is good.  If you are going to say, as the theologians do, that God is good, you 
 must then say that right and wrong have some meaning which is independent of 
 God’s fiat, because God’s fiats are good and not bad independently of the mere 
 fact that He made them.   If you are going to say that, you will then have to say 
 that it is not only through God that right and wrong came into being, but that they 
 are in their essence logically anterior to God.199  
 
Even on a cursory reading we may see the force of the dilemma.  If a theist argues that 
God loves right actions because they are right, then it follows that these actions are right 
independently of God’s loving them.  For instance, if God were not to exist, the actions 
would be categorized as right would still be right.  God, ontologically speaking, does not 
provide the foundation for ethics (as the objection goes).  Further, “if the moral law were 
independent of God’s will, then He no less than we, would be under an obligation to obey 
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it.”200  Such a claim demeans any strong notion of God’s freedom, even if it were to be 
the case that God created the world; for prior to creation these moral “brute facts” exist 
and God, whose very nature is to do good, must create the world such that those features 
supervene on creation (God is morally constrained to create the best possible world). 
 On the other hand, if the theist says that right actions are right because God loves 
them, then it seems that any action God loves is right in virtue of God having loved that 
action.  If God does not have “good moral reasons” for His commands, then His 
commands are “from the moral point of view, completely arbitrary, and we have no 
obligation to obey them.”201  In a nutshell, advocates of DC need to do one of two things.  
The first is “admit that God’s commands are not backed by any further moral reasons, 
while insisting that we nevertheless have an obligation to obey them.”202  The second 
option is “try to show that the moral values that rationalize God’s commands are not 
independent of God and do not compromise His sovereignty.”203   
 Of course, the Euthyphro dilemma becomes a more compelling story if one agrees 
that these two options exhibit all of the possibilities; either the arbitrary will formulation 
or the independence formulation.  However, a number of other options are available to 
the DC ethicists that serve to counter this claim.  One may argue that the logic of Socrates 
as presented in the Euthyphro is not sound, for it is based upon a false dichotomy; or one 
may make the claim that the mode of God’s willing is His perfect nature.  Each of these 
views requires unpacking.  I will first argue that the logic of Euthyphro is faulty when 
one considers the dilemma in light of the doctrine of divine simplicity.  After articulating 
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the logical problem, and providing a preliminary defense of divine simplicity, I will then 
turn my attention in the next chapter to other problems that confront such a doctrine; we 
will first consider whether or not postulating such a doctrine diminishes God’s freedom, 
and then we will consider whether or not simplicity diminishes God’s power.        
It is my contention that the theist is on firm ground if he claims that God’s 
goodness is best articulated through the doctrine of divine simplicity.  According to 
divine simplicity God’s nature is not composed of different properties (e.g. omnipotence, 
omniscience), but rather God is a being itself subsisting, whole and entire with no 
differentiation of parts.  If one looks more closely at, for example, the postulate of 
Bertrand Russell, he makes an implicit commitment to the bifurcation between properties 
from and the being that exemplifies those properties.  However, such a bifurcation is not 
an essential theistic belief, for the doctrine of divine simplicity has substantial support in 
the annals of theistic literature (especially Christian).  If the property/exemplar dichotomy 
is rejected, then one has good reason for arguing that the Euthyphro dilemma does not 
hold.  I will now turn my attention to offering an account of divine simplicity, and of how 
this doctrine resolves the apparent dilemma. 
The Logic of Euthyphro and Divine Simplicity 
 Postulating a doctrine of divine simplicity as a defeater of the Euthyphro dilemma 
is not without historical foundation.  In a relatively recent article, Norman Kretzmann 
argues that the Euthyphro is dissolved on just such a doctrine.  According to Kretzmann 
there are two theories of religious morality that can be extracted from Euthyphro, 
theological objectivism (Euthyphro’s first horn) or theological subjectivism (Euthyphro’s 
second horn): 
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 (TO) God approves of right actions just because they are right and disapproves of 
 wrong actions just because they are wrong.  
 
 (TS) Right actions are right just because God approves of them and wrong actions 
 are wrong just because God disapproves of them.204 
 
The important project is to show how Kretzmann thinks that (TO) and (TS) are resolved 
through simplicity, a doctrine which maintains: 
 God is radically unlike creatures in that he is devoid of any complexity or 
 composition, whether physical or metaphysical.  Besides lacking spatial and 
 temporal parts, God is free of matter/form composition, potency/act composition, 
 and existence/essence composition.  There is also no real distinction between God 
 as subject of his attributes and his attributes.  God is thus in a sense requiring 
 clarification identical to each of his attributes, which implies that each attribute is 
 identical to every other one.  God is omniscient, then not in virtue of instantiating 
 or exemplifying omniscience—which would imply a real distinction between God 
 and the property of omniscience—but by being omniscience.  And the same holds 
 for each of the divine omni-attributes:  God is what he has.  As identical to each 
 of his attributes, God is identical to his nature.  And since his nature or essence is 
 identical to his existence, God is identical to his existence.205 
 
More specifically, Kretzmann emphasizes the entailment of such a doctrine on identity 
statements, that “God is good” is more precisely phrased “God is identical with 
goodness.”206  To be more specific, God is goodness made real, not just the property of 
goodness, but the reality of goodness.   
 It seems that one may hold a Platonic account and still derive the same identity 
claim, namely that “God is good” means that “God is identical with the [property of 
goodness].”  Yet such a distinction is exactly what proponents of divine simplicity desire 
to avoid, for though God may be exemplifying the same properties, the emphasis for 
simplicity is that these properties are descriptive of God’s essence, not their own essence 
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that God chose to exemplify (even eternally).  Thus, we may delineate a distinction 
between kinds of identity claims.  Borrowing from Frege, “there are two kinds of identity 
claims, uninformative, as in 9 = 9, and informative, as in 9 = 32.”207  The counterpart to 
our moral discussion obviously involves informative identity claims.   
 Consider Frege’s famous analogy involving the morning star, the evening star, 
and the planet Venus.  Given that these three names designate the same referent, then “it 
is true and informative to say that the morning star is identical with the evening star.”208  
By identical he must mean to imply that both the morning star and evening star have all 
and only the same properties.  Yet one may consistently hold that the morning star and 
the evening star are not altogether the same.  For “if we focus on the designations rather 
than on the phenomena themselves, we say that the designations “morning star” and 
“evening star” differ in sense although they are identical in reference.”209  Thus we have 
two expressions with one and the same referent, and yet have two different senses.  The 
analogue to simplicity is quite forthright.  We have God’s goodness, God’s power, and 
God, respectively.210  The purported strength of such a distinction is that “when God is 
conceived of as identical with perfect goodness, the kind of distinction that was crucial 
between (TO) and (TS) becomes a mere stylistic variation.”211  Thus we arrive at 
“simplicity counterparts” to (TO) and (TS): 
 (PBO) God conceived of as perfect goodness itself sanctions certain actions just 
 because they are right and rules out certain actions just because they are wrong. 
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 (PBS) Certain actions are right just because God conceived of as perfect goodness 
 itself sanctions them, and certain actions are wrong just because God conceived of 
 as perfect goodness itself rules them out.212 
 
What we derive from (PBO) and (PBS) is an objective standard of good that is the sole 
criterion of moral rightness and wrongness, namely God; these standards follow from His 
nature, for He has these properties essentially.  This is a marked advance from (TO) and 
(TS), for they left us at the hands of the dilemma with no apparent hope of resolution.  
Now we may claim that (PBO) and (PBS) are two ways of saying the same thing: 
“actions are right if and only if goodness certifies them as such, and goodness certifies 
actions as right if and only if they are so.”213  God is conceived of as “the ultimate judge 
who is identical with the ultimate criterion itself.”214  Therefore, the bifurcation between 
(TO) and (TS) does not obtain under this construction, and the chasm between 
theological objectivism and theological subjectivism collapses.  If there is no dichotomy, 
then there is no Euthyphro dilemma. 
 Of course, postulating the simplicity doctrine (henceforth SD) as a defeater of the 
Euthyphro objection is not without its problems, for the doctrine is highly controversial.  
Norman Kretzmann’s presentation is no exception, for as William Mann argues, “the 
solution is too good to be true…because he [Kretzmann] is willing to trade in the locution 
‘just because’ for the locution ‘if and only if’.  If those locutions were interchangeable, 
then we could express [Kretzmann] slightly differently:” 
(PBO*) God conceived of as a moral judge identical with perfect goodness itself 
approves of right actions if and only if they are right and disapproves of wrong 
actions if and only if they are wrong. 
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(PBS*) Right actions are right if and only if God conceived of as a moral judge 
identical with perfect goodness itself approves of them and wrong actions are 
wrong if and only if God conceived of as a moral judge identical with perfect 
goodness itself disapproves of them. 215 
 
What Mann has drawn out of Kretzmann’s argument is the presumption that the ‘just 
because’ clause in (PBO) and (PBS) record “genuine asymmetries.”216  Based on this 
presumption Kretzmann is able to claim that the two horns end up being equivalent.  
However, if there is a causal asymmetry that obtains between God’s act of approval and 
the rightness of the action, the question of which of the two is prior may still be revised, 
which would undermine the resolution provided by Kretzmann.  I think this objection is 
substantial for the SD proponent, and requires further attention.  Let us look closer at 
Mann’s argument, and see how the SD proponent might respond. 
 William Mann proposes a “modal analogue” to the discussion between 
objectivism and subjectivism, having to do with the relationship between God and 
necessary truths.  The alternatives are: God either affirms necessarily true propositions 
because they are necessarily true, or necessarily true propositions are necessarily true 
because God affirms them.  SD proponents would presumably want to restate these 
alternatives as follows: 
(NPN) God conceived of as omniscience itself affirms necessarily true 
propositions if and only if they are necessarily true and denies necessarily false 
propositions if and only if they are necessarily false. 
 
(NPG) Necessarily true propositions are necessarily true if and only if God 
conceived of as omniscience itself affirms them and necessarily false propositions 
are necessarily false if and only if God conceived of as omniscience itself denies 
them.217 
                                                 
215 Mann, William, “Modality, Morality, and God” in Nous 23 (1989): 85. 
216 Ibid., 85. 
217 Ibid., 88.  I have renamed Mann’s propositions to account for the biconditional relationship.  Thus, 
(NPN) holds that God affirms that certain propositions are necessarily true, whereas (NPG) holds that these 
propositions are necessary because Go d affirms them.  
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Of course, the analogy between (TO), (TS), (NPN), and (NPG) are exact.  (NPN) 
suggests that God knows all necessary truths, affirms their necessity, and cannot curtail 
their necessity.  Further, the necessity of such propositions as 2 + 2 = 4 determines the 
content of God’s belief.  (NPG) implies on the other hand that it is God’s willing 2 +2 = 4 
to be necessarily true that causes this to be so.  How can it be tha t necessary truths are 
dependent on God, yet God cannot revise them? 
 It is fair to suppose that freedom (in this case God’s freedom in creation) involves 
“the agent’s ability to bring about the opposite outcome or allow the opposite outcome to 
occur; let us call this the liberty of indifference.”218  Consider the proposition: 
(1) 2 + 2 = 4 if and only if God affirms that 2 + 2 = 4 
If we suppose the liberty of indifference applies to God, and not only contingent 
creatures, then we are forced to admit that God is not free with regard to (1), for He does 
not have the power to actualize its negation.  Following Mann, proponents of (NPN) 
affirm an epistemic variant of (1):  
 2 + 2 = 4 if and only if God believes that 2 + 2 = 4 
  Proponents of (NPG) affirm a volitional variant:   
 2 + 2 = 4 if and only if God wills that 2 + 2 = 4219 
However, the dichotomy between the epistemic proposition and the volitional proposition 
never obtains under SD.  Proponents of the epistemic thesis hold that beliefs are proper 
only in regard to how they correspond to the way the world is.  But this presupposes there 
is a Platonic mathematical realm prior to the exercise of God’s will as Creator.  Under 
this construal God has a belief, in this case regarding the necessity of the proposition 2 + 
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2 = 4, and this belief is independent of His will.  As such, God’s knowledge regarding the 
proposition is strictly a matter of intellection; that is, God’s beliefs about the proposition 
are mediated through something other than His creative will.  But as Mann notes, and 
properly I think, there are two implications for SD in our discussion of epistemic priority.  
The first is the equivalence of God’s “believing with God’s knowing” and the second is 
“the identity of God’s knowing with God’s willing.”220 
 According to SD, God’s believing 2 + 2 = 4 is God’s willing that 2 + 2 = 4.  As 
Mann explains: 
It is not as if there are two separate faculties in God, an epistemic faculty and a 
volitional faculty.  It is rather that there is one divine activity, which in some 
respects from our point of view is more aptly called his believing or knowing, and 
in other respects more aptly called His willing.221 
 
The implications of this are forthright.  The proponent of SD affirms necessary 
propositions are unchangeable, but also that God wills their content to be exactly what it 
is.  Thus we can… 
 
think of the necessity of truths not as templates according to which even God 
must channel His activities in the act of creation, but rather as part of the creative 
expression of this perfectly rational will.222 
 
In holding that God is perfectly rational, the SD proponent holds that God’s knowing will 
is the ground of knowledge of all true propositions, contingent or necessary that they are 
true, and of all false propositions that they are false. 
 The epistemic variant of the original Euthyphro dilemma only works if one 
dissociates God’s knowledge and will, which is exactly what SD does not affirm.  Divine 
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Simplicity does not claim that God’s understanding of necessary truths is logically prior 
to his willing them.  In fact, there is no difference in these actions.  There is an obvious 
distinction in the descriptions between His knowing and willing, but this does not entail 
that these are ontologically distinct; the descriptive distinction resides in how we think 
about God.  Given this, there is no logical division between His knowing and willing.  So 
the chasm between (NPN) and (NPG) is bridged on the simplicity doctrine, and the DC 
proponent need not accept the epistemic variant of the Euthyphro as a threat.                 
 We have given sufficient attention to the logical problem of Euthyphro’s 
dilemma, and have shown that the doctrine of divine simplicity provides a sound defense 
of the problems posed in Euthyphro’s disjunction.  We have argued that the success of 
the disjunction relies on the mistake of believing we must prioritize either God’s 
knowledge or God’s volition, which actually are not distinct when one endorses a view of 
God as perfectly simple.   
The Euthyphro and Non-Divine Command Theories 
 There is a reason for thinking that no matter what framework we endorse as our 
moral position the Euthyphro dilemma may be raised.  And of course there is no reason 
why a DC ethic should be rejected merely on the basis of the Euthyphro if a sufficient 
case can be made that everyone must give an answer to it.  So why do I think that 
everyone has a Euthyphro dilemma?  Part of the response hinges on the nature of the 
argument itself—but only in an implicitly epistemic sense.  If we say that God is good it 
seems we are using a pre-existing nexus of value concepts to make that claim, or so the 
objector proposes.  I’ve tried to give reason as to why a simplicity doctrine resolves this 
concern, but even if it does not I still think there is another line of response to be made—
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namely to consider the opponent’s view and see if it fairs any better with the same 
problems.  Simply put the concern is whether or not naturalistic accounts of goodness 
require an external, independent standard to which they conform.  Upon closer inspection 
we will find that they do, and that there is no compelling response to this problem, so that 
the non-theist is in no better shape, at least as far as the Euthyphro objection goes, than 
the DC theorist.  For, suppose we endorse a Platonic criteria of goodness where goodness 
is a property much like a brute fact.  All we have done in postulating this entity is to 
move the question back one step.  Granted, this view allays any arbitrariness—but has in 
the meantime sacrificed efficient causation.  Forms, ideas, abstracta are all causally inert, 
and do not cause things to be a certain way.  How, then, do the Forms come to be as they 
are?  There is also the lingering infinite regress problem, namely why is it the case that 
these ideas may be postulated, but not verified, as the ultimate stopping point for values?  
It seems consistent to ask whether or not we can gauge these ideas or Forms by yet 
another standard of goodness that supervenes on them—and the infinite regress begins 
anew.  If the Platonist argues that the Forms are where the evaluations cease, then the 
theist is on firm ground in making the same claim about God.  But as I’ve said, at least 
the theist may postulate not only that God defeats the infinite regress problem, God also 
defeats the problem of causation and agency to bring about these states of affairs. 
 Perhaps a teleological ethic is on safer grounds—more specifically a utilitarian 
schema for determining an “ultimate criterion” for moral values.  On this point I think 
Edward Wierenga is correct.  He writes: 
We may note that if the objection [Euthyphro] is correct, it can also be applied 
against utilitarianism:  “we must judge for ourselves whether an act whose utility 
is as great as any of its alternatives is right.  To judge this is to make a moral 
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decision, so that in the end, so far from morality being based on utility, utility is 
based on morality.”223 
 
What is at issue here, I think, is the concern over who has last say in what grounds these 
values—what is the “stopping point” that provides the grounds of these values?  The 
necessity of the stopping point just is that it provides resolution to infinite regress 
concerns, that values are not inextricably tied to other systems or account of evaluation.  
Thus, when we ask “what is good about…” we want the definitive account of good-
making properties, not merely an account of these properties.  As William Alston notes: 
Whether we are Platonist or particularist, there will be some stopping place in the 
search for explanation.  An answer to the question ‘What is good about?’ will, 
sooner or later, cite certain good-making characteristics.  We can then ask why we 
should suppose that goodness supervenes on those characteristics.  In answer 
either a general principle or an individual paradigm is cited.  But whichever it is, 
that is the end of the line…On both views something is taken as ultimate, behind 
which we cannot go, in the sense of finding some explanation of the fact that it is 
constitutive of goodness.  I would invite one who finds the invocation of God as 
the supreme standard arbitrary, to explain why it is more arbitrary than the 
invocation of a supreme general principle.224 
 
In lieu of our argument of chapter III, it will certainly be the case that relativistic theories 
of any stripe will not sufficiently allay the concerns of Euthyphro, nor will it be the case 
that the most sophisticated system of noncognitivism will suffice either.  The purpose of 
this reductio is that it takes the problem to where it really needs to be—not prioritizing its 
implications only on one view.  Through a simplicity doctrine I provided how a DC 
theorist might want to respond to Euthyphro’s concerns; in this section I have provided a 
defense.  Of course, the aim of this element is not to argue that since it is the case that 
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224 William Alston, What Euthyphro Should Have Said” in The Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and 
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everyone has a Euthyphro dilemma DC is true.  Rather, my aim in this section has been 
to sober up the minds of the objectors whose rejection of DC hinges on Euthyphro.225   
Other Considerations  
 In chapter IV we took specific steps to delineate a distinction between something 
being good and something being right.  Recall that goodness is a value term that exists 
(logically) independent of actions that are categorized as right; right actions are those 
whose actualization follows in acting from the force of a rule rather than acting in accord 
with a rule.  This highlights an important note in our discussion of Euthyphro.  On a 
pragmatic level it is a “truism” of “evaluational” development that some persons come to 
understand goodness through someone who embodies these properties rather than 
understanding the rules by which these properties are being governed.  But to point out 
the obvious, what this says of the one acting lovingly, virtuously, and so forth, is not that 
they do it out of external compulsion, but that it may be their very nature to act in just 
such a way.  If God’s actions do have a moral component, it does not follow from the 
idea that He acted under the compulsion of a rule to overcome His hellish proclivities.  It 
does not follow from anything we have postulated that an action is moral only if it is 
performed under obligation.  Instances of supererogation defeat such a claim.  Even so, if 
it is the case that one argues that acting morally is a byproduct of acting under obligation, 
it still does not follow that we cannot speak of God’s goodness as an amoral fact about 
Him.  I reject such a claim because of its obvious absurdities—the most significant of 
which is that God is not “morally” good.  However, I bring this up merely as a 
counterpart to the claim that if we endorse the obligation model of goodness, it is 
logically impossible for God to be good.     
                                                 
225 For instance, Kai Nielson. 
 102 
 Suppose for a moment that we allow for Platonic essences.  All of the fears of 
arbitrariness are resolved, and so long as one endorses an account of divine goodness that 
makes it out to be an attribute like the goodness of any other thing, there is no problem 
with God being good.  I think there is another concern besides the problem of God’s 
aseity that requires attention here.  It seems to be a leap in logic to infer that if Platonic 
Forms exist, then God depends on them to account for His goodness.  Certainly this 
dependence relationship is not one of causal dependence—the Forms are causally inert.  
This is not insignificant, for the original assertion of the dialogue I think is best read as a 
causal model.  Consider again Plato’s construction of the dilemma through the mouth of 
Socrates: 
Consider this:  is the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it 
pious because it is being loved by the gods?226 
 
We may now recast the argument in its logical form.  In order for Socrates to succeed, the 
two possibilities must be held as a disjunctive dilemma—that if we endorse the first horn 
of the dilemma there are unacceptable consequences, and likewise if we accept the 
second horn of the dilemma.  The conclusion, based on this structure should be that one 
cannot claim either aspect of the disjunction to be true without falling into problems.  
Socrates comes to a different conclusion.  Given the absurdity of the claim that the good 
is determined by the gods it must follow that the other horn is true, QED.  But we’ve 
noted the problems of causation for Platonic models, so the causal line of argument is far 
from conclusive. 
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If we deny the relationship in the disjunction as one of cause and effect, we must 
then ask what the relationship actually entails.  Perhaps we could postulate an identity 
claim as a rejoinder.227  In doing so another line might be provided that shows no 
disjunctive dilemma exists to be resolved.  Euthyphro might have responded to Socrates 
by saying “I have made an identity claim, similar to ‘Jocasta is Oedipus’ mother.’  Am I 
required to say that she is Jocasta because she is Oedipus’ mother, or that she is Oedipus’ 
mother because she is Jocasta?”228  Such an identity claim is not to be understood in 
terms of a causal relationship, and provides sufficient reason to deny the conclusion of 
the dilemma.  
  The problem in postulating identity claims is that one must ground what kind of 
identity claim is being made.  Here it seems to refer to a being’s properties, and given our 
previous assertion of SD, this poses the question of how we are to understand properties 
and identity.  Alvin Plantinga, contra SD, argues: 
 If God is identical with each of his properties, then, since each of his properties is 
 a property, he is a property—a self-exemplifying property.  Accordingly God has 
 just one property: himself.  This view is subject to a difficulty both obvious and 
 overwhelming.  No property could have created the world; no property could be 
 omniscient, or indeed know anything at all.  If God is a property, then he isn’t a 
 person but a mere abstract object; he has no knowledge, awareness, power, love, 
 or life.  So taken the simplicity doctrine seems an utter mistake.229 
       
 Hanink and Mar argue that Plantinga’s challenge misses the point.  The “believer” 
confesses that God is both “person” and “Perfect Righteousness” which allows for the 
conclusion that the property of Perfect Righteousness is a person. 230  Such a response will 
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only work if one allows for the possibility that persons and properties are not distinct as a 
matter of conceptual necessity, which is what SD wants—at least regarding divine 
ontology.  The alternative is that we have a being that (in this instance) either exemplifies 
Perfect Righteousness or Perfect Righteousness is essentially a part of His nature; that is, 
righteousness is an essential attribute of God but “not identical with Him.”231  Hanink and 
Mar contend that such a supposition is acceptable, that “God’s uncreated but essential 
righteousness is dependent on Him for its existence and identity in a way that does not 
make God’s existence equally dependent on His righteousness.”232  This relationship is 
much like natural numbers, where the number one is an “essential member” of the set of 
natural numbers.  The set cannot exist without the number one, nor can the number one 
exist without the natural number system.  It is still consistent, though, to maintain that the 
system of natural numbers is “metaphysically more rich” than the number one.233  By 
parity of reasoning, there is no righteousness without God and there is no God without 
righteousness.  All this argument seems to show, though, is tha t if one holds to a 
bifurcation of persons and properties, it still does not follow that the disjunctive dilemma 
of Euthyphro holds.  This is no small contribution, for what it elicits is that even if the 
coherence of SD is questioned, the validity of the disjunction still remains problematic.   
 There is one more thing I would like to consider about the structure of Euthyphro, 
and this goes to the causal language integrated into the dialogue.  If we have recourse to 
the assertion of Socrates, and allow for the use of the term “because” in his original 
argument, it is not at all clear that the meaning of “because” is indefeasibly connected to 
God’s reasons for approval—which is what the Euthyphro dilemma requires.  Thus, what 
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we are aiming at here is allowing for the claim that for some action, God approves of that 
action because it is good.  If I approve of Eggplant Ponchartrain because it is the perfect 
blend of textured eggplant, Ponchartrain sauce, and angel hair pasta, then these properties 
must be in the dish for me to discover them.  These properties are a part of the dish such 
that they do not depend on my having eaten or even ascribed these properties to it.  But as 
Richard Joyce has noted, some “because” claims are better understood as “in virtue of” 
relations rather than cause and effect relations.234  For example, if we say Allen is a 
bachelor because he is an unmarried man, we do not understand this as a cause and effect 
relationship.  Allen is a bachelor in virtue of the fact that he is an unmarried man.  
Seemingly this relationship is symmetrical even in a materially equivalent construct.  But 
certainly what is not gotten at here is that Allen is unmarried because he is a bachelor, 
where “because” means his being a bachelor is a reason for his being unmarried.235   
One might argue that if God’s reason for loving a thing is not grounded in the 
thing itself, then His love is arbitrary.  But this need not be the case.  It is compatible with 
our thesis that (1) an act is right because God wills it, and (2) God wills an act because it 
contributes to human flourishing.  What this does not entail is that human flourishing is 
fundamentally what makes an act right.  (1) Expresses a metaphysical relationship 
whereby the rightness of right actions consists in God’s willing them.  And I think it is 
consistent to say that (2) comports with my earlier thesis that DC and natural law may 
coalesce on a level of divine supervening.  More explicitly, what DC and natural law both 
assert has its genesis in God’s will.  Part of natural law theory is that persons have a 
human nature that is contingent on God’s creative will.  Thus, when God exercised His 
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creative will and brought human nature into existence, there was a blueprint for its full 
realization.  Though I have disagreed with Hanink and Mar in other areas, this is one 
point upon which we converge, namely that DC and natural law form a structural unity; 
insofar that they do, the objection that the moral law is arbitrary fades.  Hanink and Mar 
write: 
In willing human nature, God also wills the realization of human nature.  
Moreover, in the Decalogue—to take the central case—God’s will operates 
legislatively.  This realization of human nature is worked out in the conducting of 
human life.  One’s life is excellent insofar as one is rightly oriented toward the 
goods that constitute human happiness.  One is virtuous insofar as one’s conduct 
is habituated in obedience to God’s legislative will.236    
                
 I think another important aspect of the Euthyphro problem rests on the theological 
distinction between the gods of Homer and Hesiod and the transition to the traditional 
Hebraic God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.237  None of the Hellenistic gods were, 
ontologically speaking, that than which none greater can be conceived.  In other words, 
there is no Greek god that embodies each of the perfect making features of divinity.  I 
think this inspires much of the concern found in Socrates’ claim, but does not warrant any 
more consideration for our purposes.               
The Binding of Isaac  
 The narrative that most plagues DC theorists is found in Genesis 22, a narrative 
known in the Hebrew tradition as the binding of Isaac.  There we find God commanding 
Abraham to sacrifice his only son, Isaac (Gen. 22:2).  Nothing in the narrative indicates 
that Isaac deserved death (as from the principle of forfeiture, for example); and nothing in 
the narrative indicates that Abraham was hesitant to perform the action.  The text is 
explicit, that Abraham’s expectation was that both he and Isaac would be returning down 
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the mountain together, and that God would restore Isaac unto life (Gen. 22:5; Heb. 
11:19).  Abraham could reasonably project such an expectation because it is through 
Isaac that God will “number his ancestry as the stars in the sky,” which is impossible to 
do if Isaac is dead.  Granted, this statement of blessing came to Abraham after he obeyed 
God in his willingness to sacrifice Isaac.  My point here is that Abraham and Sarah had 
already received a message from God that this child would be a blessing; in this instance 
it is revealed how Isaac would be a blessing—Abraham’s expectation of Isaac’s 
continued life is therefore reasonable.  The implication of this narrative in our current 
discussion has to do with the arbitrariness objection.  And it is to this end that I want to 
concentrate my comments.   
 An important point is worth mentioning; it would be anachronistic of us to make 
an argument against child sacrifice from a conventionalist perspective.  Robert Adams 
explains that the binding narrative is missing, “precisely the thought that it is, or might 
be, morally wrong for Abraham to sacrifice Isaac.”238  Further, its absence from the 
Genesis narrative, “probably reflects a cultural background in which child sacrifice was a 
generally accepted practice and disapproval of this manifestation of a parent’s generous 
piety toward a deity was not part of the religious repertoire.”239  I am merely trying to 
avoid a pitfall that befalls much of the discussion concerning this narrative.  There would 
be no cultural backlash upon Abraham if the sacrifice had occurred, and we have no 
reason to think that “child sacrifice was and is a hideous evil in the life of any individual 
                                                 
238 See Robert Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, 278. 
239 Ibid., 278. 
 108 
or culture that has practiced it, despite any religious virtues that they may have 
exemplified in the practice.”240     
Thus, what we need to provide is a plausible account of how the DC theorist 
might respond to the concern that God’s command to Abraham was morally 
reprehensible in that it seemingly violates God’s own prohibition against such actions.241  
I think an underlying problem in the debate between DC proponents and DW proponents 
is based on an incomplete application of the text.  Most, if not all, of the attention has 
been given to what I call God’s initial command.  In Genesis 22:2 God says to Abraham: 
Take now your son, your only son Isaac, whom you love, and go to the land of 
Moriah, and offer him there as a burnt offering on one of the mountains of which 
I will tell you. 242 
 
Of course, if the act commanded in this verse were to be actualized, then Isaac’s life 
would end.  But one of the factors central to our discussion is the verse preceding this 
one, and the second imperative following it.  Consider the beginning of the narrative: 
Now it came to pass [after these things] that God tested Abraham, and said to 
him, “Abraham!”243 
 
If we left this verse in isolation, then the content of the testing would be incomplete.  In 
order to test someone there must be explicit content revealed from one agent to another.  
Let us call this the content of the imperative.  The command may be “have no other Gods 
before me,” or the command may be “do not murder.”  But what is revealed is a specific 
way in which the agent is required to act.  If God were to merely utter “obey me,” then 
the follower may rightly question “with regard to what?”  Hence, what we find in the 
                                                 
240 Ibid., 280. 
241 Canonically Exodus is after Genesis.  I am not being anachronistic, for the injunction against murder is 
found systematically throughout the Bible, antedating even the written Law (consider the narrative of Cain 
slaying Able). 
242 John MacArthur, The MacArthur Study Bible, New King James Version (London: Word Bibles, 1997), 
Genesis 22:2. 
243 Genesis 22:1. 
 109 
moral commands are the revealed will of God explicitly stated as to how an agent may 
exemplify obedience.   
 Another consideration from the text is that the narrative identifies two commands 
from God, the initial command is for the sacrifice, and the second command is from the 
Angel of the Lord revealing that Abraham is not to sacrifice Isaac (Gen. 22: 12).  Thus, in 
the span of twelve verses God expresses two imperatives to Abraham, one the antithesis 
of the other, at least with regard to the consequences of the command.  Prima facie, one 
may suppose that in commanding logically opposite states of affairs God has shown His 
will to be arbitrary, but I do not think this is the case.  Fir st, what we argued in chapter IV 
is that DC provides the best case for how God’s relationship to speech and its binding 
force works in speech-act theory.  In the case of Abraham we must not confuse the 
objective of the command with the probable consequences of obedience to the command.     
Every moral command imposed by God has as its root the same thesis, namely to 
reckon whether or not one has anything held in a higher priority than the relationship of 
the individual to God.  In this case, the initial command tests Abraham concerning the 
content of his ultimate concern; either the life of his son or his belief in the primacy of 
God.  But what is of interest here is that in commanding the binding of Isaac, God 
brought it about that Abraham was morally obligated to sacrifice him.  Now one might 
one may argue that in imposing the obligation on Abraham to sacrifice Isaac God desired 
to bring about the intention in Abraham to sacrifice Isaac.  I think the narrative indicates 
something else; namely that in all circumstances where God places a moral obligation on 
an agent, the intent of the obligation is not necessarily to bring about a specific state of 
affairs per se (Isaac’s death), but to bring about obedience with regard to the content of 
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what is commanded.  Thus, given that I previously argued that the sacrifice would not be 
condemned socially, and that Abraham expected Isaac to be with him in some sense after 
the sacrifice, an account of what Abraham was obligated to do is needed.  Second, we 
must give attent ion to the intention formation problem of the narrative.  If God 
commands Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, and creates the intention in Abraham to bring 
about the death of an innocent, is this not an instance of intent to murder—hence a 
violation of God’s own Law (and necessarily arbitrary)?  Let us consider these in turn. 
   There is no textual reason to argue that Abraham balked at the command to 
sacrifice Isaac on the basis of social constraints or a belief in the finality of death.  
Abraham had neither of these concerns.  What is more, such constructions miss the point 
that is central to the narrative.  Even if we endorse a DW construct and hold that God’s 
commands play only an informative role in moral obligation, we must take note of what 
is informed through the commands.  If we have recourse to the story of the Fall of Adam 
and Eve, God uttered a divine injunction against eating of the tree of knowledge.  There 
is no conventional attack on eating of such fruit; in fact, not long after the divine 
command the serpent appears to Eve making an appeal that the fruit not only brings 
knowledge (a good thing), but as well makes them (Adam and Eve) as God is.244  Neither 
knowledge nor being as God is can be a bad thing, especially insofar as these 
characteristics are divine traits.  Recall that our primary aim in wrongdoing is “always 
some anticipated good.”245 This is not the level upon which we fault Adam and Eve.  
Rather, in eating of the fruit Adam and Eve violated a known command of God.  The 
perceived goods of knowledge and God-likeness were held in higher esteem than God 
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Himself.  Thus, when one argues that God has no reason to command the things that He 
does, the theist is on solid ground to claim that the content of a divine command is to 
produce (reducibly) the same intention in every agent, only the byproduct of which has 
variation.  What is this intention?  To obey the known commands of God and have no 
other perceived good to be held in higher esteem than Him.  God’s reason for 
commanding is to see this through in our moral agency.   
Conclusion 
 How does this impact our discussion of Abraham and Isaac?  I think Abraham 
was confronted with the same problem as Adam and Eve—namely that when God 
commanded him to sacrifice Isaac, knowing the content of the command automatically 
means knowing what it would be to not meet the expectation of that command.  We have 
no more reason to think that Abraham would not sacrifice Isaac merely out of knowing 
what it would be to not obey than we do for any social constraint placed upon him, 
especially since there were none.  If we ask what the perceived good in such an action 
would be, the answer is the same here as it was in the narrative of the Fall—for the “sake 
of standing” Abraham might have failed to sacrifice Isaac, and in doing so have failed to 
set aside a life that is “subordinate to God’s edict,” and instead “struck out on his 
own.”246  This means that Abraham could have seen a good in a personal, independent 
destiny aimed at becoming like God.  In this case, it might just be that the binding 
narrative is one instance of control over life itself, namely that of Isaac. 
 So what of the second concern, that when God commanded Abraham to sacrifice 
Isaac He intended to bring about the intention in Abraham to take the life of an innocent 
(i.e. murder)?  What we have argued, I think, sufficiently answers this question.  When 
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we differentiate the byproduct of obedience with obedience itself, these concerns are 
allayed.  Abraham’s decision to sacrifice Isaac was not simply intending the death of an 
innocent, and thus committing murder.  Rather, the intention formation process is that in 
obeying the command Abraham decided to execute God’s will.247  In fact, Scripture 
affirms such a conclusion.  Of Abraham it is written: 
By faith Abraham, when he was tested, offered up Isaac, and he who had received 
the promises was offering up his only begotten son.  It was he to whom it was 
said, “In Isaac your descendants shall be called.  He considered that God is able to 
raise people even from the dead, from which he also received him back as a 
type.248   
 
Even more pointedly, consider Patrick Lee’s comments on Abraham and Aquinas: 
 
One might object that in Abraham’s case the death of Isaac is a condition for 
Abraham’s executing God’s project and therefore Abraham must intend the death 
of Isaac directly.  But Thomas’s [Aquinas] argument is that the role of an 
executor is a special case.  Acts we perform ‘on our own’ are composed of act- in-
intention and act-in-execution; but where a subject executes the intention of a 
superior, the whole act is divided between partners, with the result that the 
executor’s intention precisely as executor, is no different from the manifest 
intention of the superior.  Hence Abraham’s intention is the same as God’s:  if 
God does not directly intend death, then neither does Abraham.249     
 
It is not the case that God’s intention was to secure the death of Isaac—God will do Isaac 
in anyway.  Nor is it obvious that what God was doing in commanding the sacrifice was 
producing an intention in Abraham to commit murder.  Rather, God set out to “test” 
Abraham with regard to the content of his faith.  If all intrinsic moral evil is a replication 
of the fall of Adam, I think the test is best understood as whether or not Abraham would 
liken God to His status and Abraham unto his own.  The decisive grounds for revealing 
this, in this case, just was the binding of Isaac.    
                                                 
247 See Hanink and Mar, 249. 
248 Hebrews 11:17-19. 
249 See Patrick Lee, “The Permanence of the Ten Commandments,” in Theological Studies 42 (1981): 433-
434.  This quotation taken and adapted from Hanink and Mar, 261. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ON GOD’S FREEDOM, POWER, AND BEING WORTHY OF WORSHIP 
 
 
 
 In the previous chapter we defended the notion that God is necessarily morally 
perfect, and explained His necessary moral perfection through the doctrine of divine 
simplicity.  As such, we founded the content of His commands in His nature, which is 
neither arbitrary nor bound by any independent criterion of moral value.  And so, we 
argued that the teeth of the Euthyphro dilemma are brittle and not up to the task of 
masticating DC when it is founded upon the simplicity doctrine.  One may wonder, 
though, just what the theist has lost in postulating such a doctrine; for in arguing that, 
necessarily, God is morally good, we may have vitiated two (or more) doctrines that are 
conceptually mandatory for any perfect being theologian.   
 Consider the problems of God’s freedom and God’s omnipotence, respectively.  
We argued that it is logically impossible for God to will (for Himself) any evil state of 
affairs.  Such a postulate seems to destroy any possibilities of moral freedom in God, if 
moral freedom is to be understood as the ability to will another (perhaps opposite) state 
of affairs than one does.  Also, such a postulate seems to diminish God’s omnipotence in 
that He does not have the power to actualize an evil state of affairs; God cannot perforce, 
sin.  Let us consider these two problems in turn, for it seems there is a dependence 
relationship between them.  At least descriptively, God’s will is anterior to His actions, 
thus we will place the discussion of God’s freedom first and subsequently address the 
problem of God’s power.250  Finally, we will consider how our responses to these 
                                                 
250 I do not mean to circumvent my previous defense of simplicity here, which is why I refer to the 
descriptive difference made in that chapter.  
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concerns leaves open the possibility that the traditional God of theism is worthy of 
worship.    
Necessary Existence and God’s Freedom 
 There are several reasons for wanting God to be maximally free.  If God is 
determined by external conditions, then His moral autonomy is compromised.  For He, no 
less than we, is morally evaluated by whatever these external conditions stipulate in 
conjunction with whatever state of affairs He actualizes.  Such a view diminishes God’s 
sovereignty and should be rejected.  Our concern is of a different nature, for we argued 
against any independent criterion of value in chapter IV, and proposed a model of God’s 
activity that divorces Him from any obligation, moral or otherwise.  However, if we hold 
that God acts necessarily as He does, then one may object that we have diminished God’s 
freedom, and concomitantly bound Him morally to a different determining condition, 
namely His nature.  On this model it is consistent to say that God conceives of seemingly 
an infinite number of possible divine actions.  However, there is logical necessity with 
regard to what God actualizes, for God is morally constrained by His nature to do all and 
only that which is right.  What is meant by “constrained” is a bit elusive, but suffice it to 
say it is not compatible with a meaningful account of divine freedom.  Thomas Flint 
explains the problem well: 
 If God is a truly perfect being, he has no choice but to create (i.e. actualize) the 
 best world he can create.  Failure to do so would point to either a lack of 
 knowledge or benevolence, and such lackings would be inconceivable in the case 
 of “that than which none greater can be conceived.”  But if God’s creative activity 
 is thus determined by essential elements of his nature (i.e. his omniscience and 
 benevolence), one can hardly label his acting of creating a free action and still 
 remain a libertarian in good standing, for libertarianism insists that an agent 
 performs a free action only when his activity is not determined by his nature.251  
                                                 
251 See Thomas Flint, “The Problem of Divine Freedom,” in American Philosophical Quarterly  20 (1983): 
255. 
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 Flint’s conclusion is quite problematic for our discussion; if God is not 
significantly morally free, then God is not a moral agent.252  So, how might we 
understand divine freedom in lieu of our claims about the divine nature in response to the 
objection by Flint?     
 One suggestion, made by Thomas V. Morris, is to understand divine goodness as 
“God’s acting always in accord with universal moral principles, satisfying without fail 
moral duties and engaging in acts of gracious supererogation.”253  Let us be clear, on 
Morris’s “duty model of goodness” God has moral obligations to “universal moral 
principles.”  As he sees it, a logical problem arises when one jointly commits to three 
theses: (1) the duty model of divine goodness, (2) a libertarian account of free will, and 
(3) the claim that God is necessarily good.254  From the notion that God necessarily acts 
as He does we may conclude, says Morris, “…that God does not exemplify the kind of 
freedom requisite for being a moral agent with any duties at all.”255  This entails that 
there is no necessarily good moral agent, for “only free acts are morally characterizable 
as the satisfaction or violation of duties.”256  Let us adopt Morris’s requirement for 
                                                 
252 This is Alvin Plantinga’s language.  He writes, “A world containing free creatures who are significantly 
free (and freely perform more good than evil actions) is more valuable, all else being equal, than a world 
containing no free creatures at all.  Now God can create free creatures, but He can’t cause or determine 
them to do only what is right.  For if he does so, then they aren’t significantly free after all; they do not do 
what is right freely.  To create creatures capable of moral good, therefore, He must create creatures capable 
of moral evil; and He can’t give these creatures the freedom to perform evil and at the same time prevent 
them from doing so.  The fact that free creatures sometimes go wrong, however, neither counts against 
God’s omnipotence nor against His goodness; for He could have forestalled the occurrence of moral evil 
only by removing the possibility of moral good.”  See his God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: William 
Eerdman’s Publishers, 1974), 30.  Plantinga’s construction of freedom as the power to do otherwise 
certainly fails on our model.  
253 See Thomas Morris, “Duty and Divine Goodness,” in Morris, Thomas V. ed. The Concept of God  
(London: Oxford University Press, 1987), 107. 
254 Ibid., 108.  
255 Ibid., 108. 
256 Ibid., 109.  
 116 
freedom, that “an agent S performs an action A at a time t freely only if no conditions 
exist prior to t which render it necessary, or unavoidable, in a broadly logical sense, and 
by doing so in fact bring it about that S performs A.”257  From our discussion so far there 
is nothing to prevent the DC theorist from accepting a libertarian account of free will, nor 
must we deny God’s moral agency or goodness. For it is still coherent to suppose, even 
under the duty model of goodness, that God fulfills all three conditions.  Morris, for 
instance, makes a distinction between two states of affairs, namely behavior which results 
from obeying a rule and behavior which accords with a rule.258  This distinction allows 
us to bifurcate deontic principles governing human moral agency and divine moral 
agency.  Humans are bound by moral duty, the byproduct of which is that humans act 
“under obligation.”  Following our model in chapter III, however, there is an ontological 
distinction between human nature and the divine nature.  God’s will is “holy,” to borrow 
a phrase from Kant (more on this in a moment).  The goodness of God is distinct from the 
deontological category of being right; for being right requires an agent to bring about 
what is moral.  Goodness involves no such requirement.  We noted in chapter III that the 
purpose of obligation is to draw an agent toward an action that they are not otherwise 
motivated to perform, for example, to draw the liar from lying and the murderer from 
murdering.   
 The import on our discussion here is forthright, for one may hold that God acts 
necessarily as He does, acting “in accordance” with principles which would “express 
duties for a moral agent in his relevant circumstances.”259  Of course, under this 
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construction God does not have any duties; nevertheless if God says that He will bless 
Abraham with a child, then Abraham will be blessed with a child.  Morris explains: 
 R.L. Franklin has characterized the purpose of promising as ‘that of committing a 
 man reliably to future acts’.  God can certainly declare his intention to bless 
 Abraham, thereby committing himself reliably to do so (where committing 
 himself amounts to intentionally generating justified expectations in his hearers).  
 The libertarian can hold that, in making this sort of declaration, God is doing 
 something for his creatures with an effect analogous to that of promising, or that 
 even in the analogous sense he is making a promise.260     
 
William Alston, as we noted, has a promising approach that encapsulates what we have 
said about deontological terms such as “right” and “wrong” and ontological terms such as 
“good” and “bad”.  He invites us to consider God’s goodness as distinct from the 
goodness of human agents.  If we understand God’s goodness as, necessarily, God acts in 
accordance with His perfect nature, then the axiological values we have put forth 
regarding divine ontology and divine actions are merely descriptive propositions about 
His nature.  Alston explains: 
 If we want to say that moral goodness can be attributed to a being only if that 
 being is subject to the moral ought, his moral obligations and the like, then we 
 won’t say that God is, strictly speaking, morally good.261  
 
So, our purpose in this section is to offer an account of divine freedom that avoids the 
pitfalls of necessary perfection.  We want to offer an account of freedom whereby God is 
maximally free, and hence relevant with regard to moral agency, and yet remain true to 
our thesis that God cannot sin. 
 There are two conceptions of freedom, says Timothy O’Connor, which pervade 
the literature on free will. The first is the “openness of the future” to alternative 
                                                 
260 Ibid., 118.  
261 See Alston, “What Euthyphro Should Have Said,” in Craig (2002), 289. 
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possibilities for our actions.262  A person acts freely only if she could have chosen a 
different action.  Suppose we are in line at Andrea Braccatto’s and are attempting to 
select from a number of options, say between their fine cappuccino or their latte, and 
perhaps even whether or not we will have a wonderful éclair.  The decision to partake of 
the éclair and cappuccino is indicative of the fact that agents with metaphysical freedom 
“are able to select from among significantly different alternatives.”263  What is significant 
to note in such circumstances, and we can imagine them being moral rather than 
gustatory, is that freedom is not coextensive with the existence of the alternatives but is a 
matter of “self-determination.”  The alternatives are “indicators of the self-determination 
manifested by one’s action, which is necessary for responsibility.”264  Thus, it is 
O’Connor’s contention that the freedom that is relevant to moral agency is born from the 
one action that is chosen, and not from the metaphysical category of worlds-gone- 
otherwise.   
 A second notion of freedom, and one that is more central to our thesis, centers on 
the idea of self-mastery. 265  According to O’Connor: 
A person acts freely to the extent that he has control of his appetites and impulses 
and is able reliably to direct his more significant actions toward larger aims.  A 
self-mastered person perforce has a great deal of self-knowledge, including 
especially knowledge of the factors that incline him to this or that course of 
action…A free agent knows himself well—knows his own stable purposes, 
desires, and beliefs—and reliably acts in a way that reflects in some way this self-
understanding.266   
 
                                                 
262 Timothy O’Connor, “Freedom with a Human Face,” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXIX (2005): 
208. 
263 Ibid., 209. 
264 Ibid., 209-210. 
265 Ibid., 210. 
266 Ibid., 211. 
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Let us apply the concept of self-mastery to the doctrine of God; God has no conflicting 
aims or practical constraints to which He is subject.267  Nor does it seem that God has any 
desires, for desire is a passive state that arises from something not fulfilled in the agent 
with the desire; this mitigates the notion that God could have any irrational impulses.   
 It seems that O’Connor is on good historical ground in making such a claim, for 
the notion of rationality is at the core of Kantian ethics.  In fact, in chapter I we noted an 
argument for the tenability of a Kantian DC ethic based on such considerations.  Our 
purpose here is not to endorse that specific argument, but to consider how it advances our 
discussion on self-mastery.  Kant wrote: 
If the will is not of itself in complete accord with reason (the actual case of men), 
then the actions which are recognized as objectively necessary are subjectively 
contingent, and the determination of such a will according to objective laws is 
constraint.  The conception of an objective principle, so far as it constrains a will, 
is a command (of reason), and the formula of this command is called an 
imperative.  All imperatives are expressed by an ‘ought’ and thereby indicate the 
relation of an objective law of reason to a will which is not in its subjective 
constitution necessarily determined by this law.  This relation is that of constraint.  
Imperatives say that it would be good to do or to refrain from doing something, 
but they say it to a will which does not always do something simply because it is 
presented as a good thing to do.  A perfectly good will, therefore, would be 
equally subject to objective laws (of the good), but it could not be conceived as 
constrained by them to act in accord with them, because, according to its own 
subjective constitution, it cannot be determined to act only through the conception 
of the good.  Thus, no imperatives hold for the divine will or, more generally, for 
a holy will.  The ‘ought’ here is out of place, for the volition of itself is 
necessarily in unison with the law.  Therefore imperatives are only formulas 
expressing the relation of objective laws of volition in general to the subjective 
imperfection of the will of this or that rational being, e.g. the human will.268 
 
Overall we are in agreement with Kant, except that previously we demarcated the good 
and the right in order to explicate why a being that has a holy will does not have any 
moral obligations, and Kant does not do so in terms of this distinction.  However, the 
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268 See Kant, Immanuel.  Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: 
Liberal Arts Press, 1959), 29-31.  This edited version quoted from William Alston in Craig, 286-287. 
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picture that Kant paints of God, and which is of great use, is one where God is self-
sufficient.  To quote Mark Linville, “He [God] is not finite, dependent, or a being of 
needs.  God lacks the desire for happiness.  And lacking this desire, He lacks any 
inclinations that could conflict with the moral law.  God has a “holy will,” “a will 
incapable of any maxims which could conflict with the moral law.”269  Linville’s 
conclusion is that the moral law (a la Kant) for a perfect being is a law of holiness, and 
not a law of duty.  Further, the connection between God’s reason and His will is 
derivative of that found in the Categorical Imperative.  Since the will is the source of 
moral failure, reason must bind the will.  In God, there is perfect reason and perfect will; 
hence no binding is necessary.   
Let us further this line of argument.  It is a central tenet of perfect being theology 
that God is omniscient (i.e. perfect knowledge of the past, present, and future).  It seems 
reasonable, then, to hold that God have complete knowledge of His own actions as well 
as ours.  If this is so, then God has knowledge not just about His actions, but about how 
He will value (likely to be understood as axiological value) actions.  W.R. Carter explains 
very nicely: 
One surely is guilty of some sort of moral failing in the event that one realizes one 
is about to act maliciously (say), it is within one’s power not to so act, and yet one 
proceeds to act maliciously.  In such cases, the moral transgression lies, not 
merely with what one does (the malicious action), but with what one does not do 
(namely, decide to act).  Accordingly, I am skeptical of the idea that there is such 
a world in which an individual ceases by way of moral failing to occupy divine 
office.  No possible world is such that one of its inhabitants sins at t but also is 
omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good at t – 1.270 
                                                 
269 Mark Linville, “Euthyphro and His Kin,” in The Logic of Rational Theism: Exploratory Essays, ed. 
William Lane Craig and Mark MacLeod (Edwin Mellon Press, 1990), 199. 
270 W.R. Carter, “Omnipotence and Sin,” in Analysis 42 (1982): 105.  It should be noted that God’s 
relationship to time is not my concern here, even though I understand it has profound implications for any 
theory of divine epistemology.  Suffice it to say that given my defense of SD in the previous chapters, I 
hold to a tenseless theory of time. 
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Of course, Carter’s concern is to offer a reply to the claims of Nelson Pike on the 
problem of God’s omnipotence, which we will take up in a moment; but the epistemic 
corollary fits our current theme.  In order for God to sin, for instance, it must be the case 
that God perceives some good in the act of sinning.  Prima facie, this good is self-
directed, but it need not be the case that this is true (God could, for instance, perceive 
Himself robbing a bank for the purpose of feeding the hungry, and this not to His own 
gain).  But to endorse such a view as even plausible with God requires one of two things: 
(1) God can have a deficient intellect such that His understanding of the good in a 
situation is lacking, or (2) there is no direct connection between God’s intellect and His 
will.  The first of these assertions is immediately countered by the notion that as Creator 
and sustainer of every human action, God cannot be ignorant of those actions.271  Further, 
it requires a concept of the good that is not intrinsic to God, and hence requires Him to 
ponder the relevant merits of a given action as gauged by some standard.  We have 
already argued against this possibility in chapters II and III; and we have ruled out the 
possibility of (2) in our discussion of the concept of self-mastery in the current chapter.  
It seems we are on better ground to speak of a connection between action-directed 
intentions and their influence on the rational process; this goes more to a defense of the 
self-control thesis than the possible-worlds suggestion.  Since we have a model whereby 
God may will something (human action) morally and it not come about, what of God’s 
intentions about His own actions?     
                                                 
271 I understand that open theism denies such a claim, but that is not my concern here.   
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 First, it is to be noted that an intention “settles an agent on one course or 
another.”272  Otherwise stated, the agent is “committed to a goal”, and the intention 
provides a “settled objective.”273  Thus, I propose that when an agent has an intention, the 
intention is “conduct controlling” and not merely a “potential influencer of conduct.”274  
Hugh McCann proposes that the rationality of intentions “depends on whether the goals 
they embody are such that, by pursuing them, we gain an acceptable chance of changing 
the world in ways we believe are better.”275  Thus, when the agent settles on an objective 
there is a presumption of “epistemic consistency” whereby it is possible for the plan to be 
“successfully executed without any of the agent’s beliefs being false.”276  Consider this in 
contrast to the model of sin provided before.  It follows from the concept of sin that there 
is a failure either of will or intellect.  If God fails in His intellect, it seems a matter of a 
false belief regarding an action, and hence He fails the epistemic consistency 
requirement.  If God fails in His will, then it follows from our model that (1) God is not 
rational with regard to intention formation, for He would have a belief about an action’s 
merit and then do otherwise, and (2) God would fail the self-control paradigm, for He 
would be acting according to desires (which have no necessary positive aim) in contrast 
to His intentions, at least as we have construed rational intentionality.  However, there is 
no reason for us to hold that God is culpable for these snafus.  God, as we have argued, is 
a perfectly rational being whose will is in complete accord with reason.  To borrow from 
Aquinas, God knows and wills Himself, that is, His actualized being.  Aquinas writes, 
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“Hence as His essence itself is also intelligible in species, it necessarily follows that His 
act of understanding must be His essence and His being.  Thus, it follows from all the 
foregoing that in God intellect, and what is understood [His essence] and the intelligible 
species, and his act of understanding are entirely one and the same thing.”277                 
But there is a greater issue here than first meets the eye, founded upon the claim 
that freedom is best understood as the power to do otherwise.  The issue concerns God’s 
act of creation.  God, it is often argued, bears some responsibility for creating a sinful 
world given that He knew anterior to its creation that Adam and Eve would partake of the 
forbidden fruit (or pick your favorite sin).  For, the argument runs, even if it is not within 
God’s power to create a world of free creatures that always choose to do what is right, is 
was certainly within God’s power not to create at all.  Let us consider the implications of 
these concerns on our discussion of divine freedom, for it seems God is not in the bank 
robbing business but is in the work of creation.  Can it be said of God that He is somehow 
culpable for the sin of Adam?  This problem is different from the one provided before, 
for there we were considering whether or not God could sin with regard to His own 
actions.  Now we are considering whether or not God may be found guilty in some way 
for actions that He wills, but does not directly perform.   
It seems that part of the concern here derives from our earlier discussion 
pertaining to God’s will and human actions, such that God as a matter of Creator and 
Sustainer of all things in some sense wills certain evil states of affairs; perhaps one has in 
mind the atrocities of Auschwitz or the genocide in Darfur.  For the sake of consistency 
we cannot deny that God wills these things to be, but this does not commit us to the view 
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that in His willing there is a “joint exercise of agency” between the sinner and God.278  
Consider again Hugh McCann’s analogy to make this point.  God’s relationship to 
humans is not “analogous to that of the puppeteer to the puppet—which would indeed 
destroy our freedom—but rather to that of the author of a novel to her characters.”279  The 
figures of the novel owe their existence in the author’s creative imagination, and “they 
are born and sustained in and through the very thoughts in which she conceives them, and 
of which they are the content.”280  Persons, and for that matter all of the created order, are 
brought into existence and sustained through the Creator’s will (synonymous with 
“creative will”).   
The power of this analogy is that it identifies the assumption upon which the 
objection is based, namely that there is a causal-nexus between God’s creative will and 
human actions.  But this is not the case.  As McCann notes, the author of the novel cannot 
enter into the world of the characters and “pervert” their authenticity as agents.  In fact, 
McCann argues, and I concur, that in creating us God does not “act upon us or produce 
any intervening cause-even an act of will on his part-that somehow makes us do what we 
do.”281  God, as author of the novel, comprehensively provides through His creative fiat 
the existence of our decisions and the manifestation of our actions.  To be precise, God 
creates us “in or willing,” and the relationship is not as “cause to effect but as will to 
content.”282  For the sake of clarity imagine the state of affairs where I decide to rob a 
bank.  Under this construction, it is a matter of God’s creative will that I in fact rob the 
bank.  However, nowhere in my decision to rob the bank is God to be indicted, for all that 
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we have in God’s creative will is that God wills to grant existence to my act of deciding 
to rob the bank.      
This leaves a second concern, namely whether or not God is to be indicted for the 
content of His creative will (or for His having created anything at all).  Such a concern is 
to be likened to a reader finding moral fault in Thomas Harris for creating Hannibal 
Lecter cannibalizing his victims.  And so, to answer this question, and here again I think 
McCann is correct, we have to consider what it is that makes wrongful willing wrong, or 
we have to know what constitutes the sinfulness of sin. 283  These questions bring us back 
to the overall thesis of this work, namely offering a plausible account of DC ethics.   
Whether we are considering the narrative of the fall of Adam (Gen. 3) or 
chronologically prior to that the fall of the angels (Isa. 14; Jude 6) the essence of moral 
evil is the same:  the defiance of a divine command.  To be more specific, in defiance of 
the divine command to not partake of the forbidden fruit, Adam and Eve acted exactly in 
the same manner as the fallen angels before them.  The purpose of the defiance was to 
“achieve a certain kind of standing,” an “independent destiny” whereby they would 
become like God.284  Thus, we may agree with McCann’s view that at its core every sin is 
the same—namely to set oneself in rebellion against God, deciding to do what He has 
forbidden us to do.285  But let us be clear, we have defended a traditional, normative DC 
ethic specifically for this reason, that in God’s creative will Adam, Eve, and even Satan 
did exactly as God willed that they do, even though His commands were contrary to what 
was actualized (see chapter III).            
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Necessary Goodness and Omnipotence 
 Suppose that we are confronted with the following two competing claims on the 
goodness of an agent: 
(G1) A being that is unable to sin is better than a being that is able to sin but does 
not. 
 
(G2) A being that is able to sin, but does not, is better than a being that is unable 
to sin.286 
 
The contrast between (G1) and (G2) brings forth the supposed tension that follows by 
entailment from our argument from God’s moral perfection.  (G1) is a precise rendering 
of the impossibility of God’s sinning.  Yet, if God is omnipotent, then how can it be the 
case that God is incapable of sinning?  At first blush we are on better grounds arguing for 
(G2), for in doing so we do not lose any of the moral qualities of God, and on this model 
He still does not sin, nor do we compromise His freedom or power.  However, something 
seems amiss under any view that has God as able to sin.  So, let us first investigate why 
the implications of (G2) are incoherent, and then turn our attention to a defense of (G1).   
In order to defend (G2), one must first explain what it means for God to be able to 
sin.  It does not seem that we will arrive at (G2) through conceptual analysis.  The 
concept of sin means to miss the mark; and this either intellectually or morally (where 
this mark comes from is of vital significance).  The mark certainly is not divine 
obligation in terms of some independent criterion, neither does it seem to be self- imposed 
obligation.  The incoherence of a first-person imperative is twofold.  If we recall, our 
notion of obligation is a normative thesis whereby an agent is drawn through the 
imperative to a certain action they otherwise would not perform.  God has no need of 
such an imperative.  Second, suppose for the sake of argument that God did need an 
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obligation to draw Him into action; there is no positive prospect of finding a source for 
obligation.  It cannot be God, for the standard must be external to draw Him to the action 
(for the defect is now within Him, and requires reconciliation to what is normatively 
right).  Nor does it make sense to say that the imperative is a first-person command, for 
that is conceptually ludicrous (there are no first person commands).287  So it seems, the 
idea of “calling God down” is not going to succeed based on a conceptual analysis of sin. 
Second, and briefly, there are no biblical grounds for arguing that God has the 
ability to sin.  In fact, the systematic testimony of Scripture is that God is both 
omnipotent and yet does not have the ability to sin.  “God cannot lie” writes Paul to 
Titus.  “God cannot swear by a being greater than Himself” explains the writer of 
Hebrews (6:18).  Suffice it to say, Scripture is not committed to the thesis that God’s 
omnipotence entails that God can do anything.  So, let us consider a third option, namely 
whether or not omnipotence logically entails the ability to sin. 
Thomas Aquinas makes a distinction between two types of possibility, namely 
things that are logically possible and things that are possible in terms of an agent’s 
abilities.  Regarding the first, Aquinas writes: 
Everything that does not imply a contradiction is numbered amongst those 
possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent; but whatever 
implies a contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, 
because it cannot have the aspect of possibility.  Hence, it is better to say that such 
things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them.288        
 
The import of Aquinas’ distinction on our discussion is that the conjunction of possibility 
in terms of ability and logical possibility is the essence of divine omnipotence.  Thus, 
“anything that implies a contradiction” involves the conjunction of two states of affairs 
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that violate the law of noncontradiction.  If something is impossible for God, it must also 
be logically impossible.  Thus Aquinas thinks the dilemma is laid to rest, and argues: 
To sin is to fall short of a perfect action; hence to be able to sin is to fall short in 
action, which is contrary to omnipotence.  Therefore, God cannot sin, because He 
is omnipotence.289 
  
 However, there is nothing provided yet that proves sinning is both impossible in 
terms of God’s abilities and logically impossible; a contention that seems prima facie 
compatible with Incarnation theology (consider Mark 1).  Thus, it seems we need further 
clarification to make our point.   
In Proposition 12, in his work A Discourse Concerning the Being and Attributes 
of God, Samuel Clarke argues that the properties of God are coextensive, and hence the 
properties of God’s necessary moral perfection and God’s omnipotence entail that God 
cannot sin.  In a rather lengthy narrative Clarke writes: 
Free choice in a bring of infinite knowledge, power and goodness can no more 
choose to act contrary to these imperfections that knowledge can be ignorance, 
power be weakness, or goodness malice.  So that free choice in such a being may 
be as certain and steady a principle of action as the necessity of fate.  We may 
therefore as certainly and infallibly rely upon the moral, as upon the natural 
attributes of God—it being as absolutely impossible for Him to act contrary to the 
one as to divest himself of the other; and as much a contradiction to suppose him 
choosing to do anything inconsistent with His justice, goodness, and truth as to 
suppose Him divested of infinity, power, or existence.      
From this it follows that God is both perfectly free and also infinitely powerful, 
yet He cannot possibly do anything that is evil.  The reason for this is also 
evident.  Because, as it is manifest infinite power cannot extend to natural 
contradictions which imply a destruction of that very power by which they must 
be supposed to be effected, so neither can it extend to moral contradictions which 
imply a destruction of some other attributes as belonging to the divine nature as 
power…It is no diminution of power not to be able to do things which are no 
object of power.  And it is in like manner no diminution either of power or liberty 
to have such a perfect and unalterable rectitude of will as never possibly to choose 
to do anything inconsistent with that rectitude.290        
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Clarke’s argument offers a necessary gloss on Aquinas, and allays much of the concern in 
the contemporary literature concerning necessary goodness and moral perfection.   
If we mistakenly suppose that there is no logical connection between perfect 
goodness and omnipotence, or other perfect making properties, then we may conceive of 
a being that brings about and evil state of affairs because it is in its power to do so.  Such 
an argument has been put forth by Nelson Pike, and warrants a closer inspection in light 
of Clarke’s claims.   
 If we recall, in our introduction we agreed with Nelson Pike that the term God is a 
title, and with that title comes necessary properties (omniscience, omnipotence, 
goodness).  Also, if a being is God, then it follows de facto that that being is without sin.  
To make the assertion that a being is God, and does not have these properties is, as Pike 
argues “logically” inconsistent with the attribute ascription status of the title.291  
However, in contrast with Aquinas and Clarke, Pike argues that, though the being that is 
God holds that title, it is logically possible that God might not have filled that status.  
Pike writes: 
It should be noticed that this third assumption covers only a logical possibility.  I 
am not assuming that there is any real (i.e. material) possibility that Yahweh, if 
He exists, is not perfectly good.  I am assuming only that the hypothetical 
function “If X is Yahweh, then X is perfectly good” differs from the hypothetical 
function “If X is God, then X is perfectly good” in that the former, unlike the 
latter, does not formulate a necessary truth. 292 
 
In distinguishing between the title God and the person Yahweh, Pike argues that he has 
eased the tension between necessary goodness and omnipotence.  It is logically possible 
for God to sin (a la (G2)), which makes no statement against God doing all and only 
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things that are not morally evil.  To do evil means that individual would not merit the title 
“God.”  The being that is God has the “creative power” to bring about states of affairs the 
“production of which would be morally reprehensible.”293   
 We should first note that the creative power of God is exactly what Clarke argued 
is coextensive with God’s moral perfection; which is why the inability for God to sin is a 
perfect making feature.  This undermines Pike’s claim on the logical possibility of God’s 
sinning.  Only if we divest the relationship of goodness and power do we obtain this 
possibility, and under that construction a being that is maximally powerful is not 
necessarily good.  The difference between these two beings is that logical possibilities 
concerning God’s nature changes, so that “If God is omnipotent, then He can bring about 
any state of affairs logically possible for an essentially perfect being to bring about.”294  
Thus, we need not endorse Pike’s claim that the title God entails such a possibility, nor 
need we endorse (G2) to alleviate the problem, at least as the problem confronts us now. 
 If we conclude that the argument from divine title does not work as is, then there 
still seems to be a lingering problem.  Consider the following claim: 
The world simply cannot be such that it contains a being that is both (essentially) 
omnipotent and essentially sinless.  Any being that is essentially sinless is such 
that there is no possible world in which it commits sinful actions.  Since such a 
being cannot sin, it cannot be all powerful and so cannot satisfy one of the 
requisites of divine office.295 
 
Such an assertion has merit if and only if the tenet of God’s essential perfection is denied, 
and a doctrine of God’s contingent goodness is endorsed.  As such, there are possible 
worlds in which the being that occupies the divine office (in the actual world) does 
commit a sin; the power of the agent, then, is to be characterized as the ability to do 
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otherwise.  Such a claim seems specious for several reasons.  First, suppose we agree that 
freedom is grounded in the power to do otherwise.  There is nothing that logically 
commits us to the belief that the counterfactual entails that God commits a sin.  Edward 
Wierenga notes, “God’s freedom requires that he be able to do alternatives to what he 
does; it does not require that these alternatives be evil.”296  Second, rather than 
understand freedom under a counterfactual model, we previously argued that freedom is 
better understood in terms of self control, or in Kantian terms a holy will.  Given that we 
have already addressed this, let us consider the most damning objection to such a claim.   
 According to the argument from divine title, God’s goodness is not an essential 
property of His being, it is only a property of the being that possesses the office of 
divinity, and in the actual world this being is God (Yahweh).  Pike’s argument implicitly 
entails that there are worlds in which God, or as he says Yahweh, does not possess the 
office because He is not perfectly morally good in that world.297  We may suppose then, 
that there are worlds in which the divine office is unoccupied, for there are no beings in 
that world that are perfectly (or maximally) morally good.298 
 But we should recall that our commitment is to the interdependence of perfect 
making properties, and the argument of God’s necessarily being morally perfect follows 
therein.  Given God’s essentially perfect will, as we noted before: 
The only way for God to sin is for him to not have the power to carry out the 
dictates of that will.  But to do so would be to “fall short in action.”  But God’s 
power is precisely the power to do whatever His perfect will desires.  Hence, for 
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God to sin would necessarily be the result of weakness in creative power, and 
contradict His omnipotence.299 
 
So, there are a couple of points here that we may score against our objectors.  The first is 
that the objectors have yet to show, in any of our discussion, that there are beings with 
more power than God; rather there are actions that finite beings do (and we’ve called 
these imperfect powers) that involve abilities that God lacks.300  Earlier we noted that our 
discussion of God’s freedom occurs logically before God’s power, and it is precisely for 
this reason.  As essential perfectionists we are committed to the notion that God’s actions 
are intentional, and hence a matter of His will.  Further, given the connection between 
God’s rationality and will, there is some end at which the action is directed.  Thomas 
Morris sees the rationality/will connection to entail the following: 
(1) Agents can only do what they see as good. 
(2) To see evil as good is to be in error. 
(3) God cannot be in error, so 
(4) God cannot see evil as good, and thus 
(5) God cannot do evil.301     
So it will help our discussion to further our claim on God’s ability by clarifying what has 
been called a successful act, which is an act that is successful at producing the end to 
which it is aimed.302  Concerning God’s actions this entails that God must have both the 
capacity and the all- things considered intention to perform that action.  The distinction 
between God’s will and God’s power is forthright, for it undermines the contention that 
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God lacks the power to perform this action is identical with God cannot perform this 
action.  One is a matter of God’s willing and the other a matter of God’s potency; any  
action that God “cannot do” may then be understood as God lacking the “will-power” to 
perform that action. 303    
 So, we are committed to the view that to sin is logically impossible for God, and 
this is no condemnation on God’s freedom or power.  With regard to the claims of Nelson 
Pike we may conclude that God is comfortably sitting on His throne, and the office is 
occupied.  Let us now consider how this discussion has been drawn into the literature as 
to its effect on a pivotal soteriological issue, namely whether or not God is a being that is 
worthy to be worshipped.     
On God’s Being Worthy of Worship 
 In light of our discussion on God’s freedom and God’s omnipotence, we now 
have a background against which we might respond to the claim that God is not worthy 
of worship.  The argument for this claim is to be understood thusly: 
(1) A Person is praiseworthy for an action only if he could have refrained from 
performing it.  
 
(2) A necessarily good being cannot refrain from performing good actions, so 
 
(3) A necessarily good being is not praiseworthy for any of His actions.  If 
 
(4) God is necessarily good, then 
 
(5) God is not praiseworthy for any of His actions.  But surely 
 
(6) God is praiseworthy for His good actions.  So 
 
(7) It is not the case that God is necessarily good.304 
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Thomas Morris provides a nice review of the central concern held by many people, both 
theistic and atheistic, about essential perfection theology.  What we want to say at the end 
of the day is that God is praiseworthy; however, what is proposed in (1) – (3) undermines 
our ability to make such a claim.  We do not praise a calculator for telling us that twice 
two is four, nor do we praise God for His actions that could not be any way other than 
they are.   
 The success of this argument hinges on whether or not premise (1) is true, and we 
have given good reason to think that it is not.  There is nothing in postulating God’s 
necessary goodness that entails coercion or any causal conditions that “make” God who 
He is.  Further, such a claim is successful only to the extent that the counterfactual model 
of freedom is successful.  But we have denied this claim for two reasons.  First, even on a 
counterfactual model it does not follow that the alternative action God perform be evil, it 
need only be different from the one actually taken.  So even if we accept premise (1), 
there are still accounts of God’s activity (logically speaking) that do not require only one 
state of affairs, only one type of state of affairs, namely those that are not blameworthy. 
But this says nothing against God’s ability to refrain from instantiating a specific state of 
affairs; He could logically instantiate any possible state of affairs of equal (good) value.   
 Our argument against (1) undermines the claim of (2) as well, for what is required 
for (2) to be true is that God must be able to refrain from performing any of the good 
actions that He does in fact do.  Thomas Morris argues that the success of (2) “trades on 
an ambiguity” between the following: 
(2’) A necessarily good being cannot refrain from ever performing any good 
actions whatsoever, and    
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(2”) A necessarily good being cannot refrain from performing any of the good 
actions he performs.305 
 
Even if we were to agree that (2’) is of concern, the answer resides in God’s act of 
creation; nothing necessitated God’s act of creation.  But it seems Morris is right in 
claiming that (2”) is the hook, and this, I think, we have shown to be wrongheaded in our 
argument against (1). Without (1) and (2) the argument does not go through.  So we need 
not worry about (3) as it is based on premises that are unsound.  
 I think another line of defense follows from God’s actions that are supererogatory.  
Granted, the traditional understanding of supererogation is that it involves going “above 
and beyond the call of duty.”  At first blush this seems to rule out the possibility of any 
divine act of supererogation.  However, I think the definition confuses the point to be 
made in the discussion.  The very notion of obligation speaks of a normative claim on an 
agent to draw them to an action of good value.  In other words, deontic statements of the 
sort made against murder and the like are statements about deficiency in the agent before 
any action ever obtains.  The badness of an action consists not in its outcome, but in the 
will of the agent to act in a certain way.  The murderer is guilty of the offense before it 
obtains specifically because she willed evil—and this independent of whether or not the 
act fails or succeeds.  So what we have is value before obligation, and supererogation is 
obviously a value- laden term.  To argue that a supererogatory act is the byproduct of 
going beyond what one is obligated to do is categorically backwards.  It is better that we 
understand the nature of supererogation in terms of ontology and not in terms of the 
traditional normative requirement.  Consider the concept of grace.  Grace is an unmerited 
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act of favor from one person to another.306  There is nothing in the action required; it is 
permissible, but not obligatory.  But we certainly would not say that when an agent is 
gracious they are acting under compulsion of some sort (normative or otherwise).  
Rather, the graciousness in an action is the byproduct of the goodness in the agent 
performing the action.  Even more pointedly, what we find in actions of this kind is a 
total contrast from the deontological definition.  Grace, it seems, exists only when 
something has gone wrong, there is a fracture in the relationship, and there is no positive 
prospect of amends.  There is seemingly no prospect of recompense for certain wrongs—
such as a woman who is the victim of a rape.  In such cases what we have is that in order 
for there to be reconciliation the victim gives twice—first as the object of wrongdoing 
and then as the agent of amends.  Money does not address the wrong done, even if it 
provides the victim with security of some sort, equally so imprisonment.  Rather, the very 
nature of the goodness of grace is that it seeks to reconcile what has been broken from the 
other end—from the end of the victim and not from the end of the victimizer.  All the 
more such a claim holds in divine-human affairs.  If sin is irretrievably to set oneself in 
rebellion against God and fracture the divine-human relationship, the only possibility of 
reconciliation is through a divine act of grace.  Admittedly, such grace may not be 
accepted, but that is a debate of a different stripe.  All that concerns us here is that in even 
offering reconciliation where otherwise there could be none God has done something 
supererogatory.                            
 There is still a second issue to be dealt with here, and that is the implication of the 
alternative-world model for the relationship between praise and blame.  What the 
objector’s argument provides is a strange notion of praise where blame is a necessary 
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condition of praise’s possibility; this strikes me as counterintuitive at best.  The very 
success of the alternate-world model hinges on the notion of actions being conceivably 
distinct from what they are; but we are on good grounds to say that in the case of God the 
conceivability criterion is a bad guide to possibility.  Nothing in that criterion says 
anything of the kind of power in the agent such as self-mastery (or control) or being 
maximally rational.  Nor does it say anything of the relationship between reason and the 
will.  The volitional element of agency is irreducibly characterized to the conceivability 
criterion, or worlds-gone-otherwise, and this supposedly to actions of diminished moral 
value; I praise you because I can conceive of a world where I could blame you.  Let’s just 
say this will not wash.    
Conclusion  
 I think the model we have proposed has a much more promising response to these 
concerns.  We have shown how it can be the case that God’s omnipotence does not entail 
that God can do everything, strictly speaking.  We have also dealt with the more 
problematic issue of God’s freedom and proposed a volitional model whereby God’s 
freedom is best understood through the relationship between His intellect, His will, and a 
notion of self-control (or mastery).  We have argued that God is not subject to impulses 
or desires, for these very concepts are passive in nature and show potency in God’s 
willing and acting.  Further, from the supposition provided in chapter III that God has no 
duties, here we have argued that the praiseworthiness of God’s actions may be 
understood as (1) their being supererogatory in nature, or (2) their being in perfect 
harmony with actions that for humans would be characterized as moral.  Thomas Morris, 
as we have noted, distinguishes between acting “in accord with a rule” and “acting from a 
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rule” and holds that God does the former.  I think the language is muddy, but it draws to 
light the difference between the “prescriptive” function of moral principles for human 
conduct and the “descriptive” element of divine activity.307   
So it seems the argument against the praiseworthiness of God fails.  There is no 
reason to think that power and freedom are incompatible with one another, nor should we 
be inclined to think that the concepts of freedom and power are self- referentially 
incoherent in divine ontology.  Further, the very fact that God is Creator and Sustainer of 
every contingent being warrants praise in itself; in Him we “live and move and have our 
being,” as the Bible says.  The debt of existence is no small debt, and God’s act of 
creation and offering of reconciliation is a manifestation of His supererogation.        
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
 
 At the beginning of this project I articulated that my focus in writing this essay 
was to provide a coherent account of Divine Command ethics.  In order to accomplish 
this task I have given attention to the epistemological and metaphysical concerns that are 
part of endorsing a strong thesis regarding theistic ethics.   
 To be more specific, chapter I provided a brief history of Divine Command ethics; 
which perhaps is more appropriately to be considered a relevant history of Divine 
Command ethics.  There we surveyed the earliest and most contemporary literature on the 
subject, and offered exposition on the elements of early theological and later analytic 
arguments for endorsing a Divine Command theory.  As we noted, some have arrived at 
such a thesis from the doctrine of God’s impeccability—the idea that God cannot sin.  
Others arrived at this view arguing from the notion of God’s sovereignty—that no 
external criteria for morality may be accepted theistically because it impugns God’s 
absolute sovereign reign over all that exists, including the moral order of the actual 
world.  And yet others find more promising analogical arguments for Divine Commands 
in that we may derive from God as First Cause a related supposition of God as First 
Good. 
 Going back to the Reformation, we considered the arguments from John Calvin 
and Martin Luther that Divine Command theory provides the most coherent ethical 
framework from a biblical perspective.  From the premise that “laws imply a lawmaker” 
a theological construct was offered to account for the necessity of God’s commands to 
elicit obedience from human agents.  As Calvin and Luther argued, violation of any 
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command (Divine) was sufficient to warrant judgment; their theological construction of 
commands to the Fall, the Fall to original sin, original sin to Divine judgment, eventually 
necessitated (from a literal hermeneutic) the controversial doctrines of predestination and 
election.   
 The contemporary literature has centered on the relationship of God’s will to His 
commands.  In this debate we noted that some have seen a difference between the content 
of God’s will and His commands.  The example of Abraham and Isaac drew this 
distinction out, for it seems that God commanded something (the death of Isaac) that He 
did not will.  We highlighted what we called the Divine Will formula (DW), proponents 
of which include Philip Quinn, Edward Wierenga, and Mark Murphy.  The essence of 
this view is that persons are obligated by God’s will, and not His command.  Traditional 
Divine Command theories (DC) hold that moral obligation does not obtain merely from 
what God wills (either antecedently or consequently), but as a matter of what He 
commands us to do.  For the DW proponent, the command is merely informative, for the 
DC proponent, the command is necessary for moral obligation. 
 In chapter II we considered an argument for the necessity of God to ground 
objective moral values.  There we provided a rubric for what makes values objective, and 
argued that since objectivity by definition entails that these values are independent of 
human minds and constructions, this does not entail that these values are independent of 
any mind (for instance, God’s).  Thus, we took the criteria of objectivity to have three 
necessary conditions (true, independent of our desires and beliefs, and universal) and one 
sufficient condition (these values had to be a part of the furniture of the universe).  After 
providing this foundation, we then considered the possibility of naturalistic ethics 
 141 
fulfilling these conditions for objectivity, and concluded that each view was found to be 
lacking.  We then argued how theism best accounts for objective moral values. 
 In chapter III I constructed my own account of Divine Command theory.  In order 
to do this, we first considered the positive and negative aspects of DW.  I agreed in large 
part with the writing of Mark Murphy—that God’s moral will very likely follows from 
what He antecedently wills.  We came to this conclusion because God as First Cause and 
Sustaining Cause brings about everything through His consequent will—which seems to 
violate any notion of human autonomy, and makes divine judgment seriously 
problematic.  However, I disagreed with Murphy that moral obligation obtains when God 
wills (antecedently) that an action be required.  My argument hinged on the nature of 
speech-act theory largely because both DW and DC hold that divine speech-acts have a 
role to play.  Murphy concluded that God’s speech-acts are merely informative.  I 
concluded that this means Divine speech cannot accomplish what human speech can, 
namely to place obligation on the agent to whom the speech is directed.  I then 
considered the relationship of speech-acts to another concern—God’s practical authority.  
I concluded that God’s practical authority is not in question under my view.  In fact, such 
an objection is best resolved under my view. 
 In chapter IV I considered the implications of the famous Euthyphro dilemma on 
DC ethics.  I first elaborated the nature of the dilemma in terms of its logical form, which 
enabled me to derive where it was that Socrates went wrong in his formulation.  I argued 
first that Socrates provided a false dichotomy.  That was we cannot conclude from the 
absurdity of one aspect of a disjunction is the truth of the other.  I noted that both 
logically and even in the dialogue Socrates did not address this concern.  One aspect of 
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the logical argument against Euthyphro included an appeal to the doctrine of Divine 
Simplicity.  My reason for such a postulate is that it is an underlying assumption of 
Euthyphro that the wedge of persons and properties is exact, and that at best personal 
agents are merely exemplars of already existing universals.  If we argue that God is 
simple, then no such a wedge exists.  God is pure action, as the doctrine holds.  My 
argument was not intended to be a defense of Simplicity in light of all its problems; rather 
it was to show how Simplicity provides a plausible rejoinder to the underlying 
assumption in the dialogue.  In committing myself to Simplicity, I made a strong 
commitment to theological essentialism—the idea that God’s attributes (say goodness) is 
necessary.   
 From my argument in chapter IV we elicited two major objections that provided 
the foundation of discussion in chapter V.  For in holding to essentialist language it is 
argued that the doctrine of God becomes compromised—we lose either His freedom or 
His power.  We argued that no such conclusion is warranted.  First, it is not the case that 
(holding to the model of power as “worlds-gone-otherwise”) counterfactuals entail that 
God has to perform or even will a state of affairs of logically opposite value, rather He 
can will a state of affairs of the same moral value and yet these states of affairs be 
distinct.  The logical argument fails.  Second, we argued that it is better to understand 
power in terms of God’s self-mastery or perhaps self-control rather than through 
counterfactual models of freedom.  God, as it were, it perfectly self-mastered, and it 
would defy His reason to act in a manner that is wrong.  We noted that every agent acts 
according to some perceived good.  Non-essentialist, or non-perfect-being theologians 
allow for the contingency of God’s goodness to resolve the freedom dilemma, but 
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undermine other attributes to allay its concerns (in this instance, His knowledge a la what 
He perceives to be good).  God’s omniscience guarantees that He will not be aiming 
merely at a perceived good, but what is in fact good.  The implications of a Kantian “holy 
will” took on a more robust form at that time; for what it offers is that insofar as reason 
binds the will on defective agents, God’s will and intellect are in perfect harmony with 
one another.   
 What we can derive from this is vast, a perfect starting point of which is from 
Ecclesiastes: 
 The conclusion, when all has been heard, is: fear God and keep His 
 commandments, because this applies to every person.  For God will bring every 
 act to judgment, everything which is hidden, whether it is good or evil.308   
 
But beyond this theological conclusion, I think it is safe to conclude that endorsing a 
Divine Command theory is no threat in many ways to what the natural law theorist or 
even what naturalism wants.  We do not have to liken goodness to its source—for in my 
understanding goodness supervenes on every element of the created order.  Just like the 
distinction between our understanding of properties and natural kinds, no such concern 
arises under this framework (this is to confuse the order of knowing with the order of 
being).  Admittedly, in the end many will disagree with my thesis.  For some it will be a 
matter of philosophical hurdles that just cannot be surmounted.  For others, it is because a 
view like mine cannot be endorsed in conjunction with certain other worldviews.  But 
this latter issue is not a matter of philosophical (i.e. methodological) discernment; it is a 
matter of the wedge that exists between competing presuppositions.  I do not take such an 
issue to be a threat to my thesis, for I can retrace my steps to encourage the skeptic to 
                                                 
308 See Ecclesiastes 12:13-14. 
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view its content from within, and not from without, to find the redeeming (pun intended) 
content of its message.    
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